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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation, “Between North and South: The Politics of Race in Jim Crow 
Memphis,” uses the history of Memphis, TN as a case study to argue for the role of place 
in understanding racial knowledge and politics in U.S. History.  Situated near the borders 
of the Mason-Dixon Line, I argue that Memphis should be considered neither a Southern 
nor a Northern American city, but a borderland locality. As such, the rules of racial 
hierarchy that served as the backbone of Jim Crow apartheid operated differently than in 
Deep South or Northern cities. Between 1910 and 1954, the Memphis city government 
was led by one of the most corrupt and racially oppressive political machines in 
American history, headed by notorious political boss E.H. Crump. What makes this story 
unusual however is that the machine was kept in power not only through the typical 
tactics of political patronage, the spoils system, intimidation and violence, but also 
through the explicit support of middle-class black community leaders. My dissertation 
examines key moments in the history of this strange alliance and unearths a surprising 
story that positions Memphis as a city that destabilizes conventional wisdom about the 
nature of what it has meant to be seen as “Northern” or “Southern” in American history. 
I argue that Memphis’ location has historically made it a hub or “gateway” city. This has 
allowed Memphis to be an important place not just for the importation and exportation of 
goods, but racial knowledge as well. My work emphasizes how factors such as geography 
and migration made Jim Crow Era Memphis into a city of syncretic racial politics. As a 
border city, Memphis was a place where the overt racism of the Deep South joined with 
the “polite racism” of North. For example, it was a place where black and white political 
interests could unite to run the Ku Klux Klan out of town. However, it was also a city 
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where black political opposition to white supremacy provoked swift and aggressive 
retaliation from the city government and police. Memphis was a place where the 
government promoted black achievement and individuality under the banner of 
Progressivism. And yet, black labor leader A. Phillip Randolph was barred from setting 
foot within Memphis under the threat of arrest or worse. By highlighting such 
contradictions, my dissertation contributes to recent efforts in Black Urban History and 
Black Freedom Studies to assess the role of spatiality in American history. Ultimately, I 
argue that place is a powerful enough factor to shape both the discrete and large-scale 
structures of racial hierarchies in America. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
RACIAL POLITICS IN THE CITY ON THE BLUFF 
 On Thursday, October 3, 1991, Willie Wilbert (W.W.) Herenton became the first 
African-American mayor of Memphis, Tennessee.  The mayoral race preceding his election had 
been hotly contested like no other in recent Memphis history.  Herenton, previously the 
superintendent of the Memphis school board, faced longtime white mayoral incumbent, Dick 
Hackett.  While many similar-sized urban cities with comparable African-American populations 
had elected black leaders in previous decades, the Memphis political scene remained largely as it 
had been for the past century, marred by intense racial polarization and African-American 
disenfranchisement.  
 Historically, “the city on the bluff,” as Memphis was often called, was a place where 
blacks and whites very seldom found common ground when it came to politics. This much is 
evident in the results of the 1991 mayoral election that saw Herenton squeak by Hackett by the 
most razor thin of margins. In the final election count, Herenton received 122, 596 votes 
(49.44%) to Hackett’s 122,454 (49.39%), a margin of only 142 votes.  Post-election estimates 
showed an astounding 96% of white voters breaking for Hackett, while an equally whopping 
99% of black Memphians voted for Herenton.1  Despite taking office under such auspices, 
Herenton went on to become a fairly popular mayor for the majority of his time in office, serving 
for 17 consecutive years over a period of 5 terms before finally announcing his retirement in 
2008. After Herenton’s retirement, Memphis then went on to elect yet another African-
American, A.C. Wharton, to the mayor’s office in 2009. Lingering racial tensions 
notwithstanding, the election of Herenton in 1991 marked a turning point in the Memphis 
                                                
1 Marcus Pohlmann and Michael Kirby, Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W. Herenton, 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 165-167. 
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political scene, as, historically speaking, even comparatively minor efforts at black political 
enfranchisement in 20th century Memphis had always been hotly contested affairs that were at 
times quite literal struggles of life and death. At the heart of this dissertation lies the belief that 
the specific challenges of race that still linger today in “the city on the bluff,” as Memphis is 
often called, cannot fully understood without knowledge of the historical origins of racial-
political polarization in Memphis. 
Framework and Thematic Concerns 
Conceptually speaking, “Between North and South” is a project focused on moments. 
While this dissertation does follow a more or less linear narrative from the 1920s through the 
1950s, it is less interested in simply recapping the history of this period on a point-by-point basis. 
For example, the 1910s and 1920s receive a fair amount of attention, as this was the period 
where the parameters of Memphis’ racial-political milieu were first set. By contrast, the 1930s on 
the other hand are only delved into briefly, as this was a period of relative stability in terms of 
Memphis’ racial-political power dynamic. In this way, “Between North and South” privileges 
what might be called a historically impressionistic take on racial politics in Jim Crow Memphis. 
It focuses on moments of high drama and conflict between Memphis’ black leadership 
community and the city’s white governmental power structure– moments of political 
insurrection, protest and dissent, and where the dominant social order of Memphis threatened to 
unravel if not fall apart entirely. Particular effort is made to capture the atmosphere, mood and 
emotion of these moments in Memphis’ history while situating them within a broader framework 
of spatial and racial-political theory. Thus, by tracing the increasingly contentious ways 
throughout the Jim Crow Era in which Memphis city officials and black community leaders 
interacted with one another, “Between North and South” shows how politics, oppression, 
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progress, and black activism in Memphis came to be inextricably linked in a tangled web of 
confusion. 
At the center of this dissertation stands the idea that Jim Crow Era Memphis was what 
might be called a “border” community. My use of the word border here has less to do with the 
specific geographical location of Memphis and more to do with how in a metaphorical sense 
Memphis “fits” within the traditional Southern/Northern dichotomy that historians have used to 
conceptualize the Black Freedom Struggle in American history. What I mean by this is that 
historically Memphis has been a place that has not easily sat within such boundaries. In terms of 
racial politics, the North has often been cast as a place of opportunity for African-Americans, 
standing in stark contrast to the routine disenfranchisement that circumscribed the black 
experience in the South.  
I argue here, however that Memphis, an ostensibly “Southern” city, has throughout the 
20th century been placed that blurs the line between such distinctions. In Memphis, 
disenfranchisement often came in the guise of freedom and opportunity. In this way Memphis 
has been a city of contradictions - a city stuck “between North and South.” As such, Memphis 
was a place where the overt racism of the Deep South joined with the “polite racism” of North. 
For example, Memphis was a city where even under the thumb of Jim Crow apartheid, blacks 
had the right to vote. Yet such enfranchisement came at the cost of political autonomy, as their 
voting choices were circumscribed through the machinations of white governmental paternalism. 
Memphis was a place where black and white political interests could unite to run the Ku Klux 
Klan out of town. However, it was also a city where black political opposition to white 
supremacy provoked swift and aggressive retaliation from the city government and police. 
Memphis was a place where the white city government promoted black achievement and racial 
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harmony under the banner of Progressivism. However, black labor leader A. Phillip Randolph 
was barred from setting foot within Memphis under the threat of arrest or worse. By uncovering 
the factors undergirding such contradictions, “Between North and South” contributes to recent 
efforts in Black Urban History and Black Freedom Studies to assess the role of spatiality in 
American history.  
Historians Kenneth W. Goings and Gerald L. Smith have theorized about what they call 
the “unhidden transcripts” of racial politics in Jim Crow Memphis These transcripts or rules 
consisted of (1.) “overt attempts [by white Memphians] to control an African-American 
community that seemed to not know its place,” (2.)  “a large and ever increasing [black] 
population base that helped to bolster the assertiveness of Memphis African Americans,” (3.) the 
fact that “city officials as well as police officers were involved overtly or covertly” in attacks on 
Memphis’ black community, and (4.) the fact that Memphis black community “continued to 
grow and assert itself” regardless of organized oppression and violence. Goings and Smith frame 
these “unhidden transcripts” as the primary factors which shaped the nature of black resistance to 
white abuse and authority.  Both historians are right to argue for the salience of these ideas as 
such, but they neglect to account for the fact that blacks in Jim Crow Memphis but also chose to 
cooperate with white authority as a tactical method of pursuing political enfranchisement.2 
Taking this into account, there are three themes or transcripts about racial politics in Memphis 
upon which this dissertation is built. The first of these deals with unspoken agreements about 
race in Jim Crow Memphis. “There are just certain ways of going about doing things in 
Memphis” is a common refrain among both blacks and whites in this dissertation. Those “certain 
things” most often came in the form of racialized hidden transcripts that dictated the terms of 
                                                
2 Kenneth W. Goings and Gerald L. Smith, “ Unhidden Transcripts: Memphis and African American Agency, 1862-
1920,” Journal of Urban History, March 1995, 375-376. 
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cross-racial interactions. These particularities alone do not make Memphis unique for its time. 
More or less every city in Jim Crow America can be said to have had its own “certain ways” of 
negotiating issues of race and racial knowledge. However, there are two things that make 
Memphis stand out in this regard. First, there is the vehemence with which this refrain was used 
in public discourse to self-distinguish Memphis from cities in both the North and the South. 
Next, there was also the unusual fact that both black and white Memphians called upon this idea 
of unspoken agreements in support of their own individual agendas. Both black and white 
Memphians often made use of such hidden transcripts often in an effort to marginalize or shut 
down entirely those with opposing viewpoints and who sought to disrupt the racial status quo in 
Memphis.  As will be shown, there were penalties doled out by both the city’s white power 
structure and black community leaders against those who (sometimes, quite literally) stepped 
outside the boundaries set in place by shared ideas of how things “just are” or “are supposed to 
be” in Memphis.  
The second idea running through “Between North and South” revolves around the 
particularities of black-white coalition politics in Memphis. Specifically, I highlight the unique 
struggles and challenges presented within a city such as Memphis; a place that was paradoxically 
bound by traditional Southern mores of racial interaction at the same time as black and white 
leaders billed it as a “Progressive” city where both races could stand together with common 
goals and values. This dichotomy simultaneously led middle-class black community leaders and 
the white city government to form strategically beneficial alliances that nevertheless always 
filled with antipathy and constantly stood on the verge of total collapse owing to divided 
priorities and agendas between and within both leadership structures. 
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 The third thematic concern of this dissertation deals with the notion of insiders and 
outsiders. In other words, I expose how black and white Memphians involved in the Memphis 
political scene constructed the idea “who “belonged” in Memphis and who did not – who was 
“one of us” and who was “one of them.” These were ideas that were shaped in large part by the 
previous two points. As was determined and enforced by both Memphis’ black and white 
leadership, “insiders” were those who chose to abide by the rules set in place by the 
aforementioned unspoken agreements. “Outsiders,” in short, were those who did not and brought 
in “outside” ideas contrary to the unique way of doing things in Memphis. Thus, the “them” or 
“outsiders” in this case was not purely a matter of one’s birthplace or place of residence. Rather a 
key point was that anyone, black or white, at any time could be labeled as an “outsider.” Not just 
a rhetorical term of derision, this label carried with a number of consequences ranging from 
social and political ostracization to being run out of town (an occurrence that happened 
surprisingly often) to outright violence. Again, it is important to emphasize that not only could 
anyone be considered an outsider regardless of race or residence, but also that the labeling of 
such individuals was often a cross-racial effort as well, a facet of racial politics in Jim Crow 
Memphis that created frequent intra-racial discord amongst both blacks and whites.  
Historiography Part One: Race and the City 
In writing “Between North and South,” I attempt to situate Memphis within a broader 
historiographical dialogue concerning black urban history, specifically on the topics of racial 
politics and spatiality. Within recent decades, there has been growing awareness of the 
importance of spatiality to the black urban experience. Black urban historians have in recent 
decades begun to sense a disconnect between how historians traditionally constructed the idea of 
place in narrative form and how historical actors themselves have constructed such an idea in 
 7 
terms of lived experience. This notion was particularly important when it came to notions of 
“North” and “South,” terms which have stood for geographical location, but which also have 
become a type of shorthand by historians to discuss specific notions about race in 20th century 
American history, i.e. “A Southern way of doing things,” or “A Northern way of doings things.”  
 Over the past 20 years or so, a trend has emerged of historians making a concerted effort 
to deconstruct such easy ideas about the supposed divide between North and South. Historian 
Thomas Sugrue, for example, has written that when it comes to studying and writing about the 
black freedom struggle, a degree of spatial awareness “greatly complicates our understanding of 
the underlying causes of racial inequality, the creative strategies black and white activists 
deployed to challenge it, and the obstacles they faced.”3  The earliest works in this movement for 
spatial awareness focused largely on simply incorporating the North into the discourse of the 
black experience in America. Thus, in various ways, they all tended to make the case that 
Northern cities were not, as previously thought, ancillary to the narrative of black life in America 
vis-à-vis the concepts of “freedom” and “unfreedom.”  
 These historians meticulously made the case that Northern sites of racial struggle were 
just as dynamic and historically significant as their Southern counterparts were in terms of how 
issues of racial knowledge, political economy, access to the voting ballot, interracial cooperation 
and intra-racial conflict played a part in shaping the narrative of black rights. For example, 
Sugrue’s monograph, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
North, is a book that maps out the Civil Rights Movement as it occurred over a stretch of time 
that reaches more broadly than traditional boundaries in terms of both periodization and 
geography, showing how Northern cities, traditionally seen as being outside the purview of Civil 
                                                
3 Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random 
House, 2009), xx. 
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Rights history, played an active role in shaping the contours of the movement. While the idea of 
“the North” in and of itself is perhaps still a simplification, for Sugrue’s purposes, he focuses on 
states where “the battle for racial equality . . . played out with special intensity,” places such as 
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.”4 Sugrue furthermore 
argues that “the history of civil rights activism is inseparable from that of national level political 
and economic history.” In that sense then, it follows that to wall off black urban history into 
rigidly discrete areas of study/ideology does violence to the inherent dynamism and 
connectedness of the black urban experience.5  
 Following along in Sugrue’s footsteps is Kimberly Phillips study, Alabama North: 
African American Migrants, Community and Working Class Activism in Cleveland, 1915-1945, 
(1999) In her monograph, Phillips seeks to document what she refers to as “the synthesis of 
southern and northern black experiences that converged in Cleveland, Ohio, during the first half 
of the 20th century,” rooted in black migration across from Southern to Northern states and vice-
versa.6   During the early to mid-20th century, countless numbers of Southern blacks migrated 
North in search of better social and work-related opportunities.  According to Phillips, as one of 
the major destinations of these southern migrants, Cleveland, or “AlabamaNorth” as new 
residents soon began referring to it, serves as a microcosm for understanding the public and 
                                                
4 Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, xxvii 
5 Sugrue would later follow up on a few of these ideas in his article “Northern Lights: The Black Freedom Struggle 
Outside the South.”  Here he writes that traditional historiography tends posit the North as being relevant to the 
Black Freedom Struggle only so much as it was a site where the movement lost its non-violent roots and 
disintegrated into in-fighting and militantly aggressive ideologies of racial empowerment that were 
counterproductive to the effort made in the South by the Civil Rights Movement’s “leaders.” Recent scholarship 
however, he goes on, has begun to challenge the Southern-oriented approach to telling this history, arguing both for 
a longer narrative of the Civil Rights Movement and one which sees Northern cities are key to that very narrative. In 
this way, Sugrue draws a few different line of demarcation between Southern and Northern cities, the first of which 
is based on black access to the voting ballot and the second of which revolves around black resistance to white 
oppression in the North usually being self-organized as opposed to efforts in the South that often relied upon white 
allies in the form of clergy and interracial activist organizations. 
6 Kimberley L. Phillips, AlabamaNorth: African-American Migrants, Community, and Working-Class Activism in 
Cleveland, 1915-45, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 2. 
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private dynamics of making such a move.  Shunned socially by white racists and northern black 
elites, and also excluded work-wise from all but the most menial of laborious tasks, Phillips 
argues that black migrants made use of the various socio-cultural tools that they brought with 
them from the South to make life livable in a way that fit their specific needs. They, as Phillips 
asserts, “drew on a variety of cultural and organizational experiences and beliefs created in the 
South” and in the process “established complex networks of kin and friends and infused the city 
with a highly visible southern African-American culture.”7  
 Matthew J. Countryman makes similar arguments in his book Up South: Civil Rights and 
Black Power in Philadelphia.” He makes the argument that “racism was never just a southern 
problem. Nor were civil rights activists ever solely concerned with solving southern variants of 
racial segregation and inequality.”8 Countryman writes, “the modern civil rights movement was 
as much a product of the black experience of racial oppression in the urban North as it was of life 
in the segregated South.”9 However, he makes sure to note that there were also key differences in 
the shape of civil rights activism in the North and its Southern counterpart. Notably, Northern 
civil rights activism often constituted a critique of liberal and policies for paying mere lip service 
to black rights. As a result of this critique being a core part of the Northern movement, Northern 
black activism often shunned such hallmarks of Southern civil rights activism as seeking change 
through legislative fiats, interracial coalition building and intra-racial respectability policing.”10 
“Racial oppression,” Countryman writes, “was of course not the same in Philadelphia as it was 
‘Down South.’ Both the forces of racial domination – and the means they used against black 
                                                
7 Phillips, AlabamaNorth, 3. 
8 Matthew Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 3-4. 
9 Countryman, Up South, 4. 
10 Countryman, Up South, 6. 
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people – were different than those faced by African Americans in the South. But to live “Up 
South” was to confront structures of racial inequality and exclusion on a daily basis.”11   
 As another point of reference, there is Davarian Baldwin’s Chicago’s New Negroes: 
Modernity, the Great Migration, and Black Urban Life. In this study, Baldwin attempts to expand 
the idea of what it meant to be part of the “New Negro Movement” in the early 20th century 
from a perspective that solely privileges intellectual activism to a view, which takes into account 
the political economy, and “mass consumer marketplace” of black urban existence.12 In 
Baldwin’s view, the city of Chicago is a worthy site for examining this thesis because of its 
history as both a major hub of black migration from the South and as a city with strong ties to 
industrial production and consumption.13 Baldwin looks at how these two aspects of Chicago’s 
history manifested in black consumption of sports, fashion, and film. Through examples such as 
these, Baldwin is able to show that black consumer culture and black intellectual activism are not 
opposed to one another.14 In fact, Baldwin argues that the black urban experience of the interwar 
period can only be reconstructed through a reconciliation of each of these components.   
 
 
                                                
11 Countryman, Up South, 10.; Also worth mentioning is Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the 
South, 1940-1980, edited by Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard. This is a collection of essays that 
collectively challenge the traditional narrative of Civil Rights that draws a line between the “real” movement in the 
South and the abnormality of Northern racism, black power and movement activity post-1965. They write in their 
introduction, “by shielding Northern segregation and the economic and social disenfranchisement of people of color 
from full examination, these formulations naturalize the Northern racial order as not a racial system like the South’s 
but one operating on class and culture with racial discrimination as a byproduct.” A more geographically aware 
history of Civil Rights, they argue, reveals a movement that was more than just a struggle for the right to vote. It was 
a struggle for economic rights as well. Moreover such an approach rebukes the notion of a black “underclass” 
responsible for their own poverty by revealing the extent that structural racism in the urban North held people of 
color back.  Ultimately they conclude exclusively Southern histories “take a national struggle challenging the 
politics and economics of race in the United States and pigeonhole it as a heroic triumph over Southern 
backwardness between 1954 and 1965.”  
12 Davarian Baldwin, Chicago’s New Negroes: Modernity, the Great Migration and Black Urban Life, (University 
of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill),  5. 
13 Baldwin, Chicago’s New Negroes, 6-7. 
14 Baldwin, Chicago’s New Negroes, 19.  
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Historiography Part Two: Tales From the Borderlands 
 Historians like those mentioned above have made great strides in bringing added 
complexity to black urban history. However, a case can still be made for certain shortcomings in 
their approach. For example, in trying so hard to emphasize the importance of the North to the 
black urban experience, what might be referred to as the old Southern exceptionalism of black 
urban history has simply been replaced with an equally problematic kind of Northern 
exceptionalism.  Along with this, few have taken the time to theorize about the role of places that 
for various reasons might not fit into either the Northern-focused or Southern-focused paradigm. 
What of places that might be said to lie “in-between” North and South? What do their 
peculiarities and similarities to other locations add to the dialogue concerning the black urban 
experience? Moreover, within this dialogue, how do we as historians of the black urban 
experience avoid distorting or marginalizing such urban localities and the people who have 
inhabited them?  
  In recent years, a small, but growing contingent of historians have begun trying to 
answer just those sorts of questions. They have begun telling the stories of what might be called 
inter-regional localities, or, simply put, borderlands. As one historian has written, “a border can 
be understood not just as a dividing line but as a space where people, ideas, and experiences 
overlap and where differences blur.”15  Here it is important to note than when black urban 
historians speak of “border” cities, it is not necessarily always a case of pure geographic 
location. Often, a “border” city can be labeled as such because it seems to forcibly resists the 
sometimes all too facile and rigid notions of being a either “Southern city” or a “Northern city.”  
                                                
15 Tracy K’Meyer, Civil Rights in the Gateway to the South: Louisville, Kentucky, 1945-1980 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 13. 
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 For the purposes of this dissertation, I follow the definition put forth by Tracey E. 
K’Meyer in In Civil Rights in the Gateway to the South: Louisville, Kentucky 1945 – 1980. Here 
K’Meyer identifies 5 distinct aspects of a “borderland” locality, including: 1. A fluid system of 
segregation that may or may not be codified into law but which operates on hidden transcripts 
nonetheless. 2. A varied industrial economy with unionized workforces involved in the civil 
rights activism. 3. “The visibility of white sympathizers in religious, civil, labor, and educational 
organizations.” 4. Political diversity amongst the city’s black population. 5. Atypicality in terms 
of restrictions on black access to the voting ballot. 6. A general conception amongst the local 
citizenry that they were not “Southern” or not “Northern” in the same way that similar cities 
were.”16 
 One of the most prominent examples of this burgeoning trend is Peter B. Levy’s Civil 
War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland. In this book, Levy 
focuses specifically on highlighting the importance of the city of Cambridge, Maryland to the 
narrative of black Civil Rights. In specific, Levy argues that one notable reason why Cambridge 
is worthy of study is because while it lies below the Mason-Dixon line, it is nevertheless outside 
Deep South, areas of the Southern United States that have tended to receive perhaps 
disproportionate attention in studying the black experience. At first, this appears to be much the 
same as the other historians above seeking simply to add Northern voices to the discussion of 
black urban history and civil rights, however, Levy goes a step further by arguing for Cambridge 
as a border city not entirely Northern or Southern. He writes, “While recent studies have begun 
to paint a more sophisticated picture of the movement, orthodox histories of the movement, 
which are the ones most people are likely to know, have divided the United States into neat 
                                                
16 K’Meyer, Civil Rights in the Gateway to the South, 5, 7-9, 11. 
 13 
geographical categories, the North and the South, and have largely left unexplored the civil rights 
movement that erupted in the border states, in communities that were neither northern nor 
southern, but a combination of both.”17  
 In Levy’s view, then, this is an idea which disrupts the popular narrative of black civil 
rights by showing that, if one takes into account locality, one can easily see that “The goals of 
the civil rights movement were not universal, and local varieties and priorities and possibilities 
governed definitions of civil rights and strategies to achieve them.”18 He goes on to say, “This 
study suggest that no single paradigm explains the civil rights movement or white backlash.” 
Moreover, “the civil rights movement was not neat geographically, chronologically, or 
ideologically. Its victories and defeats were not as dramatic or complete as they have often been 
portrayed.”19  I take this to mean, that in other words, there is room for and perhaps even a need 
for a middle area of conflict and triumph in these discussions. The focus on only the extremes 
distorts what in many ways can be seen as the crux of the black urban experience, the day-to-day 
struggles of everyday life, things that for lack of a better word seem, normal and not 
extraordinary. 
 Two further important and influential examples of racial borderlands studies are Black 
Liberation in the Midwest and Grassroots at the Gateway, by Kenneth S. Jolly and Clarence 
Lang, respectively. Both take as their focus the city of St. Louis Missouri and attempt to shed 
light on why its status as a borderland locality matters within the context of black urban history. 
For Jolly, in looking at St. Louis, he wants to redirect the traditional focus of the civil rights 
movement from the Deep South, but also provide a counterpoint to studies that have begun to 
                                                
17 Peter Levy, Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2003), 7. 
18 Levy, Civil War on Race Street, 7. 
19 Levy, Civil War on Race Street, 184. 
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place equally too much emphasis on the North as opposed to the Midwest. Both the traditional 
North and South-focused approaches, Jolly argues, miss the nuance of both Civil Rights and 
Black Power as they occurred in border regions, where such movements had their own unique 
setups with regards to issues of race, class and gender.20 St. Louis, in particular, as a border city 
needs study because of what Jolly calls its “unique tradition of segregation and discrimination 
throughout the early and mid-twentieth century.” A tradition where the boundaries of race were 
unevenly set by a combination of de jure and de facto practices, versus one over the other.21  
 For Lang, on the other hand, the conversation is at its core one about class and its effects 
on the black urban experience in St. Louis. Lang wants to not just put class back at the center of 
the discussion, but change the very way in which we as historians talk about how class is a 
central component of the black freedom struggle. He wants to emphasize what he refers to the 
“collective and institutional” nature of class-based organizing within black communities, in other 
words emphasizing the ways in which such efforts were an intellectually purposeful process.22  
Lang talks about the unevenness of the proscriptions of Jim Crow in border cities like St. Louis. 
This in turn, along with the city’s unique blend of demographics from various immigrant and 
religious populations, owing to its location along the Mississippi river as a “gateway” city 
created an environment not typical of Deep South cities, wherein blacks were largely excluded 
from skilled, constructive labor positions and thusly were more collected in clerical and semi-
professional jobs.23 Within a “geographically interstitial” city such as St. Louis, Lang argues that 
more often than not Jim Crow operated under the guise of “polite racism,” a system that 
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“reinforced black subordination under the guise of cooperation, goodwill, and public voluntarism 
among black and white professionals and elites.” Furthermore, within this system, overt racial 
conflict when it arose was attributed lower class or “common” individuals who sought to disrupt 
the otherwise “friendly” race-relations carefully constructed and held together by the city’s white 
and black elites.24 Lang furthermore emphasizes how black elites in St. Louis were able to “insist 
on many of the terms of their subordination” in return for playing the game of “peaceful” race 
relations and “assum[ing] responsibility for managing the behavior of the black laboring 
majority.”25  
 One final study worth mentioning is Kerry Pimblott’s recent dissertation from the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Soul Power: The Black Church and the Black 
Power Movement in Cairo, Illinois, 1969-74. By focusing on the small border city of Cairo, 
Illinois, Pimblott primarily seeks to rectify the thought that the emergence of the Black Power 
movement in the late 60s was in any way incongruous with the black Christian origins and 
underpinnings of the earlier Civil Rights Movement proper and black activism in general.  
In particular, Pimblott argues that far from shirking their Christian beliefs in favor of a more 
“aggressive” stance on black liberation and resistance, devout black activists on adapted their 
beliefs to support the tenets of Black Power at the same time as they modified the core beliefs 
and methods of Black Power to fit within a black Christian framework. She writes, “While the 
changing political and economic realities of the Black Power era were disruptive to the dominant 
Civil Rights ideology and coalition, Soul Power demonstrates that Black religious discourses and 
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institutions continued to provide the basis for a coherent movement culture, unifying ideology, 
and renewed access to the Black church’s tremendous organizational resources.”26  
 As far as racial borderlands studies goes, Pimblott argues that Cairo’s border location 
produced “a seemingly contradictory amalgamation of racial practices and customs,” which 
alternately provided accepted space for black activists to organize and air their grievances but 
which simultaneously prompted a “gradualist” approach to black liberation for fear of upsetting 
the delicate balance of racial politics in Cairo. Pimblott uses this dichotomy as a jumping off 
point to argue not that the distinctions of “North” and “South” in black urban history are entirely 
collapsible and do not matter, nor to argue that one supersedes the other in terms of importance 
to understanding the narrative of black civil rights, but to make the case that the only way to 
truly understand the black experience it is to understand it within the context of geo-location and 
the ideas, opportunities and experiences proffered by such.27  
   As we see by the above examples, there are a wide variety of applications for thinking 
about the black urban experience in terms of geographical and racialized borders. It is with this 
burgeoning historiography as context that I make the case that Memphis was not a traditional 
Southern city in the ways that such an idea are often understood and that there is historical utility 
in understanding Jim Crow Era Memphis as a border city. Where I differ from the above 
historians is in my idea of what can constitute a borderland community. While Memphis’ 
geographical location near the Mason-Dixon line would qualify it as such using the guidelines 
the above historians have used, my own definition of a border city is more expansive than this. 
My idea of a border city takes into account not just physical geography, but what I will term 
“ideological geography” as well. By ideological geography, I mean the confluence of political 
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ideas and racial knowledge that set the rules by which historical actors operate. What this 
dissertation shows is that cities like Memphis remind us as historians that the often-arbitrary 
boundaries that demarcate “place” are not impermeable walls that keep ideas about race and 
politics in or out. Rather, the boundaries of place serve more as a meeting ground for such ideas 
to co-mingle in often unexpected and surprising way. 
Memphis in Historical Context 
 Since its founding in 1819 by Andrew Jackson and fellow land speculator business 
partners, John Overton and James Winchester, Memphis’s economic success and population 
growth have always been closely linked to two things: slavery and cotton production.28  Its fertile 
soil and location midway up the Mississippi River made Memphis a perfect hub city in terms of 
commerce. Prior to the Civil War, 3/4ths of America’s cotton was grown and harvested in the 
Memphis area, while Memphis’ location river allowed the cotton to be shipped across the 
country cheaply and relatively quickly. All of this helped to make Memphis one of the most 
important economic centers of the country before and after the turn of the century.29  
 At the same time, however, such massive cotton production called for similarly massive 
workforce to harvest it. Therefore, through much of the 19th century, Memphis was home one of 
the largest slave markets in the South in the Antebellum Era.30 Even after the Civil War and the 
abolishment of slavery, blacks made up nearly 40% of Memphis’ population after, numbering at 
almost 16,000 by 1870.31 All of this not only factored into Memphis’ aforementioned ability to 
flourish economically, but also as historian Michael Honey has argued, specifically linked white 
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economic success in the Memphis area with the exploitation of plentiful and cheap black labor.32 
Even well into the 20th century, this is an idea that would remain influential in shaping the 
nature of racial knowledge and racial politics in Memphis. 
 After the Civil War, Memphis saw a massive influx of black migrants moving north in 
search of better opportunities than they would have further down in the Deep South.  Memphis’ 
sizable black population was mostly limited by custom to residing in the so-called “Negro 
quarters” of the city, centered on and around the famed Beale Street area. Nevertheless, because 
of both the nature of the domestic jobs blacks were often limited and also a post-war uptick in 
white immigration, black Memphians were never entirely separated from their white 
counterparts. Indeed, the Negro quarters of the city also tended to be the only areas of town 
where poor immigrants were able to find housing. However, such close proximity between 
blacks and white immigrants tended to only breed resentment between each group, as they both 
struggled to cope with substandard, dilapidated and unsanitary living conditions, rising crime 
rates, widespread poverty, while at the same time competed with each other for the same types of 
jobs. This racial animosity in turn led to frequent acts of violence between the two groups 
culminating in Memphis being the site of one of the most violent and bloodiest Southern race 
riots in the post-bellum period.33  
 The initial situation that set off the race riot in April of 1866 was an altercation between 
handful of black civil war veterans and white Memphis police after the soldier took umbrage and 
resisted orders from the officers that they moves off of the sidewalk to let the police pass. The 
relatively minor scuffle in which no one was seriously injured nevertheless turned escalated into 
a full-blown pogrom on the Negro quarters in South Memphis involving police and other white 
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Memphians out to repay black Memphis for the slight and minor injuries a few of the officers 
received. Considering the police force at the time was nearly completely made up of Irish 
Immigrants, (163 out of 180 officers), the scuffle tapped into longstanding racial tensions and 
escalated into a 3 day assault on Memphis’ black community.34 The end result was 46 dead black 
Memphians, 2 dead whites, dozens of severe injuries, reports of mass larceny and the rape of 
several black women. Moreover, dozens of black homes, businesses, schools and churches were 
burned to the ground.35 Property damage was estimated at more than $100,000.36 Local 
newspapers, however, brushed the affair off as a simple “nigger riot” and city went on about its 
daily business as if nothing of importance had occurred.37 
 Another defining incident that left a lasting mark not only on Memphis’ but its black 
population was a severe outbreak of yellow fever that occurred in 1878. Highly unsanitary 
conditions throughout the city, rife with inefficient disposal of garbage and human waste, made 
Memphis a perfect breeding ground for mosquitoes carrying deadly Yellow Fever.38 Thousands 
of Memphians black and white died as the epidemic lingered throughout the summer into the fall 
of that year, and over 25,000 mostly white Memphians, fled the city, many never to return. Many 
blacks lacking the resources to get away were left to stay and fend for themselves. While this 
resulted in mass casualties of both races, it also further shifted the racial population balance in 
Memphis once the outbreak had ended.39 After the epidemic ended, blacks comprised just nearly 
half of Memphis’ remaining population.40 
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 While, compared to many other Southern cities, Memphis had been largely able to 
survive the Civil War unscathed in terms of infrastructure damage, compared to many other 
Southern cities, a fact which helped it to maintain economic and population growth at a rapid 
clip, Memphis was still very much plagued by debt occurred during the war well into the 1870’s. 
The massive amount of money Memphis owned, adding up to about $3.5 million, brought the 
city to the edge of bankruptcy.41 This, along with the fact that so much of the city’s population 
had died or left, cutting the city’s tax base dramatically, led to the city’s charter was repealed by 
the state of Tennessee in 1879, turning Memphis into just a “taxing district.”42 The significance 
of this in terms of the city’s governmental infrastructure meant that Memphis was now in 
practice governed by two commissions, presiding over, respectively, Fire/Police and Public 
Works.43 It took Memphis until 1900 to regain its city charter, with a population of over 100,000 
at the turn of the century.44  Black Memphians still managed to make up nearly half of the city’s 
population at 44%. At the time, most black males servings as laborers in the cotton industry, and 
most black women working as servants of various stripes for the wealthier of the city’s white 
population.45  
 Early 1900s Memphis, it should be noted, was a city that held on tightly to its legacy of 
white supremacy and the “lost cause” narrative. In 1905, the same year that Memphis moved to a 
commission style of government, a monument to confederate general and Ku Klux Klan founder 
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Nathan Bedford Forrest depicting Forrest sitting atop his horse was erected. Both Forrest and his 
wife were re-interred underneath the statue in ceremony that brought attendants from all around 
the south. Just a few years later, Confederate Park was dedicated to the legacy of the confederacy 
and Jefferson Davis.46 
 At the turn of the century, while blacks were still relegated largely to areas around Beale 
St. Orange Mound, Hollywood and Binghampton, effectively cordoned off from wealthier 
whites, owing to what historian Laurie Green refers to as an enduring “plantation mentality” 
amongst Memphis’ white population, racial violence against black Memphians remained a daily 
threat.47 Black anti-lynching crusader Ida B. Wells was run out of town under the threat of death 
for criticizing institutional white supremacy in Memphis in the 1880s.48 Thirty years later 
however, much cannot be said to have changed in terms of the violence black Memphians were 
often subject to, with two of the most infamous cases occurring in 1912 and 1916 respectively. In 
the first, a white saloon owner named “Will Bill” Latura shot and killed 6 blacks in an 
unprovoked attack inside of a black bar, but was easily acquitted. In the second case, Ell 
(sometimes spelled Eli) Persons, a black logger, was arrested on suspicion of raping and 
murdering a 16-year-old white girl, Antoinette Rappel, who had disappeared while riding her 
bicycle to her uncle's dairy farm.49  
 Persons, who just so happened to live in the vicinity of the murder scene was arrested 
after it was discovered by police conducting searches of nearby homes for missing axes that 
Persons, a woodcutter, did not have an axe in his tool shed.  After being held in police custody 
for 24 hours, Persons reportedly confessed in full to the murder of Antoinette Rappel although 
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Persons would later proclaim his innocence of all charges.  Despite the contested nature of his 
supposed confession, however, Persons was further damned by the use of what local authorities 
called a new experimental procedure in which the eyes of the deceased could be photographed 
and reveal the final image that person saw in his/her final moments before death.  Rappel's body 
was exhumed to undergo this procedure, and according to Memphis police and local media, upon 
close inspection of photographs taken of her pupils, the forehead and hair of Ell Persons were 
clearly visible.50   
 Despite the obvious speciousness of these findings, after this report became public, the 
outcome of the case was all but a foregone conclusion.  Persons was indicted on the charge of 
murder in the first degree by a grand jury and in a matter of days, after a number of failed 
attempt to actually find where Persons was being held, Persons was broken out of police custody 
by a mob of Memphis citizens.  The following day, May 22, one local newspaper ran the 
headline: “MOB CAPTURES SLAYER OF THE RAPPEL GIRL; Ell Persons to be Lynched 
Near Scene of Murder; MAY RESORT TO BURNING.”51 
That morning a crowd of thousands turned out in a wooded area near the area where 
Rappel's body was found to take in the spectacle, many of whom had camped out in rainy 
conditions overnight in hopes of getting a front row spot.  The crowd included men, women, and 
children, and most notably members of the Memphis Police Force who were ostensibly there to 
keep order.  After a few words from the mother of Antoinette Rappel, Person's body was tied to a 
log, doused in gasoline and set ablaze.  Persons reportedly did not cry out causing a great furor 
throughout the crowd.  Post-mortem, his ears were cut off.  His heart was cut out, and in what 
must have been seen as eye for an eye justice, he was subsequently beheaded.  Later on that day, 
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Person's head and foot were dumped out of a passing car onto Beale St., Memphis' noted black 
gathering place, in front of a horrified crowd of black onlookers with shouts of “Take this with 
our compliments.”  Vendors offering sandwiches, gum, and bottled drinks later reported robust 
sales at Persons' execution.52  
 While cases such as Persons were certainly the most dramatic examples of prejudice and 
outright hatred of blacks in Memphis, such prejudice in the early 20th century Memphis also 
manifested itself in terms of labor as well. As Michael Honey writes, in terms of labor battles, 
Memphis was “an arena of struggle over the meaning of freedom.”53 He points out that there is a 
long history throughout the 20th century of white prejudice against blacks, and fear of blacks 
ever being seen as the equal of whites in terms of labor, income and social standing, was 
instrumental in the depressing and devaluing of skilled black labor as white unions fought tooth 
and nail, often through violent means, to exclude black laborers from joining them, despite 
blacks making up a significant portion of the skilled labor force as a whole in Memphis.54 The 
consequences of this, as Honey posits, were such that “without the right to organize, neither 
African Americans nor workers as a group could change their conditions, and that right could not 
be gained without seriously undermining the segregation system”55  
Focus and Chapter Structure 
 By the time the focus of this dissertation picks up in the early 20th century, Memphis 
already possessed a history that was very much fraught with unresolved and barely concealed 
racial conflict.  It is here that we get to the crux of the story that this dissertation focuses on. 
Memphis’ government was for decades consolidated under the auspices of city mayor and 
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nationally known political boss Edward Hull (E.H.) Crump. For all of his time in power Crump 
managed to stand not only at the center of the Memphis governmental scene but also at the 
center of racial politics in Memphis as well. Crump’s connections with what I am arguing at the 
time was a burgeoning population of black leaders and political activists in Jim Crow Memphis 
necessitate placing him and his interactions with Memphis’s black community at the center of 
this dissertation’s narrative, as for better or worse, the politics of how race operated in Jim Crow 
Era Memphis all seemed to run through the Crump regime at one point or another. Thus, this 
dissertation uses key moments in the tumultuous relationship between the Crump machine and 
black Memphis to tell a larger story about both the formation of racial knowledge along the 
borders of the Mason-Dixon line. While doing so, I showcase how Memphis’s position as an 
ostensibly southern city with strong Northern alters traditional understandings of race in the Jim 
Crow South.   
In an attempt to understand how and why Memphis politics, racial and otherwise, 
evolved along the path that they did, this dissertation maps out the contours of this unlikely 
coalition through 3 phases: It’s initial origins in the 1910’s and 20’s, it’s straining in the 1930’s, 
and it’s outright dissolution in the 1940’s and beyond. The results of this decades-long struggle 
for power and influence fractured Memphis’ black community along lines of race and class, 
thereby diminishing their organizing power and potential for decades, leaving the majority of 
African-Americans in Memphis without a solid organizational structure for handling the often 
racist caprices of Memphis’ white government.  Furthermore, I contend that the story of racial 
politics in Memphis during the first half of the 20th century is one of compelling necessity for 
understanding the full scope of race-based conflict in the Jim Crow South and beyond.  
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In this effort, the structure of Between North and South breaks down as follows. Chapter 
one looks at the formation of an unlikely and tenuous alliance between the Crump Political 
Machine and Black Memphis leaders in the 1910s and 1920s, solidifying under the mutual threat 
of the Ku Klux Klan in 1923. Chapter one examines the factors that forced these strange 
bedfellows into an uneasy coalition that bucked the racial status quo of the Jim Crow South and 
argues that this moment set a precedent and marked the beginning of a decades-long symbiotic 
relationship between the Crump regime and black Memphis at large, as each side believed it 
could use the strength, influence and organizing abilities of the other for personal gain.  
 Chapter two uses the story of local black hero Tom Lee as a signifier to show the ups and 
downs of this relationship throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, this chapter argues that 
Tom Lee's story serves as a revealing episode in the history of race and the politics of 
respectability in the Jim Crow South.  Defined as an ideology that insisted that African-
Americans always be conscious of their public image in order to counter pervasive stereotypes of 
their being lazy, shiftless, and morally debased, the Politics of Respectability proposed tearing 
down racial prejudices through attempts to humanize African-Americans in the public eye.  
However, using Tom Lee's story as a micro-historical vantage point, this chapter emphasizes the 
salience of remembering that, at their core, such constructed notions of black respectability 
represented a power relationship that could be used, and in fact was used in Memphis, both by 
blacks as a tool of political activism and also by white elites who made use of such ideology with 
for purposes of reinforcing white paternalism and patriarchal authority. 
 Chapter three examines a critical a breaking point in the relationship between the Crump 
machine and local black leaders in the early 1940s. As Memphis’ black population slowly began 
to drift away from the Crump Machine after decades of broken promises and condescending 
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racial promises, Crump in turn loosed hell upon any who would oppose his political authority 
and, perhaps more importantly here, his authority on matters of race in Memphis by sending 
local police to occupy businesses that either were by blacks who were politically active or that 
served as sites of black cultural production. This chapter, then, examines the divisions within 
Memphis’ black leadership community created by such tactics of paternalistic terror and argues 
that this particular moment in Memphis’ history created a deep intra-racial divide within 
Memphis’ black community that would only become more pronounced over time.  The crisis of 
conscious caused by what the press dubbed the “Memphis Reign of Terror” ultimately nullified 
the organizing powers of the black community in Memphis and forestalled any real chances at 
bringing change to Memphis’ racial status quo. 
 Chapter Four of this dissertation picks up where the events of the previous chapter leave 
off and follows the now-fractured black activist community in Memphis as it tries to pull itself 
back together by inviting A. Phillip Randolph to come to Memphis to give a speech. The effort 
to bring Randolph to town was an attempt on the part of local black leaders to put pressure on the 
Crump machine and was also meant to inspire a fresh round of political activism amongst 
Memphis’ black population.  What was unforeseen at the time was the further controversy and 
conflict that Randolph’s scheduled visit would engender not only with the political machine but 
within the very ranks of Memphis’ black leadership community as well, leading to a six-month 
long struggle to get Randolph to Memphis.  
 This chapter argues that this six-month period of both interracial and intra-racial conflict 
surrounding Randolph’s visit dramatizes two important aspects of the history of black political 
activism in Memphis. First, it reveals the ways in which competing visions of racial uplift 
amongst Memphis’ black leaders worked to impede those very efforts at such while 
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inadvertently bolstering the Crump machine’s political clout. Second, and more broadly, this 
moment in time marks the beginning of a transition in Memphis from what I argue are Jim Crow 
Era methods of activism to Civil Rights Era methods of such insofar as local Southern battles 
over race were now connected to and played out on a Northern national stage as well.  This 
transition was made manifest in a newfound impetus to bring in nationally known figures such as 
Randolph to resolve local disputes. 
 Lastly, chapter five acts as an epilogue to the above narratives, examining in turn their 
lasting impacts in Memphis throughout the Civil Rights Era and beyond.  Acting as a final word, 
this chapter challenges historians of the Jim Crow South to be bold and unafraid to break from 
traditional paradigms and methods of historical inquiry. I do so by holding up Memphis itself as 
just one example of a city that poses unique challenges and opportunities for historians to 
explore in new ways.  
 One last point worth foregrounding before moving on is that within the context of this 
dissertation I define the term “racial politics” as the dynamic interplay and struggle between 
blacks and whites in Memphis vying for influence and authority, relative to municipal, social and 
cultural benefits.  In this definition, I draw on Kevin Mumford’s book Interzones: Black/White 
Sex Districts in Chicago and New York in the Early Twentieth Century which posits race as 
being made up three core facets: “ideology, institutions and human interactions.”56 I argue that 
not only is the idea of racial politics a natural extension of this dichotomy, but I also posit that 
the interplay between the concepts of racial knowledge and racial boundaries exist as tangible 
manifestation of Mumford’s categories. Particularly in the case of racial politics in Jim Crow 
Memphis, I argue that, regardless of one’s race, one’s ability to manipulate the form and content 
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of this interplay proved itself to be one of the primary means of attaining and maintaining power 
throughout the time period that this dissertation explores. This definition of racial politics, while 
fixed someone around the intellectual and rhetorical construction of race, nevertheless privileges 
the tangible and material consequences of this covert type of racial warfare throughout reign of 
Jim Crow in Memphis. At the same time, this definition also allows room for wider implications 
outside of the singular context of race in Memphis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE DEVIL YOU KNOW 
 Of all the chaos that took place in Memphis, TN on November 4th, 1923, the bonfire may 
have been the height of it all. Ever since the polls in the city’s mayoral election opened that 
morning, the day had been full of arguments, fist fights and riot alarms ringing out across the city 
nearly nonstop. However, the apex of it all was perhaps the image of hundreds of jeering Ku 
Klux Klan members holding election officials hostage and forcing them to re-count ballots by the 
scorching heat of the massive bonfire. Taking into account all of the turmoil that had gripped 
Memphis over the previous months, the bonfire was in some respects appropriate for a city that 
set atop a powder keg of political and racial animus. 
Backing up a bit, in the fall of 1923, an unprecedented occurrence took place in the city 
of Memphis. The local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan made a play for political power and fielded 
candidates for every available political office in the city’s fall election, including most 
importantly a bid for the mayorship of Memphis.  Throughout the first years of the 1920s, the 
Klan had slowly amassed a sizeable presence in the city of Memphis, and by 1923, their 
estimated membership stood at around 10,000 strong. Yet, despite encompassing a vast cross-
section of Memphis in terms of class, education level, career type and income, the Klan’s 
presence in Memphis was not entirely without controversy. Many of the city’s leaders felt the 
Klan to be a blight on the city’s reputation, one that not only threatened the social order of 
Memphis but potentially opened the city up to outside influence as well. Tired of being treated as 
outsiders by those they felt should be naturally embracing them, the Memphis Klan began to eye 
the election seasons of 1923 as a chance to come out of the shadows and legitimize itself in the 
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public eye. They would do this by attempting a feat no less grand than the total takeover of the 
Memphis city government. 
In this chapter, I have three primary goals. First, I will map out the state of the racial-
political scene in 1920s Memphis. In doing so, I will highlight the major factions across racial 
lines that vied for power and sought to determine the direction of Memphis’ future, not just in 
terms of politics but in terms of setting the city’s agenda on issues of race throughout the Jim 
Crow Era. Second, I will detail the 1923 election campaign process itself, making the case that 
this election would be a watershed moment in the history of Memphis politics and race relations. 
The Klan’s foray into the business of city government pitted them face to face not only with a 
burgeoning class of black political activists in Memphis, but also with Memphis’ storied political 
machine headed by infamous political boss and former mayor of Memphis, Edward Hull (E.H.) 
Crump. Taking center stage in this conflict were racialized hidden transcripts that dictated the 
terms of cross-racial interactions, specifically when it came to the notion of “insiders” and 
“outsiders.” Lastly, in this chapter I will talk about how this political showdown dramatized 
Memphis’ peculiar brand of racial knowledge and hierarchy as a city on the border between 
North and South. 
 In its broadest concerns, then, this chapter uses the backdrop of this unusual series of 
events to examine the dynamics of race relations and politics in Memphis during the 1920’s. The 
unprecedented threat of Klan rule within Memphis highlights what might be termed the strange 
career of racial politics in Jim Crow Memphis.  By this, I mean to show how the process of 
political coalition building in Memphis was at once both racially progressive yet also regressive 
in ways that mark Memphis as a unique site of racial knowledge production in the Jim Crow 
South. The Klan threat to Memphis government was ultimately a temporary one, as Election Day 
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saw the Klan candidates soundly shellacked in nearly every contested race by the combined 
strength of the Crump-Paine-black Memphis coalition.  
Yet, despite the outcome of the election falling far short of the chaos it portended to 
bring, I argue that the drama of the run-up to the election itself is what matters most.  E.H. 
Crump and his political machine had relied upon the black vote in the past, but this time was 
different. Previous cross-racial political efforts were little more than temporary, ill-defined 
measures. However I argue that this election, more than any other moment, marked the 
solidification of what would become a decades-long symbiotic and often chaotic relationship 
between the Crump machine and black Memphis at large. Later chapters will chronicle the peaks 
and valleys of this relationship throughout the rest of the Jim Crow Era, their goals eventually 
evolved to become dramatically less reconcilable leading to a split not only between Crump and 
the black leadership community, but within the leadership community itself as well. It was 
ultimately this moment in 1923 however that locked these future events into place. From this 
moment on, as long as Crump remained a major player in Memphis politics, which he did until 
his death in 1954, each party in this cross-racial coalition would attempt to use the strength, 
influence and organizing abilities of the other for personal gain in a long campaign that, for 
historiographical purposes, presents Memphis as a unique site of study within the Jim Crow Era. 
As I will ultimately show in this chapter, the events that led to both the Klan being so thoroughly 
rebuffed in Jim Crow Memphis and the solidification of the Crump machine/black politico 
coalition perfectly encapsulate what made Memphis a city “between north and South” in terms of 
its ideological geography. 
  
 32 
The State of White Politics and Leadership in Memphis 
Before getting to the election itself, it is necessary to sketch out in the political 
environment within Memphis in the years preceding 1923. As a whole, the political scene in 
Memphis throughout the first half of the 20th century revolved almost entirely around one man, 
Edward Hull Crump, the city’s political boss. A transplant from rural Hollysprings, MS where he 
was born on October 2, 1875, Crump moved to Memphis at the age of 17 and started out as a 
simple bookkeeper. He eventually married into the wealthy and erudite McLean family of 
Memphis in 1902. Always one with an eye for advancing beyond his current station, Crump used 
his newfound wealth to buy out his old employers, and then made what he saw as an all-but 
natural move to politics.57 
Crump’s political career started out with relative simplicity as a member of Memphis’ 
Legislative Council.58 Over time, however, his wealth and growing connections within 
Memphis’ business community gradually led to Crump working his way up the political ladder. 
In the year 1909, Crump achieved a long-held ambition and was elected Mayor of Memphis on a 
Democratic platform of progressive reform, promising both governmental and social reforms. 
Chief amongst Crump’s goals were efforts to curb political corruption in the form of backroom 
dealings between local business leaders and city officials while also erasing Memphis’ reputation 
as a city of violence and sin. Crump’s ties with Memphis’ business community ran deep 
however, undercutting his reformist rhetoric at nearly every turn. Eventually, this unwillingness 
to turn his back on the influential business community that had helped him into office, lead to 
Crump’s embarrassing removal from the Mayoral office in 1917 at the hands of the Tennessee 
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Supreme Court.59 Crump’s active refusal to enforce prohibition laws thereby hurting many of his 
business community allies brought down the full force of the Tennessee legislature, backed by 
several legislators who never took to Crump’s personality and style of leadership. In particular, 
Crump’s repeated reliance on the votes of “gin drinking niggers,” as one opponent not so 
delicately put it, incensed many in Tennessee’s political sphere.60 
 
Figure 1- E.H. Crump, source: Commercial Appeal 
Crump, never one to fully lie down, still carried on in TN politics after his ouster from 
the Memphis Mayor’s office. Crump’s was elected to the position of Shelby County Trustee no 
less than 6 months after his ouster from the Mayor’s office. (Miller, Memphis During the 
Progressive Era, 158-177)  As others have written of Crump’s political entrenchment, the Crump 
organization established a network of grassroots democracy that wound its way from the 
individual voter a ward organization or civic club to Crump and city hall. The only price a citizen 
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had to pay was a profession of loyalty to the organization which still had to answer to the 
electorate and could be defeated if public needs were not met. However, as long as Crump had 
the basic support of the business community, and gave blacks limited access to the polls, it was 
very difficult to successfully oppose him.61  
 Here is it is important to emphasize again just how much Crump’s far-reaching political 
influence rested upon his control of the Memphis electorate. Like all big city bosses, he relied 
heavily upon patronage. An estimated 20,000 municipal and county workers, beholden to the 
machine for their jobs, could be counted on as sure Crump votes on Election Day. Similarly, the 
machine could rely upon the electoral support of thousands of black voters responding to 
Crump’s well-publicized paternalism. Crump and his machine officers initially were able to 
ascend to power in Memphis a decade earlier largely on the strength of being able to buy off the 
black vote in Memphis. While the thought of blacks voting en masse in other cities in the Jim 
Crow South was anathema, Crump was an unusual white Southern politician in that he fully 
embraced the black vote, seeing it as an untapped resource that could bolster his political 
aspirations.  
 Thus, the edge that initially put the Crump machine in power was its willingness to cater 
to black voters by such acts as the paying of poll taxes in exchange for black patronage.62 While 
in terms of policy, Crump was not particularly more racially progressive than the majority of 
other white politicians in the Jim Crow South, in this way he was able to establish an initial 
tenuous rapport with Memphis’s black community. The machine had a policy of paying the poll 
taxes for blacks, sometimes even buying them barbecue and beer; the blacks gratefully voted for 
the boss whose benign treatment of them contrasted so sharply with the indignities heaped upon 
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their race by southern white demagogues elsewhere.63  Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand that while Crump may have been elected on the strength of connections with 
Memphis’s black community, these connections were understood by both Crump and by the 
black leadership community that supported him to nevertheless still be bound by the confines of 
traditional Jim Crow South social mores.  
 Simply put, Crump’s progressivism on issues of race in Memphis went only as far the 
votes they could buy him from a voting bloc shunned by other white Southern politicians. From 
the perspective of many black Memphians, the limits of Crump’s paternalism were understood. 
And yet, by virtue of being the sole political figure in Memphis to even attempt to court and 
cultivate a black voting base, Crump’s offerings, limited and paternalistic as they were, afforded 
black Memphians entry into an otherwise restricted space where they could air their grievances 
with the Memphis political scene.  
 Thus, even with the tarnish on his “brand,” Crump held on to some semblance of his 
former power after his removal from office, even if that power did not come close to that which 
he held as Mayor.  Even after his ouster, Crump also continued to face relentless opposition in 
Memphis and throughout the state of Tennessee at large from both Republicans and anti-Crump 
Democrats.  Despite all of these events, however, Crump remained a fixture in the West 
Tennessee political arena, but at a diminished capacity with Rowlett Paine succeeding him as 
mayor, a man whom Crump had a lukewarm relationship at best.64 It wasn’t until the election of 
1923 that Crump was given the opportunity to lay claim to the title of true patriarch of Memphis 
politics, seizing on the election as a chance to return to the stage. The 1923 election provided 
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him with a chance to turn things around and not only regain his lost footing, but also to forge his 
empire anew and stronger than it ever had been in the past.65  
 The current Mayor of Memphis in 1923, Rowlett Paine was a man who built his political 
reputation in stark contrast to the machine politics and cronyism that mired the preceding Crump 
administration. Paine was not a member of Crump’s stable of politicians and city officials and 
had made it a point of pride to distance himself from and minimize Crump’s influence on his 
administration as much as possible. Paine had been a simple grocer for most of his life up until 
he ran for the mayor’s office in 1919. As such, he was able to paint himself as a complete 
outsider to the machine politics and corruption of the city’s previous decade and as a result 
handily won the 1919 election.66  
 Paine’s time in office after his election was not quite as simple, however. Because Paine 
was elected largely just by virtue of the fact that he was not E.H. Crump or affiliated with him in 
any close way, he never had a solid base of support as a politician in and of his own right. Rather 
than supporting anything intrinsic or unique about his political platform itself, his was something 
of a placeholder, which just happened to be the best option at the time.67 Voters were not so 
much sold on the idea of Paine himself but were rather sold on the idea that he was anyone but 
E.H. Crump. This lack of a firm base among the electorate would make Paine particularly 
vulnerable in future political challenges, such as with the election of 1923. 
 This was the political dichotomy in Memphis when the specter of a Klan election rout 
threatened to upend the status quo of city politics. Paine, in short, found himself desperately 
needing to make use of Crump’s longstanding connections with black voters to ensure the Klan 
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would not be able to win the day. It should be noted that after his ouster from the mayor’s office, 
Crump was not entirely without power. Nevertheless, he was marginalized to such an extent that 
he must have been more than happy to broker an arrangement between Paine and his old contacts 
within Memphis’ black community if it meant once again being able to reclaim a prominent seat 
at the table of Memphis politics. 
The State of Black Politics and Leadership in Memphis 
 As opposed to its white counterpart, black political leadership in 1920s Memphis was not 
nearly as monolithic. This is not to say, however, that certain figures within Memphis black 
leadership community did not tend stand out from the crowd more often than not. For instance, 
one simply cannot have a meaningful discussion of black leadership in Memphis without a 
discussion of the well-known Church family and its influence on black politics in Memphis. First 
and foremost, that was Robert Church Sr., a man often referred to as a “legendary” historical 
figure.68 An astute businessman, Church Sr. earned his claim to fame as one of the very first 
black millionaires in the U.S and among many other accomplishments is notable for helping 
Memphis to recover financially after losing its charter in the wake of a Yellow Fever epidemic 
and a debt crisis. Furthermore Church Sr. built a 6-acre park for Memphis blacks to use since 
they could not use the public parks in the city. So well known and respected was Church Sr. that 
even President Teddy Roosevelt paid the park a visit in 1902 to give a speech honoring Church 
and his accomplishments.69  
 Church Sr. was a famously headstrong and independent man of business but who only 
occasionally dabbled in local politics. On occasions when he did, however, he routinely butted 
heads with Boss Crump upon Crump’s initial arrival in Memphis and foray into the local 
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political scene. To Crump, in the process of building a political machine that run on purchased 
loyalty and/or forceful subjugation of other powerful voices, an independently wealthy and 
outspoken black Memphian who could not be bought or subjugated made for a natural enemy. 
While Church Sr. passed away in 1912, this political animosity between his family and the 
Crump machine remained very much alive as Church Sr.’s son, Robert R. Church Jr. took over 
ownership of his father’s business, the Solvent Savings and Trust Company, which at the time 
was one of the most successful black-owned banks in the country at the time, was passed down 
to his son, Robert R. Church Jr.70  
 While the elder Church was content to keep the political world of Memphis at mostly an 
arm’s length in favor of his own business interests, Church Jr. had exactly the opposite drive and 
built a reputation as one of the most influential black Republicans in the country.71  After 
receiving an education at Oberlin College, Church Jr. held an apprenticeship for a Wall Street 
banking firm for 5 years, returned to Memphis and immediately set about making a name for 
himself in the political arena, a battleground his father had only lightly treaded upon.72  For 
example, Church Jr. was a TN delegate at eight straight Republican conventions between 1912 
and 1940.73  Much like his father, being independently wealthy afforded Church Jr. many 
advantages in his chosen pursuits. Church Jr. often refused compensation for his political 
activities and gained a public reputation among fellow Republican, black and white as a figure of 
respectability, integrity and fully beyond reproach.74   
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 Black labor leader A. Phillip Randolph once wrote of Church Jr., “There was no person 
of color in the country whose political wisdom was more highly cherished and sought after, by 
both black and white Republican leaders, than his. The basic reason for this was that he no only 
possessed a mind for careful evaluation of political personalities and forces, but he was 
impeccably honest and could not be influenced by money or political power.”75 Randolph goes 
on, “He [Church Jr.] came from a family of wealth and distinction but he made no exhibition of 
this fact . . . To me, he was Bob, and to him, I was Phil.”76 Like, the vast majority of Church Jr.’s 
contemporaries held him in high regard for his reputation for integrity and commitment to black 
advancement. In describing Robert R. Church Jr., Lt. George W. Lee, a contemporary of Church 
Jr.’s who will be discussed in more detail later on, spoke of Church Jr. thusly,  “He is the most 
picturesque character on the avenue, and his very name has come to stimulate the imagination of 
the people, who have great confidence in him. On every occasion when he has asked for their 
votes, he has received them. As a result he has never been defeated for an office.”77 Still, despite 
all of this praise and esteem, it is Important to note that Church Jr. was not without opposition in 
his time. Memphis Republicans by and large were divided into two separate camps at the time, 
the “lily whites” who sought to keep their party exactly the same makeup as their name implies, 
and the “black and tans” who in the 20s favored a more racially open approach to politics by 
allowing a space for black figures and the proverbial meeting table and paying attention to so-
called “black issues.”78 Naturally, a man like Church Jr. often drew the ire of such “lily white” 
Republicans and often found himself waging war not only against the Democratic opposition 
party in Memphis but within his own chose party as well. Of Church’s struggles with this group, 
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Lee again writes, “For years he has been opposed by a small group of irreconcilable lily-white 
Republicans; but in every encounter with them he has emerged from the contest victorious. The 
story of his political triumph in the Republican Party is indelibly written into the party’s success 
in Tennessee and in the nation.” Lee’s perhaps hyperbole notwithstanding, as more whites in 
Memphis tended belong to the Democratic Party at the time than they did to the Republican 
party, the lily white wing was relatively easy to marginalize, as there simply were not that many 
of them. This in effect left the black and tans, with a larger domain of influence within their own 
party than in other cities.79  
 Their sphere of influence being what it was, then, Church Jr., alongside other prominent 
black businessmen in Memphis, Bert M. Roddy and Harry Pace, formed the Colored Citizens 
Association in 1911. It was an organization devoted to improving the conditions of Memphis’ 
black community by lobbying the city’s government to take a greater focus on improving black 
areas of town.80 Not content with just this Church Jr. was instrumental in the founding of a 
number of other black activist groups in the city, including the Lincoln League in 1916, and the 
first Memphis chapter of the NAACP in 1917. The Lincoln League, founded by Church Jr. along 
with Roddy, Josiah Settle, Waymon Wilkerson and Leroy McCoy, was an organization dedicated 
to helping Memphis blacks to be more politically active. They held registration drives, paid poll 
taxes and endorsed candidates for local and national offices.81 Church Jr. himself described his 
goal in founding the Lincoln League, and in pressing so hard for black progress in Memphis 
thusly, “We were simply trying to assert our Republicanism and our right under the American 
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flag to be counted as men.”82  As for the Memphis NAACP chapter, Church Jr. was again joined 
in its founding by the likes of black businessmen such as Lt. George W. Lee, Bert Roddy, and 
Waymon Wilkerson. Formed initially in response to the lynching of Ell Persons, but went on to 
advocate for black issues in Memphis beyond the political sphere, such as lynching, police 
brutality, and joblessness.83  
 As mentioned before, however, as influential and involved as the Church family was, 
they did not stand alone as the sole arbiters of black politics in Memphis. Alongside Church Jr. 
stood a slew of other black community leaders and Republican allies dedicated to improving the 
lot of Memphis’ black community writ large. Amongst this leadership there was, for instance, 
the Reverend Thomas O. Fuller, a highly respected black clergyman who exhorted black 
Memphians that to believe that peaceful cooperation with Memphis’ white power structure as the 
best method of black enfranchisement. Rev. Fuller entreated blacks to operate within the system 
and not take actions that would disturb the “peaceable conditions” between blacks and whites in 
Memphis.84 He was furthermore an advocate of black advancement through economic progress 
and achievement, not directly challenging the status quo.85  There was also the aforementioned 
Lt. George W. Lee, a WWI veteran and an insurance executive who also led the West Tennessee 
Civic and Political League. George Lee was born in Mississippi in 1984 to poor sharecroppers. 
He was one of small number of blacks to be given a commissioned rank in the military and 
served in France during WWI as second lieutenant of the 368 Negro Division. After the war, he 
settled down in Memphis to make his home and fortune as a businessman.86 Showing a high level 
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of business acumen, by 1920, Lt. Lee, as he preferred to be called, was vice-president of the 
Mississippi Life insurance company, earning what was then a near astronomical figure for a 
black businessman of $6,500 a year.87 In opposition to Fuller’s stance, Lee, on the other hand, 
had little love for what he called “apostles of peace at any price.” Lee’s solution to the “Negro 
Problem,” mirroring DuBois’ “talented tenth” argument called for a stronger black leadership 
class to guide and show lesser educated and impoverished blacks the way forward.88  
 Other highly regarded and notable black figures with deep pockets and a similarly deep 
influence amongst Memphis’s black populace included: Bert Roddy, owner of a local chain of 
grocery stores and the Martin brothers, J.B. and W.S., owners of the local negro baseball team, 
Waymon Wilkerson, a funeral director.89 J.B. Martin started out as a simple newspaper boy in the 
late 1890s for a black paper, the Evening Striker. He started a small drug store on borrowed 
money after graduating from school in 1910, and in 20 years, that store had bloomed into a 
chain, expanded to a two-story building and had become a fixture of Florida Street and the 
surrounding black neighborhood.90 In the words of Lt. Lee, J.B. Martin as “a man of considerable 
wealth, but [who] never displays it, believing that to do so would arouse jealousy and drive away 
a large number of his patrons.”  
 These figures, along with a few others, all came from diverse backgrounds in terms of 
what it was that made them leaders in Memphis’ black community. While this diversity in terms 
of each man’s claim to fame was a sign of a vibrant and active leadership, and even with all of 
their collective accomplishments, in general they still a relatively weak political coalition 
without much influence in the day-to-day politics of Memphis. The 1923 election then, presented 
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an opportunity, more starkly than any that had come before to attempt to gain a seat at the table 
by pooling their resources together and throwing their weight behind a political machine that had 
never been more vulnerable. As this chapter will argue later however, the metaphorical Faustian 
bargain that Memphis’ black leaders made with the Crump machine in this election opened the 
door to future troubles that would prove to be even more insidious than what would ultimately be 
a temporary threat from the Klan. 
Memphis and the Klan 
 As for the main antagonists of this chapter’s drama, the Ku Klux Klan first began to 
establish a significant presence in Memphis in 1921. It is nearly impossible however to discuss 
the Klan’s ties to Memphis, however, without first taking a look at one of the central figures in 
the Klan’s history, Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest. While today Forrest might be 
considered a controversial figure in Memphis, 100 years ago, he was all but canonized in the 
eyes of many white Memphians. As one author has argued, “To many, he was the quintessential 
Confederate hero, whose rough-hewn, unschooled martial style reflected the virtues of the 
southern ‘plain folk.’”91 Though born in rural Tennessee, and becoming a wealthy planter in 
Mississippi, Memphis was the place that Forrest called home and chose to ultimately settle.92 
When Forrest died in 1877, his funeral was held in Memphis and obituaries in local papers hailed 
Forrest “as a man who overcame poverty to achieve greatness as a naturally brilliant and 
spiritually minded warriors who embodied the ideals of self-sacrifice and honor,” as one 
historian has put it.93 In 1905, Forrest was celebrated in Memphis with the construction of a 20ft 
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tall bronze statue, depicting Forrest sitting regally atop his horse.94 The remains of Forrest and 
his wife were both re-interred at the foot of the statue.95 It should be noted that about half of the 
$33,000 that funded the statue came from small, individual donations from white Memphians.96 
A crowd of 30,000 flocked to see the statue’s unveiling and celebrate Forrest’ memory.97 Later 
on in the 1920s, Forrest birthday, July 13th was made into a state holiday by the Tennessee 
legislature.98  
 Of course, Forrest had a side that was less seldom brought up and/or celebrated at the 
time. Not only was Forrest immense fortune built as one of Memphis’ most prominent slave 
traders, as a Confederate general, he led a massacre against a battalion of black soldiers who 
from many accounts were on the verge of surrender.99 In some circles, for his actions during the 
Civil War, Forrest earned the name “the butcher of Fort Pillow.”100 Still, for all of these claims to 
fame, Forrest might be most well known as one of the founding fathers of the Ku Klux Klan. 
Forrest was chosen as the Klan’s first Grand Wizard in 1867, and while he left the Klan less than 
a decade later out of a sense that it was beginning to grow too large to manage, Forrest 
nevertheless remained a central figure of idolization in the eyes of the Klan rank and file.101 As 
the Klan began to make a resurgence in terms of both popularity and membership across the 
country in the early 1920s, members of the new Klan generation fondly looked back upon 
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Forrest as “a powerful symbol that combined selfless individual heroism and civic service with 
the subtle threat of racialized social control,” as one historian has put it.102   
 With Forrest’s strong connections to Memphis and the high esteem in which he was held 
by many white citizens there, it is reasonable to assume to that Klan could have expected to see a 
favorable reaction to their actions and ambitions in Memphis. To a certain extent, this was 
exactly what happened. At the same time as a larger national resurgence of the Klan was 
occurring, the Klan first began to make inroads into Memphis in 1920 and 1921. By the Spring 
of 1923, their local membership had enough members to attain charter status with the larger Klan 
organization. It was only the third such charter given out in Tennessee up to that point.103  Having 
been steadily growing in strength, by the time of the 1923 election, the Klan was estimated to 
have somewhere around 10,000 members in its Memphis chapter, known as a “Klavern.”104  
 However, as much as many Memphians looked favorably upon the Klan as defenders of a 
uniquely Southern way of life, their rapid growth of the Klan in Memphis did not go entirely 
unnoticed and without provoking some measure of ire. While the city government, initially 
mostly took a hands off approach to them as long as their activities remained within the 
boundaries of the law and were relatively quiet in terms of local sensibilities, Memphis’ print 
media did not have such a laissez-faire attitude. For much of the 1920s, local people The 
Commercial Appeal declared war with the Klan as an organization. This campaign was driven 
almost single-handedly by the paper’s editor, C.P.J. Mooney.  
 Mooney took the position that the Klan and its vigilante actions represented a grave threat 
to the rule of law in the city.  “Law and order have not yet gotten to the point where they must 
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hide behind closed doors and masked faces,” Mooney once wrote.105 These diatribes continued 
through the year and were published in tandem with a series of scathing political cartoons by 
Commercial Appeal cartoonist J.P. Alley that were very critical of Klan activities. The 
Commercial Appeal’ campaign against the Klan was so thorough, it even netted the paper a 
Pulitzer Prize in 1923 for “its courageous attitude in the publication of cartoons and the handling 
of news in reference to the operation of the Ku Klux Klan.”106  
  What is worth noting about this opposition to the Klan in Memphis, and as will be 
reflected throughout the rest of this chapter, it was not necessarily at this point a coherent 
opposition based on issues of race until the election of 1923. C.P.J. Mooney himself, as a devout 
Catholic, seemed to operate mostly out of self-interest and perhaps also a desire to not see the 
racial status quo of the city disrupted by the violent actions of outsiders. When the Klan ran for 
election in 1923, both E.H. Crump and Rowlett Paine also appear to have followed this line of 
reasoning as well in opposing the Klan. Naturally, both politicians were not exactly keen on 
losing the power that they had worked for years to attain. However, the thought of ceding power 
to those that were perceived as outsiders to Memphis and its way of life made the Klan threat all 
the more galling.  One scholar has written of the voting demographics in Memphis at the time: 
There [was] a strong case for considering the Klan in Memphis as only a slightly 
exaggerated expression of traditional southern values. The Klan was not the first 
southern political movement to express a belief in white supremacy, the 
superiority of rural values, or the need for a Christian orientation in public policy. 
These themes may have seemed self-evident to a population firmly rooted in the 
countryside of the deep South, the environment in which most Memphis citizens 
were raised. If the Klan did not seem particularly exotic or extreme, its electoral 
appeal should have been undifferentiated, attracting not a particular social fringe 
but a representative cross-section of the population.107  
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 Thus in terms of their views on race, the Klan, Crump, and Paine actually may not have 
found their views to be so far apart. White supremacy in Memphis was all but a given dichotomy 
no matter who was in charge of the city. Klan, Crump or Paine, the political culture of Memphis 
in the 20s was to intentionally obfuscate the prevailing racism of the day by 1. Saying that racism 
was a problem of the past. 2. Arguing that the only reason race even kept being an issue was 
because black in Memphis persisted in saying that it was.  As will be a recurring theme in future 
chapters, when issues of race took center stage in Memphis, as they did in 1923 with the Klan’s 
foray in politics, the predominant rhetoric used by Memphis’ white elite fell into two refrains. 
Firstly, Memphis has no race problems, and relations between the races were congenial and 
friendly. Secondly, those who insisted that race was in fact an issue in Jim Crow Memphis were 
either outsiders themselves or influenced by outsiders who threatened to bring the chaos and 
social disruption of other cities to Memphis.  
 Thus, specifically in this case, it was ultimately an insider/outsider dichotomy that 
dictated the opposition Crump and others felt to the likes of the Klan.  A Klan victory in the 
election of 1923, it was felt, would threaten to bring about the types of rioting and chaos seen in 
other American cities where racial tension was ever-present. In other words, while Klan 
activities in Memphis were largely unwelcome by the white elite establishment, they were 
mostly unwelcome not on grounds of the Klan’s racial prejudice, but on grounds regarding the 
hidden and seemingly chaotic way in which they policed race in Memphis.108  To be sure, then, 
the sin of the Klan in the eyes Memphis’ white power structure was not their racial animosity 
toward blacks and others, but rather the nakedly open way in which they promoted such beliefs. 
This, it was felt, was the sin that marked the Klan as outsiders with no understanding of racial 
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politics in Memphis and thus also necessitated the boldest of efforts to see them defeated in the 
1923 election, as the next section will detail. 
The Road to Election Day 
 When election season first rolled around in 1923, few could have foreseen the conflict 
that was to come. Initially, members of the local Klan chapter were fairly supportive of Mayor 
Rowlett Paine’s administration. Paine may not have endorsed the Klan publically, but either 
knowingly or unknowingly, quite a few members of Paine’s administration were either Klan 
members themselves or sympathetic to the Klan’s goals and rhetoric of racial and religious 
superiority. The incident that set the Klan and Paine specifically against one another occurred 
when it was publicly revealed in 1923 that one of Paine’ staffers himself was a member of the 
local Klavern. Clifford Davis, Paine’s secretary, initially announced his candidacy for city judge 
as part of Paine’s ticket in the upcoming election, however, his membership in the Klan made 
Paine wary about being tied too closely to their activities. Again, while the Klan certainly had 
their supporters in Memphis, as the fight with the Commercial Appeal revealed, there was also a 
large contingent of Memphians that were staunchly against the disorder and lawlessness they 
represented as an organization. Thus, fearing the implications of his administration now being 
openly associated with the local Klavern, Paine fired and publicly repudiated Davis.109  
 Given the sizeable Klan population in Memphis and that the idea of white supremacy was 
all but taken for granted by many in the city, that Paine felt the need to swiftly distance himself 
from being associated with Davis and the Klan reveals an unspoken agreement about race in 
Memphis. Yes, white supremacy was the law of the land in Memphis, but it was a law that in all 
but the most severe cases had to be garbed in the cloak of benign paternalism in order for things 
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to function relatively smoothly. Whether it was failure to fully appreciate and understand this 
dichotomy, or willful disregard for it, the flamboyancy of the Klan’s racism could not be 
tolerated in the political sphere.  
 
Figure 2 - campaign ad, source: Commercial Appeal 
 This act of repudiation on the part of the Paine administration, however, would end up 
being the opening salvo of a political war the likes of which Memphis had never seen up to that 
point.110  Incensed at the slight that Paine had shown them, the Klavern’s top officers decided 
that it was time for leadership in the Memphis that would not only openly acknowledge the Klan, 
but that would also work in earnest to further the Klan’s goals as well. Thus the Klavern decided 
to field candidates in every major race in that year’s election. Klan member W. Joe Wood ran for 
mayor. Clifford Davis went on with his plans for city judge, while H.A. Roynon went out for tax 
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assessor. In addition, four other Klan candidates ran for city commission seats.111 Campaigning 
on the slogan “A Bigger and Better Memphis,” the local Klavern had its sights firmly locked on 
the goal of completely reshaping Memphis politics.112  
 With the Klan’s formal outing into local politics, the city of Memphis found itself in a 
state of racial and political turmoil the likes of which it had seldom seen and often prided itself 
on escaping in comparison to other Southern cities.  In the weeks leading up to the election the 
Klan held numerous rallies all across Memphis in public spaces, aiming not just to fire up their 
own membership base but to inspire nothing short of a revolt in the city. On October 31st, in a 
rather dramatic show of force, over a hundred Klan members stormed into the city election 
commissioner’s office and demanded the removal of specific electoral officials whom they felt 
were hostile to the Klan’s agenda and/or were in the tank for Mayor Paine. They argued that 
given Memphis well-known and well-earned reputation for election fraud, the current election 
commission could not be trusted to carry out the election in a fair way. Therefore the Klan called 
for new “impartial” officials to be instated as opposed to the “low-browed, sullen, putrid, 
insignificant skunks and parasites” they argued were currently in charge.  When the election 
commissioner naturally refused their demands, the situation devolved into a near riot, and 
Memphis police had called to break up the ruckus. The Klan however had made its point that 
they were a threat to be reckoned with and who would fight tooth and nail to win in the coming 
election.113  
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Figure 3- campaign ad, source: Commercial Appeal 
 The Commercial Appeal, already wary of the Klan’s growing presence in Memphis, 
amped up their stream of negative coverage of the organization in the weeks leading up to the 
election. For weeks, they printed scathing editorial after scathing editorial denouncing both the 
Klan campaign and also a third Mayoral ticket that had arisen around Lewis T. Fitzhugh, another 
local politician who originally had ties to other Klan members but splintered off to form his own 
independent anti-Paine campaign.   
 “Three feverish days and the people of Memphis will go to the polls to settle the most 
bitterly contested election fight in the past quarter of a century,” the Commercial Appeal wrote in 
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exasperation as the election neared.114 Their exasperation with the election was born with good 
reason, as the tensions being raised in the run-up to the election had bitterly divided the city and 
threatened to tear it apart into virtual warring factions.  The paper furthermore spun a tale of 
economic woe if the city fell into Klan leadership, arguing that other industrialized cities such as 
Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Detroit, St. Louis and New Orleans would want nothing to do with Memphis 
business-wise were the Klan to take charge. Memphis would be shunned, in effect by the rest of 
the nation.115   
 A Klan win in the election threatened to erode years of effort on the part of city officials 
and local media to portray Memphis as a place worthy of such an esteemed position.  Of note 
here once again is the point that white opposition to the Klan was not driven based on issues of 
race, but on issues of supposed Southern propriety. The Klan’s racism and nativism were taken 
largely for granted in Memphis’ political sphere. Thus, it is worth emphasizing again here that, 
throughout the electoral campaign, white supremacy in Memphis was never the real issue in the 
Klan’s electoral bid. It was never even in doubt. Thus, almost all critiques of the Klan by local 
media and by the Paine administration defaulted to rhetoric criticizing the Klan as a force of 
instability, illegality and foreignness to Memphis culture. Along these lines, The Commercial 
Appeal argued,  
The third ticket [the Klan candidates] runs upon an issue imported to Memphis 
from Atlanta, the leaders thereof now being engaged in a bloody feud among 
themselves. It has been a source of turmoil wherever it appears. It is undemocratic 
and un-American. Its gospel is one of hate, vituperation, superstition and 
credulity. If the men running on that ticket were running on any other issue it 
would be a calamity to elect them. They are inexperienced, inefficient and so far 
as their records show have accomplished little even for themselves . . . It would be 
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an indecent thing if Mayor Paine and his associates were repudiated by the voters 
of Memphis.116   
 
In addition to regular columns echoing the above sentiments, the Commercial Appeal also 
routinely published letters to the editor from Memphis citizens who were critical of the Klan as 
well. In the weeks before the election a letter of particular note from “an overseas veteran” was 
published in the Commercial Appeal imploring black Memphians themselves to resist that Klan 
and that their votes in particularly would be a crucial component in stopping the Klan from 
winning the election. For any black Memphians who were thinking of sitting out the election or 
in some delusion actually voting for the Klan ticket, the letter writer emphatically urged 
Memphis blacks to “Remember that the serpent in the garden told Eve to eat of the forbidden 
fruit . . . The Klan is not your friend by any means. It only wants your vote, for a colored man’s 
vote is like his money, you cannot tell it when it is mixed with other money and is of the same 
value.” The letter writer went on to state that “The better thinking white people have always tried 
to keep down mob rule” in contrast to the methods of the Klan.117 
As one of the very few public critiques of the Klan campaign that explicitly drew on the 
rhetoric of race, this letter is worth exploring for what it shows us about the somewhat 
labyrinthine way in which race came into play in the run-up to the election.  As pointed out in 
some detail above, race in Memphis was a city that billed itself as a city of relative racial 
harmony in that unlike other Southern cities, it had no history of race riots in the Jim Crow Era 
and it even did what other Southern cities did not by allowing its blacks to vote under special 
circumstances. Of course, the hidden transcript behind this narrative of racial harmony reveals a 
racial dichotomy more akin to a harmony of dissonance. 
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 Even the rival News-Scimitar paper threw its support behind the Paine ticket, distilling 
the choice down to three options:  
You can have the Klan ticket and the things that the Ku Klux Klan stands for . . . 
You can have the Fitzhugh ticket – a ticket that started out 40 per cent Klan . . . 
You can have Mayor Paine and the present administration for another four years. 
They have pledged themselves unreservedly against the Ku Klux Klan and the 
things for which it stands. They have pledged themselves to give a square deal to 
every decent Memphian, and to do their best to keep Memphis from becoming a 
hell of hate and a place to be shunned.118  
 
The missive concluded, rather starkly, “You can have – Klan and chaos! Fitzhugh and 
farce! Paine and progress!”119  The Scimitar further editorialized that one thing all three tickets 
could agree upon was that “the Ku Klux Klan is the issue.”120 There was no more salient 
difference between each ticket than how they viewed the Klan and the direction in which a Klan 
victory would lead the city afterward. The editors of the Scimitar concluded  
We cannot conceive of a greater misfortune and believing that Memphis deserves 
a better fate. Have no apprehension that the hooded, shrouded apostles of bigotry 
and hatred will be able to get a stranglehold on this city through the votes of its 
people . . . The trend is decidedly in favor of Mayor Paine and the administration. 
It is the result of carefully weighing the issues, and we are confident that the 
intelligence and sound judgment of the people of Memphis will assert themselves 
and reelect the present city administration.121 
 
In editorial after editorial, and as the election drew nearer and the possibility of a Klan 
victory became all the more tangible, the Scimitar continued to excoriate the Klan. “They [the 
Klan],” the Scimitar wrote, “are not the type of men who would be drawn into an enterprise for 
civic welfare. Even if they were not of an order repulsive to American ideals, they have no claim 
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on the suffrage of the voters of Memphis.”122 And finally on the day of the election itself, a 
seemingly exasperated Scimitar opined that  
A hectic campaign is nearing its close. The red lights are flaring and the bombs 
are bursting. The orators are pouring forth their pleas. Vindictiveness is in the air. 
Back of it all there is one outstanding issue – shall Memphis’ government become 
part of the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan – or shall it 
continue to a government for all law-abiding citizens, regardless of race, color or 
creed?    . . . “If you are for Memphis and regard Klanism as a danger to her 
progress, an un-American thing destructive to the harmony and happiness of her 
people, and a danger that must be stopped – you will vote the Paine and the 
administration ticket.123 
 
 Such soaring rhetoric aside, let us stop once again for a brief moment to peel back the 
rhetoric being used here a bit to see the truth behind the words themselves and what they really 
tell us of how white Memphis viewed, the Klan, the election and issues of race and racial 
equality. More than the all but guaranteed potential for racial strife that a Klan victory would 
bring, what seemed to gall the white opposition to the Klan the most was the secretive and 
outside nature of the group. If the Klan were to be opposed on ground of racial belief, the 
complaint generally rested not so much on their belief in white supremacy, which as other 
historians have shown was de rigueur for white Memphians, but rather the nakedly open way in 
which they flaunted their beliefs. White supremacy in Memphis was the law of the land, but it 
was first and foremost an unspoken law. It was this transgression of the rules that threatened 
chaos and disorder, not the belief itself. 
 All of this time, the Paine administration outwardly put forth an appearance of confidence 
in its electoral prospects. In private though, Paine must have been more fearful of loss than he let 
on, as contacted E.H. for his help in shoring up the votes needed to win. Despite no longer being 
mayor, Crump still maintained multiple connections amongst Memphis’ black leadership 
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establishment, consisting of doctors, business owners and clergy. If leveraged properly, these 
connections could be counted on to throw their support and, more importantly, the support of 
their constituents behind whomever Crump desired. Holding all the cards at this point, Crump 
bided his time in the weeks before the November election; hemming and hawing whenever asked 
publically whom he would support.124   
 
Figure 4 - campaign ad, source: Commercial Appeal 
 For reasons all his own, Crump held back on publicly backing Paine until the very last 
minute when mere days before the election, he set about publically working to get Paine re-
elected.125 Arriving at Paine’s campaign headquarters days before the election in dramatic 
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fashion and flanked by an entourage consisting of major players in city government and 
leadership including the likes of future police commissioner Joe Boyle, Frank Rice, Dave Wells, 
and Will Logan, Crump signaled that he meant business as far doing whatever was necessary to 
break the Klan and see Paine reelected.126 Having previously obtained power through his 
connections with Memphis’ black leadership community, Crump was able to broker an alliance 
between several key contacts in the black community and Paine. These black leaders included 
prominent druggist, physician and Negro baseball team owner, J.B. Martin, T.H. Hayes the 
president of Solvent Savings Bank, Bert Roddy, founding member of the activist Colored 
Citizens Association and prominent black Republican George W. Lee.127  
  Now having the full backing of Crump and his connections, the Paine ticket hastened to 
release what was a quickly thrown-together endorsement written by a cadre of local black 
leaders, like Robert Church, Hayes, Roddy and others. This missive listed in detail the reasons 
they would be supporting Paine and calling on other blacks to not simply sit out the election and 
get behind the Paine ticket as well. Worth quoting at length, the reasons listed in the statement 
were as follows:  
The colored voters of Memphis are supporting the Paine administration ticket 
straight. We think it is the best ticket in the field. We believe that they will give us 
a square deal. We believe that they stand for law and order. We know what they 
have done in the past. We believe they are going to do better in the future. We 
want every colored man and woman to vote this ticket. First: Because it is to the 
best interest of all the people. Second: They are big men who can handle big 
things. They can and will help our race. Third: They are going to complete our 
$300,000 high school. Fourth: They are putting bright lights and good streets all 
over the city. Fifth: They are going to see that every man gets a square deal, 
whether white or colored. Sixth: They are not Ku Klux.128 
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Memphis’ black leaders concluded this missive by stating that they felt they had a duty to 
carefully consider their options and that more than anything, “We wanted to advise our people 
right. We wanted to advise them to support men that we could depend upon.”129 What was left 
out of this account, however and what I argue to be no simple coincidence was the fact that 
Crump had finally publically thrown his weight behind the Paine ticket. Existing scholarship 
argues that no clear reason can be determine for Crump waiting so long to throw his backing 
behind the Paine ticket.130 I dispute this idea and argue that Crump rarely made any political 
move without it being a strategically calculated affair. In this, Crump’s actions can be seen as 
wanting to appear as the savior of the flailing Paine campaign, making it known in no uncertain 
terms that Crump was responsible for the election’s outcome and Paine would be explicitly in his 
debt. Before Crump’s public support of the Paine ticket, black leaders were largely silent on the 
issue of the election with most blacks in Memphis likely planning to sit out the affair entirely. 
Crump’s endorsement, however, was enough to secure black Memphis’ endorsement, it seemed. 
In addition to publicly stating their support for Paine in local papers, these black leaders also 
organized a number of rallies in black neighborhoods to drum up support for the Paine ticket.131 
In this regard, they were instrumental in marshaling the black vote around one candidate and 
shifting the tide in Paine’s favor, all thanks to Crump. 
 When Election Day arrived in early November, the day itself was nothing short of total 
chaos. Riot alarms rang out all throughout the day and night, as all over the city as Klan 
members got in altercations and contested votes at precinct after precinct.132 The Commercial 
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Appeal referred to it as “the worst situation with which the police ever had to combat.”133 On the 
night of the election itself, pandemonium broke out, as hundreds of Klan members stormed the 
precinct where ballots were being counted. Having started a bonfire outside, the Klan seized 
election officials, took them out to the fire and demanded recount after recount until the numbers 
went their way.  As with the earlier Klan disturbances, given Memphis’ reputation for political 
corruption, especially with Crump’s involvement, this was done under the pretext of ensuring an 
accurate and fair counting of the votes.  
 This spectacle, unparalleled in its brazenness in Memphis’ political history before or 
since that day, continued until a massive police presence arrived to break up the situation. The 
police managed to take the ballots into protective custody and secured them in a riot car. Still, 
the Klan would not fully concede to what they saw as a literal hijacking of an election that was 
rightfully theirs to win. Thus, they only consented to allowing the police access to the ballots if 
their leader Rev. J. Ralph Roberts was allowed to ride with police and the ballots to a secured 
location in order to make sure that no ballot box tampering occurred. Wishing to avoid a the 
likely full scale riot they all seemed to be standing on the edge of, local police acquiesced to the 
Klan leader’s demands and allowed him to ride along. As police withdrew from the area with 
both Roberts and the ballots in tow, other Klan members trailed them closely in their own 
vehicles for added insurance and peace of mind.134 The entire spectacle was for naught however, 
as the final vote tally was Paine, 12,000, the Klan, 7,000 and Fitzhugh, 3,000, with many 
believing the late influx of black voters breaking for Paine helped tip the balance.135   
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 In the immediate aftermath of the election of 1923, there was in fact speculation that the 
election had been stolen by Crump for Paine as some in the local Klan chapter and even a few 
historians have suggested an “honest” counting of the ballots would have given the Klan victory 
in many of the races they entered.136 However, such accusations were never investigated more 
than a token effort. The only Klan-backed candidate to win that day was Clifford Davis for city 
judge, the man whose hidden Klan affiliations and subsequent dismissal from the Paine 
administration touched off the entire election ordeal. Historians have largely attributed his 
victory to a last minute effort at separating himself politically from the Klan once again, an irony 
of history considering his role in first galvanizing the Klan to become politically active in the 
1923 election.137 Gradually the Klan presence in Memphis dwindled, as its leadership collapsed 
owing to internal strife, and the chapter eventually dissolved altogether.138 
Aftermath and Conclusions 
 Historian Michael Honey calls the arrangement between black leaders and the Crump 
machine in the wake of the election a “tacit alliance” that while uneven and open to exploitation 
on the part of the Machine, “still made [black voters] a power to be reckoned with.”139 I both 
agree and disagree with this assertion. On one hand certainly, this moment represented an 
opportunity for Memphis’ black political leadership that with the right amount of strategy and 
savvy they could take advantage of the situation and boost not only their own standings but also 
to better the situations of their person constituents.  However, the criticism can also be made that 
this alliance was also playing straight into Crump’s hand and ultimately benefitting him and his 
machine more than anyone in the Memphis black community. While other historians have tended 
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to place more emphasis on earlier or later dates and moments in Memphis’ racial-political 
history, I consciously choose to start here at the election of 1923. This moment, I argue, was the 
start of something much bigger than just one election or simply beating back the Klan. This was 
a watershed moment in Memphis racial-political history that would have ramifications for 
decades to that few were prepared for.  
 Blacks had certainly played a part in city politics prior to this moment, but it was this 
moment that paradoxically served as a catalyst for a black political movement in Memphis at the 
same time as it sowed the seeds for that movement’s eventual downfall. This moment 
represented a great opportunity for Memphis’ black political leadership community, but they 
perhaps underestimated the strength beast that was the Crump political machine. There was 
danger in relying too much on the strength and influence of the Crump machine. Perhaps the 
risks of doing so were either ignored in favor of the pressing situation at hand, or they were not 
foreseen at all, however in hindsight it is easy to see that the Crump-Paine establishment needed 
black Memphis. Black Memphis did not necessarily need the establishment. This is a very fine 
but significant point that was lost in all chaos and backroom dealings that led up to the election 
that year. The consequences of this bargain opened up the door for the machine to steamroll over 
the Memphis black community for years after the election was over and in the history books. The 
man who could take credit for thwarting the threat of Klan rule could, could use the positive will 
engendered by such an act to unite Memphis’ black community around a single political 
ideology. Therefore, as much as the election of 1923 was a battle over control of Memphis, for 
both Crump and Paine it was also a hidden battle over future control of black Memphis.  
 As lightly touched upon throughout this chapter, there was in fact a third election ticket 
that was neither Klan nor Crump affiliated that coalesced around city court judge Lewis T. 
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Fitzhugh. Surely, just by virtue of being another option, this must have represented a potential 
middle ground between the poles of the Klan and the Paine-Crump ticket, certainly for black 
Memphians caught between one organization wholly hostile to their existence and rights and 
another that had at best only paid lip service to their needs in previous years. Yet, on election day 
Fitzhugh came in third, receiving less than half the votes of either Paine or Klan candidate, Joe 
Wood.140 What, then, stopped the Fitzhugh campaign from being the choice for black 
Memphians? 
 Initially, Fitzhugh planned to run for mayor as part of a Crump machine ticket that was 
wholly separate from Rowlett Paine. For reasons all his however, Crump decided that his best 
chances at success lay with the incumbent Paine over Fitzhugh. Displeased with being tossed 
aside so casually, Fitzhugh ran his own campaign for mayor.141 As hinted at above, however 
Fitzhugh’s campaign was never really taken all that seriously amongst the Memphis electorate. 
Despite having more of a political background than even Rowlett Paine had before he was 
initially elected mayor, Fitzhugh had yet to prove himself capable of leadership. Furthermore, 
when it came to courting the votes of black Memphians, Fitzhugh, perhaps due to pure 
unwillingness, failed to do so. He had no history of black outreach to speak off.  Crump 
however, and by extension Paine, had no qualms about making promises of support to Memphis’ 
black community. Thus, when given the choice between the devils you do not know and the ones 
you do, for black Memphians it must not have seemed like a real choice at all.  
 After the election of 1923, the political landscape of Memphis stood vastly changed from 
what it was prior. Despite the win officially going to Paine, Crump was the big winner of the day 
by long-term assessments. Paine’s time in office would come and go, but it was Crump’s name 
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that black Memphis would remember as having staved off the threat of Klan rule in Memphis. 
This was, of course, not the first time Crump had appealed to Memphis’ black community for 
their votes. However, I posit this occasion was different and special from those times before 
Crump’s ouster from City Hall.  
 The sheer shock and horror at the thought of the Klan coming as close as it did to gaining 
control over the city of Memphis, whether in hindsight they actually stood a chance of doing so 
or not, cast Crump and his machine in such a favorable light that he was able to overcome past 
disgraces and firmly solidify himself within the good graces of the black community.  Crump 
was now the “man who stopped the Klan,” whereas Paine would have come off as weak and 
ineffectual in doing so without Crump’s aid. It was Crump’s last minute decision to through 
himself and his resources and connections behind Paine that made the election swing in his favor 
and broke the possibility of a split anti-Klan vote between Paine and Lewis T. Fitzhugh that 
would likely have garnered victory for the Klan ticket.142  
 Moreover, I argue that it was specifically the presence and authority of Crump’s backing 
that allowed black voters to feel they could likewise put their backing behind the Paine 
campaign. Few other actions could have endeared Crump to black Memphians more than this 
one. Driving home the idea that it was Crump’s win and not Paine’s, Crump organized his own 
victory parade through the streets of downtown Memphis after all the votes had been tallied.143 
As for the Paine administration, with Crump’s backing and established connections, Paine was 
able to ally himself with black leaders and actively seek out the black vote with promises of 
listening to concerns that affected their communities. As the next chapter will show, these 
promises would in time prove to be hollow, however, as Paine went on to not only ignore these 
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concerns from Memphis's black community, but also, in defiance of the Crump machine method, 
openly antagonize black Memphis as well.  
What of the broader concerns of this dissertation, however? Before moving on to the next 
chapter let us pull back our focus a bit and examine the larger significance of a few key ideas 
brought up here in terms of Memphis being a city that was between North and South in terms of 
racial ideology. After their defeat in the election of 1923, the power of the local Klan order 
largely dissipated. Despite stilted efforts at once again mounting an organized and sustained 
political campaign in future elections, they were never again a serious threat to Memphis politics.  
Scholar Kenneth Wald has written, “by all accounts, the Klan should have done well in 
Memphis. The city was dominated by the very kinds of social groups with which the Klan was 
supposed to have had a special affinity – the poor, rural migrants and persons of low education 
and uncertain employment.” Also, there must be something symbolically significant about the 
actions of the Memphis Klan in deciding to publicly unmask for the sake of running for public 
office.  
 As mentioned previously in this dissertation’s introduction, there were three ideological 
factors that marked Memphis as a “border” city. 1. When it came to managing issues of race, 
there was a tacit agreement that there were just certain ways of doing things. Covert racism and 
was always preferable to the social disruption that invariably came with overt racism. 2. The 
Memphis city government, while undoubtedly filled with many who held little regard for black 
people, preferred keeping them control through the guise of Progressive cooperation rather than 
outright hostility. 3. Those who violated these first two rules tended to very quickly find 
themselves under attack from those in power. 
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Memphis, as stated before, was a city of ideological and racial-political contradictions. Only in a 
Southern city could the Klan would be brazen and audacious enough to not only openly make a 
play for power, but also to believe they could emerge triumphant for doing so. Only in a 
Southern city could they actually come close as they did to achieving such goals. The majority of 
those running in the Memphis election held jobs that would otherwise mark them as respectable 
members of society. That those running had little fear of their identities being known publicly, 
the incident with Clifford Davis being an abnormal case, speaks volumes about the ways in 
which racial prejudice operated in Jim Crow Memphis. 
 At the same time, however, Memphis was not quite so Southern that the Klan could 
simply get away with anything they desired. The Klan’s brazen acts were simultaneously 
allowable because of the city they were, and yet those acts also threatened to expose the 
fragileness of the supposedly “friendly race relations in Memphis.” For all of their repressiveness 
on race issues, the city’s white power structure nevertheless billed itself as being relatively 
Progressive, especially compared to other Southern cities. This is evident in the consensus 
amongst such power players and political rivals as Rowlett Paine, E.H. Crump, and C.P.J. 
Mooney that Klan agenda was in fact too radical and reactionary to fly in Memphis. Thus, from 
the moment the local Klavern announced its intentions to run for office, two things happened that 
one would have to search far and wide to see happen in other Southern cities. Firstly, the Klan 
was actively painted as an “outside” force representing a threat to the sovereignty of Memphis 
politics. This argument posited that true Memphians could not support the Klan’s endeavors, and 
that a win for the Klan was a win for imported values. The second unusual thing that occurred 
upon the Klan candidacy was that the city’s white elite power structure actively sought the help 
of its black population in order to maintain their own positions of power and authority. All of 
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these points mark Memphis being not your average Southern city, but not exactly like a Northern 
city where the Klan efforts were comparatively weaker and were never a serious challenge to 
legitimate politics. As the following chapter will touch upon, however, just because race as an 
ideological concept operated differently in Memphis than it did in other comparable, did not 
mean for a moment that there was not still racial turmoil bubbling underneath the surface, 
waiting to come to light. As later chapters will show, the very same factors which here united 
black and white political leadership under the guise of a mutually beneficial relationship would 
in time work to undermine the potential for true progress and racial reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
“A VERY WORTHY NEGRO” 
 On a sunny afternoon in May 1925, a steamboat carrying 72 passengers capsized on the 
Mississippi River 20 miles south of Memphis, TN.  Onboard the boat, the M.E. Norman, were 
members of the Memphis Engineers Club, a group comprising some of the city’s most politically 
influential citizens. Passing by at the same time as the ship began to go under in his tiny skiff, the 
Zev, was a young black levee worker from Memphis named Tom Lee.  Seeing the passengers 
from the steamboat struggling to survive the notoriously heavy currents of the “Mighty 
Mississippi,” rushed his boat over to where the steamship had capsized. Despite the potential 
danger to himself and not knowing how to swim, Lee began to survivors out of the water to 
safety one by one.  
 A total of 49 passengers survived the accident that day out of the 72 that were onboard 
the ship. 32 of these passengers, including men, women, and children, were saved single-
handedly through Tom Lee’s efforts.  As word of Lee’s actions began to spread around 
Memphis, practically overnight the otherwise unremarkable working-class Lee was plucked from 
obscurity and thrust into the spotlight.  Tom Lee became a local sensation – a hero in the eyes of 
a city that was thankful for and in awe of his actions. 
The Memphis city government was especially impressed with Lee, “the Old River Negro’s” 
heroics. In the days, weeks, months and even years following the Norman accident of 1925, city 
leaders bestowed Lee with tokens of gratitude. These ranged ranging from the relatively simple – 
a watch for example – to gifts and accolades few blacks in segregated Memphis could ever have 
conceived of receiving from the city’s all-white leaders. Lee was given a new house. He had both 
a municipal swimming pool and a city park named in his honor. City leaders even sponsored a 
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trip to Washington, D.C., so that Lee could shake hands with President Calvin Coolidge.  All of 
these accolades and honors were arranged by many of the same white governmental figures that 
this dissertation has already mentioned along with a few new figures of importance - people such 
as Mayor Rowlett Paine, his successor Watkins Overton, and of course, political boss E.H. 
Crump. 
 
Figure 5 - M.E. Norman, source: Commercial Appeal 
 In this chapter I juxtapose the story of Tom Lee and his reception by Memphis’ white 
elites with the story of Rowlett Paine’s downfall as mayor of Memphis and as E.H. Crump’s 
political standard-bearer. While having only a few direct connections in terms of the historical 
actors involved, I argue that the narrative of the former allows for a unique insight into the racial 
dynamics at play throughout the latter narrative. This chapter posits that the story of Tom Lee 
reads as a stand-in for the story of racial politics writ large in Jim Crow Era Memphis and 
provides another example of Memphis’ unique ideological geography, as the way in which white 
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elite Memphis perceived of and responded to Tom Lee reflects the broader ideas of how race 
operated in a city like Memphis. 
  The veneer of benevolence that Memphis’ white elites showed towards Lee can be read 
as exposing one of the hidden transcripts that undergirded the way racial politics and racial 
power relationships operated in Jim Crow Memphis. In this scenario, white supremacy was 
enforced not through lynchings or with the barrel of a gun, but through patronage and other 
means of pacification. Open racial antagonism and aggression had its uses in Memphis to be 
sure, and Memphis was not entirely free from the racial violence that plagued many cities 
throughout the South, but the preferred means of racial control was far subtler. On the surface, 
white elites projected support, sympathy and even some level of admiration for the deeds and 
struggles of the average black Memphian as embodied in Tom Lee in this case. However, such 
benign efforts at currying favor with and ingratiating themselves to black Memphians belied a far 
more uneven, coercive and hostile view of how to “handle” Memphis’ black population.  
In this way, I offer up Tom Lee’s story as a mirror to reflect the broader proscriptions of racial 
politics in Jim Crow Memphis. In doing so, this chapter reveals in intimately discrete detail just 
how deeply white elite Memphis was committed to obfuscating its belief in white racial 
supremacy through outwardly benign forms of racial aggression and antagonism. This is 
abundantly evident in the memorial put together by E.H. Crump and other white authority figures 
upon Lee’s death from cancer in 1952. Lee lived for 27 years after the day that initially made 
him a star and a hero, and for nearly all of this time, he had been purposefully kept in the public 
eye almost solely by members of Memphis’ white elite power structure. Figures such as Crump 
decided that it was their duty to commemorate Lee’s life. Thus, they commissioned the 
construction of a monument in the same park that bore Lee’s name and on the banks of the very 
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river that so many years earlier had become forever a part of Tom Lee’s life on that fateful May 
afternoon in 1925. At a dedication ceremony on July 9, 1954, a fifteen-foot tall granite obelisk 
was unveiled before a large crowd eager to see what Crump and the others had cooked up this 
time. On the monument was inscribed with what would be the city of Memphis’ final and most 
enduring tribute to the legacy of the man who, according to Crump, had captured the hearts of 
“the grateful people of Memphis” with his “kindliness, generosity, courage and bigness of heart.”  
To Tom Lee, the monument read:  “A Very Worthy Negro.”144 
 
Figure 6 - Tom Lee Memorial inscription, source: Commercial Appeal 
A Very Worth Mascot 
As undeniably patronizing as this token to Tom Lee’s life was, it was also emblematic of a 
broader narrative that took place surrounding Tom Lee and the issue of race relations Jim Crow 
Memphis, one that began 27 years earlier in 1924. Almost immediately upon hearing about Lee’s 
rescuing of 32 drowning Memphis citizens, various members of Memphis’ white elite 
community began to construct a public persona and narrative for Tom Lee that would present 
                                                
144  Beverly Bond, Jannan Sherman, Memphis in Black and White, (Arcadia: Chicago), pgs. 102-103. 
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him to the citizens of Memphis as their living ideal of what it meant to be black and respectable 
during this time period. These portrayals of Lee emphasized such characteristics as his supposed 
humbleness, timidity, self-sacrifice and obsequious deferential behavior towards whites. The 
implication to all of this was that the larger black Memphis community should also aspire to and 
follow such values of heroic self-sacrifice when it came to their interactions with whites, so that 
they too could be rewarded for their behavior. 
 
Figure 7 - Tom Lee, source: Commercial Appeal 
Curiously, to black Memphians themselves, by all accounts, (or rather by the stark lack of 
accounts in the historical record) Tom Lee barely seemed registered as a blip on the radar. 
Compare for example the lack of public fanfare and acknowledge Lee received from black 
Memphians to another local celebrity who had “made it big” in the public eye. Blues legend and 
Memphis celebrity W.C. Handy once famously wrote that he could scarcely stroll through any 
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black neighborhood in Jim Crow Era Memphis without being overwhelmingly mobbed by 
admirers. None of this appeared to be the case when it came to Lee, however. The silence of 
Memphis’ black community was deafening. 
There were no parades in his honor on Beale St. or in other black neighborhoods. When 
Lee went out in public, there were no throngs of black Memphians seeking his autograph or even 
a handshake. Compared to the multipage exposes white-owned newspapers ran on Lee’s 
exploits, the black press largely ignored him. The vast majority, if not all, of Lee’s supporters 
and boosters came from within the ranks of Memphis’ white elite community. Without their 
support, Lee likely would have gone back into simple obscurity after and become a minor 
footnote in the history of a long-since forgotten Memphis Spring. None of this is meant as a 
criticism of Lee himself or to in any way diminish his life or his extraordinary actions. However, 
the fact remains that, when viewed critically, it is easy to see that Lee’s celebrity was with built 
upon motives far more duplicitous than simple admiration. 
Despite there being no clear indicator that these efforts at not so subtly policing black 
behavior and respectability actually succeeded, through this story we see how even after the 
dramatic cross-racial alliance formed in the wake of the 1923 election, the dynamics of racial 
power in Memphis remained decidedly skewed. White leaders continued to see the city’s black 
population as little more than a useful tool to be pulled out of storage whenever the need arose. 
In the minds of Memphis’ white leaders, as long as blacks were occasionally given the most 
minute or token attention, they could be carefully molded controlled for their own political 
utility. 
While this chapter is primarily concerned with mapping out the parameters upon which 
this dichotomy operated, later chapters will reveal in more detail exactly what was at stake in 
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terms of its effect on black political activism in Memphis. Particularly, for local black leaders 
who did not acquiesce and play along with the Crump machine’s political strategy of token 
affections, they would find themselves marginalized and shunned not just by Memphis’ white 
power structure but also by others within the local black leadership community who cottoned to 
the Machine’s overtures.  Before getting to that particular drama, however, we must first see how 
the Tom Lee story is essential for understanding the psychological and structural underpinnings 
of this future conflict. 
As the previous chapter showed, after the 1923 mayoral election, the racial-political 
environment in Memphis seemed to have turned a corner. On the surface, Memphis’s white 
power structure and it’s black middle class had united to thwart a mutual threat, and in the 
process set an example for what could be accomplished by urban, interracial cooperation. 
Underneath this veneer, however, lay a bedrock of mistrust, divided loyalties, animus and 
unchecked ambition on the part nearly all involved this accomplishment. As discussed earlier, 
the methods by which such feelings could be acted upon were largely circumscribed, however, 
due to the hidden transcripts of racial dialogue and interaction in Jim Crow Memphis. Jim Crow 
Era Memphis was a place that was paradoxically bound by traditional Southern mores of racial 
interaction at the same time as black and white leaders billed it as a “Progressive” city where 
both races could stand together with common goals and values. For white elites that were savvy 
enough to take advantage of it, the Tom Lee incident provided the perfect opportunity to 
capitalize on this dichotomy. 
Thus a peculiar dichotomy was born that would endure for decades wherein Lee would 
be celebrated for his acts of self-sacrifice towards whites while simultaneously being derided as a 
figure of curiosity based on his race. Local newspapers, having a longstanding history of acting 
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as the arm of the city government, covering the story in its immediate aftermath were the first to 
adopt this dichotomy. One started off by describing Lee as a “40-year-old negro, black and 
kinky-haired, [who] became a hero in a few hours.” When asked what motivated him to do so, 
the story quoted Lee saying, “I guess I didn’t do any more than any nigger would have done in 
my place.” Still seemingly struggling to entirely comprehend Lee as a person, or perhaps sensing 
that its audience would have difficulty doing so, the article further said of Lee, “Tom is an old 
river negro . . . He does not own his own home. It is rented. His white friends say he never loses 
his head when any critical situation arises.” The article also mentions Mayor Paine immediately 
setting out to get Lee a medal of some sort.145 
 Another article on Lee went in a similar fashion, making an effort to flesh out the man 
behind the actions. Again, referring to Lee as “only a black, kinky-haired negro,” the article 
emphasized repeatedly the benign, meek and simple side of Lee. “I’m goin’ to church Sunday 
mornin’ an’ evenin.’  I always prays Sunday for forgiveness of my sins foh’ de past week,” the 
article wrote. In describing the first interaction between Lee and Mayor Paine, Lee again comes 
off as little more than a simple person, wholly out of his element around his social betters. When 
shown into the private office of the mayor he hesitated a second.  
The thick plush rug under his feet seemed to melt away.  There was 
embarrassment in his face.  “Come in, Tom,” spoke Mayor Paine. [They shake 
hands] Then Tom smiled . . . “You are a hero, Tom.” said Mayor Paine.  “Yes 
suh, thank you, suh,” Tom answered.146 
 
Curiously, the article again ends as the previous one did by mentioning the fact that Lee was 
friends with or at the very least had made the acquaintance of some white Memphians who could 
                                                
145 The News-Scimitar, “Saving 30 Lives Doesn’t Excite Tom Lee, Negro Hero of Norman Tragedy Off Coahoma,” 
May 9, 1925. 
146 The News-Scimitar, “Saving 30 Lives Doesn’t Excite Tom Lee, Negro Hero of Norman Tragedy Off Coahoma,” 
May 9, 1925. 
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vouch for his character. The story concluded, “White men who know Tom Lee say he is level-
headed of a critical situation comes up. They have tested him and claim they speak the truth.”147 
The wreck of the M.E. Norman just a few miles outside of town was naturally major news for the 
city on the bluff.  Thus, in addition to reports on the accident itself, the stories ranged from 
biographies of the more prominent drowning victims, to harrowing narratives of survival, to a 
page devoted entirely to the “heroes” that the event produced.  For example, the Memphis News-
Gazette also reported on Clarence Miller, a 20 yr. old fireman aboard the Norman who swam 
against the current to the shore and then dove back into the water to save a woman and her baby 
who were reported to be some 300 yards away from him.  There was Maj. Douglass H. Gilette, 
an engineer aboard the Norman who helped pull fellow wreck survivors ashore.  And there was 
also Henry Wiersma who also acted selflessly to pull fellow survivors to safety.148 
 Again, curiously however, out of all of the various people that the News-Scimitar 
proclaimed to be heroes that day, it was the sensational tale of Tom Lee, the mysteriously stoic 
and “kinky-haired, negro hero” with the heart of gold and humble personality which the 
newspaper gave the most space, attention, and acclaim to, and also placed front and center on the 
paper’s front page. And it was Tom Lee, not the other heroes of the day, whose story would 
endure in the city’s limelight and take on almost mythical proportions not just for the next few 
days but for the next 27 years of Tom Lee’s life thanks to the efforts of local media, Mayor 
Rowlett Paine, the political machine of Mayor E.H. Crump and various other representatives of 
Memphis’s white elite community.  
 How to account for this phenomenon, one might ask?  Certainly, Tom Lee’s actions that 
day would count as heroic and merit acclaim by anyone’s standards.  However what is there to 
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explain the disproportionate attention given to Lee over others?  Perhaps not so coincidentally, 
out of all of the heroes of the Norman wreck that fateful afternoon in May, Tom Lee happened to 
be the only one among them who was black. It may strike some as something of a well-worn 
argument to make, however, I submit that more than any of his actions that day; it was Tom 
Lee’s race that was primarily responsible for the many accolades he received both in the 
immediate aftermath of the Norman’s sinking and for the next 27 years of Lee’s life.  However, 
this was far from any pro bono deal on the part of Memphis’ white elite community.  The tacit 
unspoken price that they would charge Lee in return for his acclaim and celebrity would amount 
to exactly the cost of his public persona and identify.  
From the moment Tom Lee entered the Memphis public eye, his public identity was 
shaped in a way that would portray him as white Memphis’ notion of the ideally respectable 
negro – docile, self-sacrificing, self-deprecating, and, in a single word all-encompassing word, 
Respectable.  This caricatured portrayal of Tom Lee as the “respectable negro” would be typical 
of just about every public mentioning of Lee’s name for the rest of his life.  It would be seen in 
just about every public accolade that Lee would receive.  Consciously or unconsciously, in the 
eyes of Memphis white elite community, Tom Lee’s actions as a hero were nigh inseparable 
from his status as an African-American, a combination which made Lee the perfect figurehead to 
use to sweep Memphis’ race-related issues under the rug and portray Memphis as a city of racial 
harmony.  In so many words, Tom Lee would ever feel his two-ness – a negro, a mascot. 
 Over the course of Tom Lee’s life after the incidents of May 8, 1925, reports such as the 
one above would become something of a well-worn routine.  The pattern is fairly easy to follow:  
One of the Memphis’ newspapers, The News-Scimitar, The Commercial Appeal, or The 
Memphis World, would run a special report to check up on what Lee was up to.   More often 
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than not, a member of the city’s government or Memphis Engineers Club would have just 
recently bestowed some honor upon Lee and would have their remarks published the article.  
And, without fail, every time, the same characteristics of Tom Lee’s persona would be 
emphasized over and over again as the impetus for such his receiving such attention and praise.  
There would be commentary on things such as Lee’s meekness, his simple and unassuming 
demeanor, and his gentle and self-deprecating persona.  
 In this paradigm of Tom Lee’s racial identity, the line between explicit praise for Lee 
himself and implicit praise for the white citizens of Memphis for treating Lee so well would 
become intertwined in such a way as to be nigh inseparable.  In this dichotomy, “Tom Lee – the 
individual” loses his importance in favor of “Tom Lee – the representative of Memphis’ black 
community.”  The invocation of Lee’s public persona by the local media and the city 
government, in effect, became a type of shorthand with which to speak about the city’s racial 
divide.  In other words, as long as Tom Lee was publicly well taken care of, then Memphis’ 
black community was seen as being well taken care of also. 
 And through this dichotomy of public tokenism, well taken care of, Lee was, indeed.  In 
the years following the sinking of the M.E. Norman, the many gifts and honors bestowed upon 
Lee would be enough to make him the envy of nearly anyone.  Immediately following the 
accident, and upon interviewing Lee about the accident and his role in saving its passengers, the 
Commercial Appeal reported that “many of [its] staff, touched by Tom’s unassuming manner, 
gave him money” out of their own pockets.  Later that same month, the Memphis city 
government arranged for Lee to be taken to Washington to meet and to shake hands with 
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President Calvin Coolidge.  For his own part, Coolidge referred to Lee as an “outstanding marine 
hero.”149 
 The Memphis Engineers Club and the Commercial Appeal would then go on to raise 
$4,000 to buy Tom Lee and his family a new home. The same coalition of white elites would 
also establish a trust fund to take care of Lee’s taxes and home maintenance expenses.  
Subsequently it then became an annual custom for members of the Engineers Club to “play Santa 
Claus to Tom and his family” ever year for by publicly donating to Lee and his family every 
December to help with food, clothing, gifts and other holiday expenses.150 
 The city government would then go on to provide Lee with a permanent job on its payroll 
as, of all things, a garbage man.  On the 10-year anniversary of Lee’s act of heroism in 1935, the 
Commercial Appeal ran a story catching up with Lee and his new life in this position. In much 
the same way as writes-up on Lee did 10 years prior, this one again seems to walk a line between 
mocking Lee and praising him. The article opened with the image of “An orange-colored 
garbage truck stopped in an alley back of an apartment house on Eastmoreland Street today and a 
negro in a corduroy cap and faded overalls swung a tin garbage can upside down into the truck.  
That negro was Tom Lee.”  The article at times seems to find implicit humor in juxtaposing 
Lee’s new occupation with the many valuable baubles and high accolades he’d received for his 
actions. “Bang! Went the next can of potato peelings and kitchen refuse into the city truck.  Tom 
Lee smoked his pipe.  Someone asked him if he remembered what happened 10 years ago today.  
“Yas, suh,” Tom replied and pulled out a gold watch on the back of which is engraved the brief 
story of Tom’s heroism.”  One is tempted to wonder even how much articles like these were 
written for the benefit of Lee himself and how much they were written for the benefit of the 
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white elites they often mention that come off as benevolent figures. “No, Tom hasn’t forgotten,” 
the article went on. “He remembers how Mayor Rowlett Paine had him up at his office, how he 
was hailed as a hero.”151 
Despite, or perhaps because of the irony of one of the city’s most celebrated heroes being 
rewarded with a job in one of the most universally mocked professions, the article still makes 
sure to emphasize what by then had become Lee’s trademark self-deprecation, obsequious 
submissiveness and generally cheerful good nature.  David Tucker points out that the Crump 
political machine had a well-established M.O. doing this time period of putting blacks that were 
politically favorable to it on the city’s payroll in one way or another.  “Police and fire department 
positions,” Tucker writes, “to be sure, were reserved for whites at that time, but garbage 
collection and jobs at segregated public schools were open.”152   
Thus, Tom Lee may have been given what many saw as one of the city’s most demeaning 
jobs, that made him only “20 cents an hour . . . when it doesn’t rain,” but, simply by virtue of the 
fact that he was on the city government’s payroll, Lee was expected to play the part of the happy 
and grateful garbage man, thankful for what little he had been given.  In the years that followed, 
at the behest of Boss Crump, the Memphis Park Commission working in conjunction with the 
City Council and mayor approved the naming of a new segregated swimming pool in one of the 
city’s black neighborhood’s after Lee.153    
The ceremonial trotting out of Tom Lee would continued on for many years to come, as 
by 1948, more than 20 years after the Norman incident, the city government would provide Tom 
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Lee with a “generous” retirement pension of $75 per month and again investigated the possibility 
of Lee receiving a medal or other award from the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission.  All the 
while, Lee continued to receive annual Christmas donations and gifts from the Memphis 
Engineers Club. By 1949, Lee would be diagnosed with terminal cancer, and the Engineers Club 
along with the city government would raise  $619 to pay for Lee’s cancer treatments. In 1950, 
local newspaper The Memphis World reported on the “cancer-doomed negro hero” donating his 
own money to a cancer drive put on by the West Tennessee Cancer Clinic.  The article reported, 
Since that day [of the Norman accident],” Lee had good days and bad days, but he 
has worked hard all the time . . . He says: “I’m feeling pretty good.  I wish more 
of my white folks would come by and see me.”  His “white folks” have helped 
him through the years.  Although he has very little money to spare, Lee answered 
the plea for the 1950 cancer drive here and sent $2.00.  He commented: “I sure 
wish I could give more.  And please tell all my friends that I’m feeling fine.154 
 
By April 1, 1952, Tom Lee would finally succumb to the inevitable and die of the cancer 
that had plagued him since 1949. The local press coverage and attention Lee’s passing received 
from city officials at this moment rivaled anything seen since the immediate aftermath of the 
M.E. Norman sinking, as a wide cross-section of prominent Memphians all took time to consider 
what Tom Lee has personally meant to them.  
“It has been my privilege for 27 years, along with men like James M. Wood . . . 
and Col. Garner W. Miller of the United States Engineers to look after Tom Lee’s 
welfare,” William B. Fowler, one of the Norman survivors and one of Lee’s 
biggest white elite supporters said.  “Tom was modest and unassuming, and 
appreciative of everything that was done for him.  I am grateful that there was a 
Negro like Tom Lee,” Fowler followed up. Fowler would then go on to make 
financial arrangements to take care of Lee’s widow.  Along with other members 
of the Engineers Club and Memphis political boss E.H. Crump, Fowler would 
also act as an honorary pallbearer at Lee’s funeral.155 
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For Crump, Lee’s passing brought about fond memories of Lee’s life and persona.   “He 
was a worthy man and he did a noble deed,” Crump said.  “He used to come to see me now and 
then . . . He never boasted or bragged about anything he did.  He was always unassuming and 
very polite.”  Crump, never the one to let an opportunity to advertise his political benevolence to 
black Memphis pass by, also added, “I suggested naming the swimming pool at Ayers and Lane 
for him.”156 
The Significance of Tom Lee 
All of this, of course, begs the question of why Tom Lee matters to the story of racial 
politics in Jim Crow Memphis. In order to put all of this into a proper context, and to try and get 
a sense of why Tom Lee remained so prominently in the spotlight, it is necessary to examine a 
few other notable occurrences in Memphis over this same period of time. As mentioned at the 
end of the last chapter, after their tandem success in the 1923 election, Rowlett Paine and E.H. 
Crump eventually went on to have a political falling out, ultimately leading to Crump backing a 
new mayoral candidate in 1927, Watkins Overton, and once again corralling the black vote to get 
Overton into office. But what else was going on here, and what might this have had to do in any 
way with Tom Lee? 
  One of the major occurrences in the run-up to the 1927 mayoral election was an event 
known as the Bellomini scandal.  John Bellomini was a Memphis bootlegger who got caught by 
federal agents in a sting in the fall of 1927. In the process, they found a ledge detailing a number 
of recurring payoffs to members of the Memphis police force and high-ranking officials in the 
Memphis city government. While mayor Paine himself was not directly implicated in the 
scandal, there was widespread sentiment amongst his political opponents in Memphis that even if 
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it could not be proved that he was directly involved in the scandal, at the very least, his 
administration seemed all but incompetent to fail to notice such widespread corruption inside of 
the city. As a result, Paine began to lose powerful supporters left and right including most 
notably E.H. Crump himself who it seemed could not distance himself from the Paine 
administration fast enough.157  
 Crump, as previously mentioned, was already thrown out of office once in the wake of an 
alcohol-related corruption scandal just 10 years earlier. Naturally, he must have felt that the 
liability of once again being closely associated with an eerily similar case would spell disaster 
for his political ambitions, as in addition to being the true power behind the power in Memphis, 
he was now eyeing a run for Congress.158 One would think that with his administration in 
desperate trouble, Paine would do everything he could to recapture the magic of the 1923 
election, which saw him reelected largely on the strength of the black vote. However, for reasons 
all his own, this time refused to chase after the black vote any more, in fact, resorting to openly 
antagonizing them and doubling down on the idea of white rule in Memphis. 
 Crump, on the other, as before, seeing an opportunity to capitalize on an optimum 
situation, once again courted black leaders with an unmatched fervor, painting Paine as a figure 
who never truly had the black community’s interests at heart, pointing to Paine’s failure to take 
tangibly any of their needs seriously. Crump instead touted relative newcomer Watkins Overton 
for mayor. Ironically enough, Crump also backed Clifford Davis for another term as City Judge. 
If you will recall, it was Davis’ connections with the Ku Klux Klan and his subsequent 
unceremonious booting from Paine’s political team in 1923 that served as the catalyst for the 
Klan entering that election. Apparently, however, Davis’ old Klan ties were no longer seen as a 
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liability this time around as again with the help of black leaders like Robert R. Church Jr., and 
Lt. George W. Lee, the black vote in Memphis was marshaled and was what decisively what put 
Crump’s ticket over the top.159 
 Where, then, does Tom Lee fit into all of this? By no means am I suggesting that simply 
showering one single black Memphian with praise and attention was enough to magically 
convince all of black Memphis writ large to support Crump and his new slate of candidates. As 
pointed out before, there did exist in Memphis at this time an established group of black leaders 
with their own constituents, agendas and strategies for advancing the cause of black progress in 
Memphis. Moreover, black leadership in Memphis was very clear in the type of changes and 
improvements they wanted to see happen in Memphis, things like black police officers, better 
municipal facilities, etc. 
 What I am arguing, however, that the way Tom Lee was treated by Crump and other 
influential whites in Memphis was emblematic of the way in which white leadership saw black 
leadership in Memphis at this specific time– not entirely as a threat that needed to be forcibly 
pacified as in other Southern cities, but also not entirely as a legitimate interest group that needed 
their desires taken seriously. Instead, black Memphis leaders and voters were almost a type of 
commodity. They were thing to be easily bought, and manipulated with token-like attention paid 
to their wants and aspirations. 
 According to historian Laurie Green, one local black activist at the time described the 
situation in Memphis with regards to race relation in the following way: “[Whites] do not use 
shot gun methods to make the Negro docile and servile workmen . . . [they] control the Negro’s 
thought and progress . . . by elevating and holding up as examples . . . the so-called best Negro 
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Leaders.”160 As Green goes on to point out, those who did openly question the racialized political 
environment in Memphis during this time period were often derided as promoters of “social 
equality who sought to undermine friendly relations between the races by fomenting black hatred 
of whites.”161  Green also describes how Memphis’ black citizenry was divided “over how to 
respond to the Crump machine’s combination of benevolence . . . and enforcement of 
segregation,” however, for the longest time they were ultimately left with few political options 
other than to support Crump in the hopes that their votes would engender some level of 
communal support from the Crump machine.162 Cast in this light, then, the Crump regime 
bestowing favored son status upon Tom Lee falls perfectly in line with its modus operandi for 
maintaining political power in Jim Crow Memphis.  Clearly, the Crump machine was not an 
organization that was in any real way concerned with empowering or recognizing the black 
community outside of a paradigm that kept the machine in total power.  
 By this point in time, however, a number of weak spots had begun to emerge in the armor 
of the Crump regime.  Having been handed its first real political defeat just a few years earlier, 
the hegemonic political authority of Crump’s regime had begun to slowly crumble by the time of 
Tom Lee’s passing, as blacks in Memphis more and more began to mobilize politically on their 
own behalf rather than at the behest of the city’s white leaders.163 Beverly Bond and Janaan 
Sherman write, 
Following [the 1948] defeat and elimination of the poll tax in 1954, voting drives 
in the black community pushed across the South during the Civil Rights 
movement, [however] black Memphians were already registered at roughly the 
same rate as white Memphians.  This voting bloc provided political leverage in an 
arena where the voting age population was approximately 34 percent black.  As 
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long as they could harness that bloc, the black leadership was able to negotiate 
concessions from a white leadership needing their support.164 
 
In the midst of his political authority slowly beginning to slip out from under his grasp, 
then, almost immediately after Lee’s death, Crump was the first to call for a monument, “a 
suitable stone shaft,” to be erected in Lee’s honor.  One can only imagine Crump’s feelings were 
that another public display of support and affection for one of Memphis’ most famous black 
figures would work in his favor to shore up his faltering support among Memphis’ black voters.  
Days later after Lee’s passing, an official announcement of plans for the monument was made in 
a statement released by Crump, countersigned by members of his political machine and members 
of the Memphis Engineers Club: “Mayor Watkins Overton, Chairman E.W. Hale, Will Fowler, 
Hugo Dixon, and I will get up money to erect an appropriate monument to Tom Lee – [a] 
friendly salute to a very worthy citizen.”  The official statement went on to remark, “Tom Lee 
not only risked his own life but he did the work in a kind, cheerful way.  Kindness is the key that 
unlocks all doors.  All the world admires and is inspired by the cheerful giver, cheerful loser, and 
cheerful worker.” 
 Fueled by money gathered from Crump’s committee and private donations from 
Memphis citizens, on July 8, 1954 a 15-foot obelisk was erected in Lee’s honor in downtown 
Memphis on the banks of the Mississippi River.   Inscribed at the base of the monument were the 
following words:  
Tom Lee Memorial – A Very Worthy Negro – Tom Lee with his boat Zev saved 
thirty-two lives when the steamer U.S. Norman sank about twenty miles below 
Memphis May 8, 1925 – But he has a finer monument than this – An invisible one 
– A monument of kindliness, generosity, courage, and bigness of heart – His good 
deeds were scattered every where that day and into eternity. – This monument 
erected by the grateful people of Memphis.165 
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Underneath this inscription were the names of all the important benefactors who had contributed 
to the monument’s erection, a veritable who’s who of white elite Memphis.  By 1954, as one of 
the final acts of governance before his own death, Crump would suggests the renaming of the 
park where Tom Lee’s Memorial was placed after Tom Lee himself.166 
 In the end, this is what ultimately defined the final 27 years of Tom Lee’s life.  At the 
same time as he was publicly celebrated and taken care of by a cadre of Memphis’ most 
influential and elite white citizenry, Tom Lee was also very much used by that same cadre for its 
own purposes.  In short, from the moment words spread of his acts of heroism on May 8, 1925, 
Tom Lee’s public identity would no longer be his own.  Instead, an entirely new Tom Lee would 
be constructed, a respectable Tom Lee, a Tom Lee who’s token-like invocation would be used in 
an attempt to hide the racial discord that was bubbling under the surface in Memphis during this 
very same 27 year time period.  In the next chapter, I will delve more deeply into Memphis’ 
particular racial-political issues during the 1940s. I will show exactly why Crump and the rest of 
the white city government were so desperate to try and avert a growing sense of racial unrest in 
the Memphis and how they ultimately failed to do so. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
“WE’LL HAVE NO RACE TROUBLE HERE” 
 In the fall of 1940, black Memphians experienced a prolonged campaign of harassment, 
searches, seizures mass arrests, and violence at the hands of Memphis police. These actions were 
carried out under the direction of Memphis Police Commissioner Joe Boyle, Mayor Walter 
Chandler, and local political boss Edward Hull Crump in direct response to a growing sense of 
political mobility among Memphis’ black population.  As shown in previous chapters, for 
decades, Crump, the patriarch of Memphis politics in the Jim Crow Era, and his allies had been 
able to buy and intimidate their way into political power with the tacit support of Black 
Memphis.  Throughout the 1920 and 1930s the working relationship between the Crump 
Machine and Memphis’ black elites that had begun so many decades before slowly began to 
crumble.  
As mentioned before, the ideological transcripts that governed race and racial politics in 
Memphis, privileged conformity, cooperation and silence above all other attributes. In the 1910s 
and 1920s, black leaders had begrudgingly accepted these rules as being the cost of having a seat 
at the political table. As the 20s passed into the 30s and passed into the 40s, however, many in 
Memphis’ black political community began to see these same rules as less of an opportunity for 
progress and more of a yoke which circumscribed their actions and their personal and political 
autonomy just as much as any unpayable poll tax or violent lynch mob the likes of which would 
be found in the types of Southern cities that Memphis had worked so long to pretend it was not 
like. Conformity, cooperation and silence were the antitheses of the type of loud disruption 
necessary for societal change to occur. By the time of this chapter’s main focus in the 1940s, 
more and more black leaders in Memphis had grown overtly dissatisfied with the stagnation 
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brought about by their longstanding alliance with the Crump machine. Throughout the 20s and 
30s, he had comfortably come to rely on their votes while they saw little to nothing in return. 
Black Memphis wanted black police officers. They wanted better schools. They wanted black 
political candidates. What they received in return, as the previous chapter showed was token 
gestures and lip service. Fed up with Crump’s iron-fisted rule and broken progressivism then, a 
small cadre of black leaders in the early 40s began to seek out and back other candidates that 
promised to move away from the old “plantation mentality” of Crump and his regime. They 
began planning for disruption.167 
 Black business owners, physicians, educators, clergy and community activists, those who 
made up the bulk of Memphis’ black leadership community, began holding a series of covert 
political meetings in their homes and in their places of business to debate ways to end Crump’s 
multi-decade hold on Memphis politics once and for all. Some favored throwing their weight 
behind Republican candidates to run against Crump’s machine slate of Democrats.168 Others felt 
their best hopes still lay with the Democrats, but more on a national level and wanted to organize 
black Memphians to vote en masse for a Democratic presidential candidate.169 
  Crump considered these actions to be a direct assault by ungrateful black Memphians on 
the well-oiled political machine he had spent his life building, and subsequently ordered 
Memphis police to begin what local and national press soon dubbed the Memphis “Reign of 
Terror,” a city government-sanctioned police occupation of black neighborhoods that lasted from 
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October to December of 1940.170  During this time, hundreds of black Memphians were stopped, 
searched and arrested en masse for infractions that were minor if not outright fictitious. 
 While politics served as the catalyst for these actions, the stated goal of Crump and his 
allies in the Memphis city government in flexing the muscle of local law enforcement in this way 
was the systematic suppression of racial conflict in Memphis.171 In Crump’s eyes, Memphis was 
set apart from other Southern cities with regards to issues of race. In Crump’s mind, he was a 
generous father-type figure to “his” blacks. And like any father, he would provide for them as 
long as they followed the rules of his house, the prime rule, of course, being that there would be 
no challenges to his authority.  Those blacks that violated this prime directive were not simply 
causing a disruption, in Crump’s view, they were destroying the peace of his family and the 
sanctity of his home.  
 To this end, then, Crump and his allies offered public praise, token benefits and a respite 
from legal action to black community leaders who were publicly willing to side with him and 
rebuke other political “agitators” within Memphis’ black population.  Those who continued to 
oppose the Crump machine politically would be shown no such quarter.172 As a result of these 
draconian actions, Memphis’ black leaders soon found themselves at odds with one another other 
over how to respond to Crump.  Some eventually capitulated to Crump’s demands with the hopes 
of earning for themselves or their constituents some small amount of favor or material benefits.  
Others, left lacking communal support, struggled to stand alone against the total might of the 
Crump machine’s tactics of paternalistic harassment and terror. 
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 This chapter explores the details and the impact of the Memphis Reign of Terror, first by 
laying out the key historical actors at the forefront of the narrative, then detailing the events of 
the three-month police occupation of black neighborhoods and black-owned businesses, from 
start to finish and finally ending with an examination of the intra-racial political divisions created 
by and/or exacerbated amongst Memphis’ black leadership community.  What I ultimately argue 
is that this particular moment in Memphis’ history opened up a pronounced and extensive led to 
a wide schism within Memphis’ black community that would only grow wider and more 
disruptive to local black activist efforts become more pronounced over time.  As this chapter will 
argue, the crisis of conscious among many black Memphians caused by the Reign of Terror 
ultimately eroded decades of progress, and delayed by years any real chance at bringing change 
to Memphis’ racial status quo while at the same time leading to an increased need to for 
nationally known figures to step in and make racial politics in Memphis a priority.  
Principal Players 
 Though there are a number of principal players to be aware of in this chapter, Edward 
Hull Crump once again stands at the front of the list. As mentioned in previous chapters, by the 
1940s Crump had forged something of a working relationship with Memphis’ black community 
leaders. While this alliance was mostly imbalanced in terms of power, nevertheless black 
Memphians were enfranchised to just enough of an extent that over the course of the 20s and 30s 
they had grown to see political power as not just a privilege, but as a basic right and necessity as 
citizens. Thus by the time this chapter picks up, tensions between Crump and the black 
community had become more and more noticeable, as an emboldened black middle class began 
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to openly challenge the Crump machine’s right to authority after years of broken promises, lip 
service and regressive actions on the part of the Crump regime.173  
 Of further significant note for this chapter is a man named Joe Boyle, the police 
commissioner of Memphis in the 1940s.  Hand-picked for the job by Crump himself, Boyle was 
a very straight-laced authority figure who operated without Crump’s veneer of racial 
paternalism.  Boyle was not a man to stand for disruption to the racial status quo of Jim Crow 
Era Memphis. He was driven by an unwavering conviction that Communist activity had 
managed to infiltrate Memphis from within Memphis’s black community and that Communist 
agents had designs on upending what was in Boyle’s eyes a relatively stable and friendly 
relationship with black Memphians.174  
 In his position as Memphis police commissioner, Boyle was the public face of the Reign 
of Terror, responsible for overseeing the occupation itself and handling relations with local print 
media. Throughout the entire months-long ordeal as well as afterward, Boyle insisted that the 
occupation was about fishing out subversive elements within the black community and that 
aggressive police action was necessary to maintain order, safety and peace within the city. In 
Boyle’s eyes, the outcome of doing nothing would almost certainly lead to the type of race riots 
affecting Southern cities around the same time.175 In this regard, police monitoring of politically 
active and/or subversive blacks was of absolute necessity. Beyond the specter of racial warfare, 
in Boyle’s express view, black activism if allowed to continue unfettered would not stop at 
politics but would in time escalate to demands for social equality, an absolutely untenable 
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demand that threatened to destroy the social order of things and that needed to be stopped at any 
cost.176 
 A third historical actor worth foregrounding in this chapter is Dr. J.B. Martin – the black 
Memphis physician, druggist, and part owner of a Memphis negro baseball team whose 
pharmacy/general store was a center of black activity and became ground zero for the events of 
the Reign of Terror.  After Martin participated in a number of meetings with other Memphis 
blacks to discuss supporting Republican candidates over Crump’s Democratic machine ticket he 
became the primary target of the Reign of Terror during which Crump and Boyle accused him of 
being everything from a Communist subversive to a dope peddler using his occupation as a 
druggist to cover up his criminal activities.177 Throughout the entire ordeal, Martin unwaveringly 
insisted he was none of these things, and that the only reason he was being targeted was because 
he had the potential to be a powerful political voice for black Memphians.178 The events of the 
Reign of Terror disastrously disrupted Martin’s life, at one point even turning his own brother 
against him to side with Crump and eventually forcing Martin to leave Memphis entirely for 
Chicago. Subsequently, in an unheard of action, Martin would be barred from coming back to the 
city without special permission from Crump himself. 
 The events of the Memphis Reign of Terror lasted in total from October of 1940 to 
December of 1940. This chapter divides these events into three separate phases: 1. The initial 
raid and occupation of J.B. Martin’s store, which made headlines and created a large stir het 
turned up little in terms of illegal activity; 2. An expansion from a focus solely on Martin and his 
store into raids on numerous black businesses and neighborhoods in the surrounding area. These 
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efforts yielded a high number of arrests but also began to provoke a communal backlash that in 
turn lead to the third phase of the Reign of Terror; 3. The formation of an interracial committee 
comprised of local clergy and educators set on ending the dispute peacefully; and also a Federal 
investigation of Crump and Boyle’s activities. These two events eventually lead to the full 
withdrawal of police officers from the occupied black neighborhoods and businesses.   
The following sections of this chapter describes and analyzes each of these phases in detail while 
also analyzing the ways in which these events help us to understand some of the peculiar racial 
politics at play in Memphis under Jim Crow. This chapter concludes by examining in close detail 
the final outcomes and consequences of the Reign of Terror for black politics and activism in 
Memphis. 
Occupying Black Memphis 
 It started one morning in late October with a police raid on Dr. J.B. Martin’s South 
Memphis area pharmacy and general store.  Martin, a prominent black business owner had 
recently held a number of meetings with other black business owners and community leaders in 
his home on the topic of selecting a Republican challenger to run against the Crump machine in 
the next election thereby breaking away from Democratic rule in Memphis.  Martin was a part of 
a growing class of black activists and community leaders who had begun to endorse and field 
their own slate of candidates for local political office.  
 With these actions Memphis’ black community declared in no uncertain terms that they 
had had enough of Crump’s stagnant attempts at placating their concerns.  In turn, these actions 
provoked a swift and summary reaction from the Crump administration in an effort to maintain 
its grip on Memphis politics. This, however, was never the official reason given for the raid on 
and occupation of Martin’s shop.  Rather, over the course of the next three months, Martin would 
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alternately be accused by E.H. Crump and Joe Boyle of being a “race agitator” out to stir up a 
riot and rebellion, a Communist conspiring with other “Reds” to infiltrate and undermine the 
sovereignty of the Union, and the operator of a den of vice where black outlaws and thugs 
congregated to fight, drink and gamble.179  
 It is important to note here the reasons behind this targeted character assassination of 
Martin. Memphis, as Crump and his machine lieutenants repeatedly liked to point out was not 
like other Southern cities in terms of race relations between blacks and whites. The nakedly open 
violence and intimidation of blacks that other Southern cities such as Little Rock, Atlanta, and 
Birmingham, to name just a few, experienced as a function of day-to-day life by and large did 
not occur in Memphis during the Jim Crow Era. However, whereas Crump, Boyle, and others in 
his regime would point to this contrast as a sign of supposed racial harmony in Memphis, in 
actuality, this idea could not have been further from the truth.  
 The outward lack of racial violence in Jim Crow Memphis merely masked a more 
insidious form of black disenfranchisement.  Despite the machine’s overtures, Memphis was not 
a racially progressive city. Yet, Crump’s designs to shake Memphis’ longstanding reputation as a 
Southern backwater and turn it into a city of national importance necessitated a less open form of 
racial oppression. The Southern horrors of other cities would not be tolerated under the intense 
scrutiny of the national spotlight Crump wanted to shine on Memphis. And yet, Crump and his 
administration could not abide the specter of equality between the races either. It was simply a 
bridge too far, especially for Boyle who in a moment of perhaps careless honesty while speaking 
to local reporters remarked that Memphis always was and always would be “a white man’s city” 
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and that “any negro who doesn’t agree to this better move on.”180 Thus, any and all acts of racial 
violence and intimidation against Memphis’s black population was either done covertly or 
intentionally framed in such a manner as to provide a level of plausible deniability that such acts 
had been motivated solely by race.  
Cast in this light, then, such a grand and far-reaching event as the Memphis Reign of 
Terror called for a similarly grand effort at message control on the part of the Crump regime. It 
would draw national outrage and condemnation if Crump, Boyle et. al. were seen as explicitly 
violating the civil liberties and rights of equal protection under the law of political and racial 
rivals. However, if they were merely conducting a sweep into an unseemly area of town and 
routing out a few undesirables who just happened to be black and politically active, then that was 
an entirely different story, one which Crump must have felt would have withstood national 
scrutiny. 
 On the first day of the raid, October 25, 1940, about 40 white customers and 200 black 
customers were stopped and searched by Memphis police officers under the direct command of 
Police Commissioner Joe Boyle. Turning up no evidence of illegal activity, Boyle ordered his 
officers to maintain a presence at the location throughout the rest of the night.181 Boyle because 
the de facto face of the Reign of Terror owing to his position as police commissioner, and 
perhaps sensing that some would argue his actions were motivated by more than an innocuous 
desire to clean up the streets of Memphis, Police Commissioner Boyle was quick to get out in 
front of the news in an attempt to shape how its narrative would be told. Boyle declared in no 
uncertain terms, “The policing [of Martin’s shop] has nothing to do with politics” but instead 
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was related to allegations from undisclosed sources of “dope-peddling” on Martin’s part.182 
Martin, of course, was quick to deny such allegations insisting firmly that political revenge was 
the sole factor for the occupation of his store.183  
 Undeterred by Martin’s protestations, Boyle stuck to his story, declaring that he was 
“going to continue policing Martin’s place until this nuisance [by which he meant the alleged 
illegal drug selling] is cleared up.” “I’ve warned Martin before, and I mean business,” Boyle told 
local papers.184 To bolster his claim of Martin’s ill character, Boyle provided local reporters with 
records of a dismissed case where Martin had once been accused of buying stolen a shipment of 
aspirin from two other blacks.  Furthermore, Boyle alleged Martin had earlier in the year 
somehow intervened in keeping a black woman from being taken to court over a speeding ticket 
by bribing the police officer who made the traffic stop.185  No evidence was provided for these 
claims, but as a final dig at Martin’s character and integrity, Boyle pointed to a pool hall and 
restaurant that was neighbor to Martin’s shop as being the site of known drug activity and 
violence, implying Martin was either directly connected to these incidents or at the very least 
must have known of them by virtue of his drug store being in close proximity to.186  
 The focus on Martin in all of these accusations was made all the more specious 
considering how prominent Martin was within Memphis’ black community. Not only did 
Martin’s drugstore stand as a center a social activity, Martin was also the newly elected chairman 
of a Republican political committee. In addition, Martin was also president of the American 
Negro Baseball Association and co-owner of the Memphis Red Sox, Memphis’ all-black 
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baseball team.187 Any single one of these facts would have made Martin a respected and well-
known figure in the local black community. All three, however, made Martin a cornerstone of it. 
 Clearly, Boyle’s strategy was to attack not only Martin’s livelihood as a reputable 
physician but his standing within Memphis’ black community as well, making an example out of 
Martin so that others would see the disruption in his life and cease any and all political activities. 
In this endeavor Boyle had the express backing of the city’s political machine, as then-current 
mayor Walter Chandler soon issued a statement of support for Boyle’s activities declaring 
unequivocally “More power to Joe [Boyle]. I believe he is on the right track . . . Drug addicts 
cannot hold off long. They have got to have the drug and will come for it sooner or later.”188  
Ignoring suggestions of ulterior motives for and legal impropriety of the raid and occupation 
based on Martin’s recent political activities, Chandler went on to state “This is no time for 
appeasement with law violators and those under suspicion. The man who sells narcotics to the 
unfortunate victims of the drug habit is entitled to no mercy.”189 
 Police Commissioner Boyle stated numerously that the goal of his raids into black 
communities was to crack down on “undesirables.”  His list of people under surveillance ran the 
gamut from preachers, doctors, restaurant owners, newspaper reporters, drug store owners like 
Martin and even an undertaker. They were all potential subversives, and in Boyle’s view it was 
an “established fact” that “radical labor agitators and subversive agents [had] been working 
among Southern negroes for a long time.”  If anyone was to blame for the trouble that Fall, it 
was the blacks themselves who had been out “fanning race hatred.”190   
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 Writing letters to local white papers with regularity, Boyle pointed out the necessity of 
his occupation by routinely stating that his police force was all that stood between safety and 
order on one hand, and all-out racial warfare the likes of which other Southern cities were seeing.  
“We are not going to have any trouble with the Negroes in Memphis if it can be avoided,” Boyle 
wrote. “A great many cities in the North and South have had serious race riots with tremendous 
blood-shed. If careful and stern preparation for the defense of peace will prevent it, it will be 
prevented in Memphis.” If the true intent and meaning of Boyle’s words could be mistaken up to 
this point, Boyle went clarified more explicitly, “I say again this is a white man’s country, and 
always will be and any negro who doesn’t agree to this better move on.”  It should be noted of 
course that no evidence of Communist or labor union involvement was ever found in these raids 
and that despite Boyle’s charged rhetoric, such suspicions were never the true point of the Reign 
of Terror to begin with.  The “evidence” that Boyle and Crump used to justify the raids ranged 
from local black papers copying stories about racial issues in cities such as Chicago and 
Pittsburgh. These stores covered topics as wide-ranging as fights between black and white teens 
after football games, blacks gathering in crowds and cursing whites who drive by, blacks taking 
up too many seats while riding public transportation. To Boyle and Crump, Northern stories such 
as these being reported on in the South had the potential to stir up trouble and discontent in 
Memphis, upsetting the delicate balance of “peaceful” relations between the races.191  
 Throughout all of this, however, Boyle repeatedly made a key distinction between blacks 
who were “patriots” and those who were “dissidents” whose ideological leanings were “selfish” 
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and, as Boyle pointedly noted, carried a “distinctly Nazi flavor.” The misappropriation of such 
rhetoric here perhaps verges on the absurd, and yet it was an ideology routinely espoused by the 
Crump machine, for what better way to portray one’s cause as righteous and detractors as 
abhorrent than by using what in many regards may be the epitome of such a dichotomy. In this 
schema, “patriots” were those backed the goals of E.H. Crump and recognized his benevolence. 
“Dissidents” were, in short, those who did not.  
 In this regard, Boyle, and by extension Crump, explicitly attempted to divide the black 
community into “good” and “bad” members while offering an “out” to those who would take it 
and publicly rebuke their “bad” counterparts.  Boyle’s likening of black agitation to Fascism 
stands as a self-evident bit of historical irony one hand. But on the other, such patently absurd 
rhetoric also highlights the desperation on the part of the Crump machine to fully marginalize 
such agitation as something innately foreign or outside of the mainstream within the context of 
traditional Southern society. 
Boyle furthermore wrote that any “intelligent” negro knew it to be correct in his or her 
heart that “for the safety of all Negroes,” a stand had to be taken by their more reasonable 
counterparts. They should abandon the agitators within their number and stand on the side of 
order, the side represented by E.H. Crump’s governance.  If they rejected this offer of a “squarer 
deal,” as one commentator put it, they would all “pay harshly” as a group for the actions of the 
few.192 This thinly veiled threat of racial violence served as a backup plan should the rhetoric of 
kindly and benign paternalism fail to meet its mark. 
 It would seem, however, that some combination of the Crump machine’s carrot and stick 
offer did work exactly as planned, as one of the most surprisingly open defenders of Crump and 
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Boyle’s actions, however, turned out to be J.B. Martin’ own brother, W.S. Martin, a local 
physician and someone else who would have been looked at as an influential black community 
member. Writing a personal letter to Crump about a week after the police occupation had begun, 
the other Martin pleaded with Crump not to lump him in together with the “serious mistake” of 
his brother’s political actions and was emphatic that in contrast to his brother, he was in fact 
quite grateful for Crump’s many years of patronage and benefits, including the construction of 
new schools and playgrounds, and the renovation of three negro housing projects.  Reminding 
Crump of his appointment by a city councilman to a local negro Democratic political board, 
W.S. Martin promised that he would ask all of his friends and associates to remain loyal to the 
Democratic ticket from President Roosevelt on down.  
Taking pains to remind Crump of the “30 year-long relationship” the two had (one 
questions the need to so explicitly do so if their relationship was as close as Martin intimates) 
that began with Martin purchasing a buggy from Crump, Martin closes his letter by once again 
emphasizing that his intent in writing was to assure Crump that he “appreciate[d] all you have 
done for the colored people of Memphis and Shelby county and that I am one hundred percent 
behind the entire democratic ticket and that I deem it a privilege and an honor in doing so.”193 In 
contrast to the close relationship Martin appeared to believe he shared with Crump, just a few 
months earlier he had written another letter practically begging Crump for just a “five or ten 
minute conference” to get Crump’s advice on a business matter.194 
 Another revealing example of black leaders flocking to rebuke Martin and his political 
activities involved black physician, Dr. T.O. Fuller. With Fuller having long been a member of 
Crump’s inner circle of black community leaders, J.B. Martin wrote to him seeking aid in the 
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hopes that Fuller could convince Crump end the occupation of Martin’s pharmacy. In his letter, 
Martin earnestly pleaded his case that he was a man who, despite owning his own shop and being 
seen as one of the more prominent of Memphis’ black community. In actuality, he was not a very 
wealthy man, and he could not withstand the loss of business caused by the Memphis Police 
Department’s occupation for much longer.  Martin wrote that “I have been misunderstood, and I 
am making this for appeal to you to straighten this matter our for me. With all that you have done 
for the administration, if you can’t, no one else can. If you think my activities in politics has 
anything to do with the matter, I am willing to cease from now on.”195 
 Whether Martin’s turnaround here represented an actual acquiescence to the machine or 
simply a desire to see his life swiftly return to some semblance of normalcy, there is no record 
available of how Fuller responded to Martin’s plea. From what is known of Fuller’s own history, 
however, one can presume it would not have been the way Martin intended.  Fuller, arguably 
even more so than Martin’s own brother was loyal to and firmly in the pocket of the Crump 
administration.  Fuller, in fact, seemed to enjoy the type of close relationship with Crump and the 
machine that W.S. Martin so wishfully presumed to enjoy. Routinely, Crump and Fuller would 
exchange favors with one another.  Crump would donate money to the church that Fuller owned, 
and Fuller would respond in kind by, for example, providing Crump with such items as free 
passes to see the local negro baseball team, the Memphis Red Sox.196 Fuller would on other 
occasions entreat Crump to offer a letter of support to a friend hoping to avoid the draft and also 
ask Crump for monetary support to bring a black Baptist convention to Memphis, pledging that 
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such an act of support would make valuable inroads with Southern negroes.197 In time, Fuller 
would even go on to personally attempt to persuade Crump of the need to compile lists of loyal 
members of the black community who could be counted on to pledge their allegiances to Crump 
in future political endeavors. These negro “Friends of Shelby County” were, on Fuller’s 
suggestion, to be organized into constituency blocks by occupation, targeting black business 
owners, teachers, clergy, general laborers, and so forth.198  
 The question must be asked here, what was it that caused so many of Memphis’ black 
elite to continue to support Crump in the face of the havoc his administration was wreaking on 
members of their own community? There is the obvious answer Crump’s intimidation tactics 
were working and that they were simply fearful of being Crump’s next targets if they openly 
opposed him in the way that J.B. Martin did. However, I argue that this is only half of a broader 
conclusion that can be reached here. In order to fully understand the somewhat puzzling loyalty 
that these black elites continued to show the Crump regime, we must think historically about the 
type of relationship between Crump and his black allies in Memphis.  
 As mentioned previously, Memphis was unlike the majority of other Southern cities 
when it came to relations between the city’s white ruling class and its black leaders. For decades 
up to this point, the two sides had managed to maintain something of a working relationship in 
terms of quid pro quo benefits. The black elite kept the broader masses convinced that Crump 
and his regime were their best hopes for political enfranchisement and by doing so likewise 
prevented Memphis’ black population from causing too much disruption to Crump’s agenda. In 
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return, Crump only rarely openly resorted to the types of heavy-handed racial violence found in 
other areas of the deep South and from time to time would make a token gesture towards 
addressing one of the many ills plaguing the black community, for example, approving the 
construction of a segregated swimming pool or public park so that blacks had a public space to 
congregate that approximated those that white Memphians often took for granted.  
 Make no mistake however; this relationship was decidedly slanted in Crump’s favor.  It 
was something of an open secret in Memphis that dissenters to white authority in Memphis were 
taken care of private and under the cloak of darkness rather than in the naked daylight of the 
public watch. Yet, it must also be understood that as unequal a power relationship as it was, it 
was still far more beneficial than the racial norms of Jim Crow South writ large dictated.  Thus, 
in this light, many of Memphis’ black elites while perhaps privately none too fond of Crump’s 
paternalism felt it was either making due with his caprices or nothing at all. The grip on a sliver 
of racial equality in Memphis was at best always a tenuous one, and the efforts of J.B. Martin 
and others threatened to render it nonexistent entirely, or in other words, ruining it for everyone. 
In the moment, then, that fear superseded any supposed ideas of racial solidarity, prompting so 
many to throw Martin under the figurative bus when the opportunity arose.  
 The actions of T.O. Fuller’s and W.S. Martin show us that despite Crump’s incursion into 
black civil liberties, the ties that bound the Crump machine and Memphis’ black leadership 
community were still quite strong at this historical moment. They were solid enough to the point 
where voiced political opposition to the machine provoked a virulent response from within 
Memphis’ black community, as many were fearful of losing the working relationships that they 
had with the Crump machine.  
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The Machine Reaches Further 
 The round-the-clock surveillance and policing of Martin’s store and customers would 
continue on for weeks with no tangible results in terms of arrests to show for the effort.  Now 
entering its second month, and with local media beginning to openly question the purpose 
efficacy of the occupation, Boyle ordered his officers to spread out their efforts and search not 
just Martin’s customers but anyone who happened to be out occupying the vicinity and looked 
like they might be of suspicious character. These searches quickly escalated into mass arrests. 
Blacks, Hispanics, the elderly, the young, the working and the unemployed were all fair game to 
be targeted. They were all rounded up and prosecuted with more than a few tales of injuries 
being picked up along the way.  
 The paranoia of the ongoing raid reached a fever pitch when even a white Catholic priest 
walking through the neighborhood was caught in the dragnet at one point. Father Bertrand Kock, 
clad in full monk’s robes, was stopped by police, searched and even ordered to remove his 
sandals and stockings for inspection. Kock was in the area to visit a black parishioner, of which 
he had more than 700, as he belonged to one of only two Catholic churches in Memphis that 
served blacks. Kock would note that for the all the impropriety of his search, during his 
experience he witnessed a number of blacks themselves being treated much more harshly being 
physically shoved around by police officers stationed in the area.199  
  Of course, any reasonable person would not have suspected the good Father of engaging 
in any of the illicit activities of which Martin and others in the black neighborhood were being 
publicly accused of.  And yet, Father Kock was detained and harassed regardless of the respect 
one would assume his clothing, let alone his race, would have provided him with. The real crime 
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that Kock committed to warrant such treatment was his traversal onto what was seen as a black 
space.  Knowingly or unknowingly, by visiting Martin’s shop, Kock transgressed against 
Memphis’ hidden racial boundaries. There was a “black” sphere and a “white” sphere, and the 
two were only meant to intersect under controlled conditions. The fact that Kock routinely 
ministered to black parishioners in the neighborhood made his transgression all the more severe.  
Thus, in the moment of his detainment, Kock was no longer seen as a priest or even a white 
Memphian. Rather, these facets of his identity were forcefully and quite literally in regard to his 
clothing, stripped from him, and for the moment he became just another person upsetting the 
racial order of Jim Crow Memphis.  
 Perhaps the most dramatic action of the Reign of Terror next to the initial raid on J.B. 
Martin’s store, however, was a mass arrest that occurred around 3 weeks into the occupation in 
mid-November. All told 65 blacks were rounded up in one fell swoop out on Beale St.  Widely 
noted and even celebrated in song as an area of the city that was the pre-eminent destination for 
black social activity, the Beale St. represented no less than a full-frontal assault on the civil 
liberties and freedoms of black Memphians even as Boyle stressed that he had nothing personal 
against the good and “honest” blacks who frequented the street and its establishments.  On the 
13th of November, after Boyle announced an expanded initiative to include “all the lawless 
frequenting and operating on Beale . . . and other sections of the city where lawlessness has been 
known to exist,” 10 businesses, from cafes, to pool halls, to restaurants and juke joints, were 
raided in one night by over 20 officers. Making sure to tie the raids in with the ongoing crusade 
against J.B. Martin, Boyle issued a public statement that the raids were part in parcel with his 
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agenda of cleaning up Memphis and issued a new attack against Martin claiming that he had 
once bribed a former police chief with an expensive new suit.200 
A total of 65 blacks, systematically, lined up, searched and arrested with each charged 
with carrying a knife or other illegal item, things like pen knives, switchblades and what was 
known as an “Arkansas toothpick.” Of the 65, 5 were released the next day because it was 
decided their weapons did not fit the parameters/description to be considered illegal. The others 
were all fined $50 each. One man, Roy King, protested that the police had no right to search him 
without probable cause and was fined an additional $10 on a charge of public intoxication.201 
Police and local newspapers hailed the mass roundup as a sign that Boyle’s occupation was 
working as intended and pointed to a subsequent lack of stabbings and arrests for weapons 
carrying as proof.202   
 As the occupation stretched on into the month of December, Boyle would continue to 
proclaim his the need for vigilance, at one point declaring that after months of effort, he had 
identified a number of subversives within the black community whom he charged with “fanning 
race hatred.” Boyle’s list included black clergy, doctors, cooks and restaurant owners, newspaper 
writers and editors, an undertaker and, pointedly, “one negro drug store operator.” List cast 
suspicion on blacks from all walks of life, with the explicit assumption that anyone could be and 
most likely was guilty until proven innocent. “Should anything happen in Memphis,” Boyle 
declared, “These 19 will be largely responsible for it.”203 
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Signs of a Counter-Offensive 
 With the paranoia escalating and reaching perhaps its zenith with this proclamation and 
the occupation now dragging on into a third month of police occupation and harassment, an 
organized backlash began to unfold, as some in Memphis’ community decided that enough was 
enough. Two significant events happened in the latter stages of the occupation that forced Boyle, 
Mayor Chandler and Crump’s hands as far as calling off the continued police occupation of 
black neighborhoods and eventually led to them calling off the occupation entirely. These events 
showcase both the ways in which the Reign of Terror had begun to change the nature of racial 
politics in Memphis in some aspects, while reinforcing the status quo in other aspects. 
The first event of note, and unprecedented in Memphis history up to this point, was the 
formation of an interracial counsel Commission that was comprised of local clergymen and 
educators. This commission tasked itself with the goal of ending the police that wanted an end to 
the occupation of black Memphis and in the process, restoring a measure a restoration of peace 
to in what they saw as a the city in the grip of turmoil. This commission was fairly diverse in 
terms of its racial make-up. The commission included not only prominent black ministers such as 
Rev. George A. Long of Beale St. Baptist Church, Rev. Harry B. Gordon of Centenary 
Methodist Church, and Rev. Howard Perry, but also white ministers clergy who were well-
known in the city such as Rev. William G. Gerhl of Grace St. Luke’s Episcopal Church, Rev. 
Alfred Loaring-Clark of St. John’s Episcopal Church., and The diversity of this commission was 
purposeful insofar as its members wanted to present a racially united front to show the Crump 
administration that the Reign of Terror was an event that in one way or another affected all 
Memphis alike, not just black and white. . As will be shown, however, given the prevailing racial 
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climate of Memphis, the commission’s diversity was ultimately both its greatest strength and a 
source of weakness.204 
 For weeks after its initial formation in November, the commission attempted to meet with 
either Boyle, Chandler or Crump in an effort to express their concerns over what they called the 
harassment, intimidation and persecution of black Memphians. For just as many weeks, however, 
their efforts for what they perceived to be entirely political reasons, and they were repeatedly 
denied a face to face with anyone in charge. The Crump regime had no intentions whatsoever of 
dignifying the commission’s efforts in the public eye, as to even grant them a meeting would 
have meant that their concerns about racial persecution in the city were valid enough that they 
even needed to be addressed. Not only that, Boyle went as far as to publicly rebuke their efforts 
by saying they were dangerously close to promoting full social equality between black and white 
Memphians, a charge that in the South routinely served as a way to stymie racially progressive 
activism.205 The specter of “full” racial equality in the South invariably played upon deeply 
rooted fears to the fear amongst many Southern whites that a time would come in the life of 
America where they would be compelled against their will of not only being not only forced to 
share public spaces with blacks but, even worse, to envision a future ruled by miscegenation and 
the “tainting” of the white genetic stock.  The term “racial equality” as spoken by Southern 
whites had carried these connotations for decades by the time of the Memphis Reign of Terror, 
and Boyle knew exactly the effect his charges would have in the Interracial Commission’s 
efforts.  
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 In a sternly worded letter, Boyle wrote “Lawlessness of this city is our problem, day and 
night and we suggest you leave it to us. We know what we are doing.”206 Boyle argued that 
Memphis blacks had absolutely no grounds to complain given that for such a large percentage of 
its population their total taxes paid only totaled 5% of the city’s income collection. “We have no 
race trouble here,” Boyle stated plainly at one point.  It was a refrain that would become the go-
to defense against any and all challenges to white authority in Memphis. The true source of any 
perceived discontent came from “selfish and unprincipled negro paper promoters” who were 
intent on “conducting themselves as if they lived in Chicago, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.”  
 Moreover, Boyle charged that the black members of the interracial commission, 
specifically those such as Rev. Long and Rev. Gibson were firmly against the notion of “white 
supremacy” which was the natural order of things in Memphis. Finally, Boyle concluded by 
imploring the white members of the commission to rethink their positions, arguing, “Please don’t 
be disturbed – have no misgivings about the negroes here. Much has been done for them. Mayor 
Walter Chandler, Mr. H.W. Hale and Mr. E.H. Crump have had their interest at heart for many 
years – long before a majority of the Interracial Commission came to live in Memphis.”207  
 Never missing a chance to take another pot shot at J.B. Martin, Boyle also argued that the 
white commission members should be careful of the company they cast their lots in together 
with, saying that Martin and his wife, being fair skinned, had once passed for white to attend a 
Barnum and Bailey Circus and gloated about the fact afterward. “It is utterly beyond my 
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understanding how you white ministers can get in on a proposition of this kind when you are so 
poorly informed on what is actually going on.”208   
 Knowing the stakes of allowing such charges to stand, this was a charge the council, of 
course, strenuously denied Boyle’s allegations. Whatever their intentions truly were, to 
publically admit otherwise would have been tantamount to discrediting their efforts entirely with 
the majority of Memphis’ white population. Thus, the united racial front that had begun in 
earnest as an effort to show how the Reign of Terror had disrupted the peace of Memphis for all 
its citizens, not just blacks, now turned into a liability for the council’s efforts. The popular 
thinking in Jim Crow Memphis was that the one and only reason an organized interracial group 
would or even could exist was if it had some grand agenda to fully invert the city’s white, male 
power structure, what many whites took for granted as the sheer natural order of things. The 
organized co-mingling of the races in such a manner was otherwise anathema.  
 For their part, many black members of the Interracial Commission spoke out about what 
they saw as the true reason for the intrusions into black neighborhoods.  Rev. George Long and a 
number of other black clergy argued that the search for “reds” and subversives was in effect little 
more than a coded message meant to disguise the political motivations of Crump and Boyle. 
Upon receiving death threats in the mail, Long pleaded vehemently that he had “never made any 
statements about Negro social equality . . . The whole thing is over the fact that I was active 
politically during the recent campaign, but not on the side of the political administration.”209  
 In this statement we see multiple things beginning to happen.  While Long and other were 
very adamant about exposing the police occupation for the politically-motivated farce that it was, 
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even while defending themselves, many of those very same leaders in no uncertain terms began 
distancing themselves from the more radical charges of stirring up discontent within Memphis’ 
black community.  This active distancing reveals a thought that many black leaders would come 
to share, that it was far better and more palatable to be seen as simply exercising one’s political 
rights than fighting for one’s civil rights.210 The white members of the Interracial Commission 
eventually adopted a similar stance.   
Denied a face-to face meeting with Boyle, Mayor Chandler or Boss Crump himself for 
weeks now, the commission began to moderate its tone and message. This in turn finally led to 
the council being granted a two-hour meeting with both Boyle and Chandler in early December. 
The meeting, most tellingly, was held on the condition that only the white members of the 
commission could be in attendance.211 Thus, the message being sent was clear. Despite the 
commission’s efforts to involve blacks in the process, the Reign of Terror would be discussed 
and planned only on the terms of white authority in the city. This was something that was 
happening to Memphis blacks. It was not something happening with them, an important 
distinction. 
 Somewhat astonishingly, despite it occurring on segregated terms and with no black input 
whatsoever, the meeting was hailed as a total success and landmark moment in the history of 
race relations in Memphis by both, as the two sides – Boyle and Chandler, and very specifically 
the white members of the Interracial Commission. The details of the meeting were not made 
public; nevertheless, both sides proclaimed victory and publicly stated that any tensions between 
the two sides were the result of misunderstandings of each other.  Rev. Alfred Loaring-Clark of 
St. John’s Episcopal Church stated “We had a very happy conference . . . From beginning to end, 
                                                
210	  “Politics,	  Says	  Negro	  Pastor,	  Referring	  To	  Charges	  Made	  In	  Boyle	  Letter,”	  The	  Commercial	  Appeal,	  date	  unknown,	  1940 
211	  Racial	  Commission	  and	  City	  Fathers	  in	  Harmony,	  Memphis	  Press-­‐Scimitar,	  December	  1940 
 112 
no antagonism was shown and the city stated its intentions of continuing the policy of help and 
consideration of all negro problems.”  
 Loaring-Clark went on to describe how “The Interracial Commission stated its objective 
of better relations between the two races in Memphis. It added that the perfect race relations 
could better be accomplished by understanding and good will than by force. I think the city 
agreed in that.” On the question of social equality between blacks and whites, it was stated “No 
such thing as race equality has ever been mentioned in our meetings. We’re all Southerners.” 
Rev. W.B. Selah of St. John’s Methodist Church concurred, opining; “I thought we had a very 
good meeting and have ironed out any differences that may have existed between city officials 
and the commission. I believe we will be able to work together.”212  
 For his part, Mayor Chandler was in complete agreement with this assessment. “The 
ministers who called on us expressed approval of the city’s law enforcement program and 
assured us that their sole desire is to co-operate whenever possible for them to do so. They 
expressed the feeling that their membership on the commission might enable them to be of good 
service to the city government in meeting inter-racial problems arising from time to time. 
Commissioner Boyle and I thanked them and assured them of our appreciation of their good 
purposes.”213 
 Perhaps most telling in the midst of this celebration and back patting, there was no public 
statement on whether or not the police occupation of black neighborhoods would end. For all the 
pomp and circumstance in the wake of the meeting, little that was tangible actually occurred in 
its aftermath.  Perhaps content that just by expressing its views to those in charge, even if those 
views had been moderated to an extent, it had done as much as it could, or perhaps fearful of 
                                                
212	  Racial	  Commission	  and	  City	  Fathers	  in	  Harmony,	  Memphis	  Press-­‐Scimitar,	  December	  1940 
213	  Racial	  Commission	  and	  City	  Fathers	  in	  Harmony,	  Memphis	  Press-­‐Scimitar,	  December	  1940 
 113 
pushing a more radical agenda, the commission no longer took it upon itself to try and end the 
Reign of Terror. The claim that the basic civil and human rights of black Memphians were being 
violated by the events of the Reign of Terror would no longer be a tenable argument, as any the 
easy capitulation of the Interracial Commission to the machine for all intents and purposes 
rendered any further efforts at discursive protest moot. 
Federal Intervention 
Even as the efforts of the Interracial Commission to end the Reign of Terror ultimately 
petered out ineffectually, other avenues for redress had already been set in motion. With the 
Reign of Terror having dragged on for three solid months of raids, searches, seizures, arrests and 
beatings, the news of what was occurring down in Memphis eventually filtered out to a national 
audience bringing more attention to the city than any in the Memphis city government wanted.  
 Ray H. Jenkins, state manager for the Tennessee Republican party took note in late 
November and released a statement that the disenfranchisement of potential Republican voters in 
Memphis was unconscionable, illegal and needed to be brought to a swift end. In his view, the 
Reign of Terror “amount[ed] to a confiscation of a person’s property,” and “That’s the most 
deadly way in the world to put a man out of business.”214 Boyle, in typical blustery fashion, 
advised Jenkins “to keep [his] hands out of Memphis.”215 Boyle sent a telegram to Jenkins 
warning him “When you endeavor to defend J.B. Martin, do you realize you are defending one 
who is a common fence dealing in stolen property whose police record is notorious in this 
community and further has been the subject of a narcotic investigation?”216 As he likewise has 
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told the Interracial Commission, Boyle went on to write, “If you knew the facts, you are 
undertaking to defend practices that no honorable man would countenance.”217 
 Here we see multiple things happening at once in regards to the tension between the 
racial conflicts of Jim Crow Memphis being at once a local concern and also a concern that 
touched upon larger statewide and national concerns. For all the effort at painting the occupation 
of black neighborhoods and businesses in Memphis as a routine and necessary measure to stop 
and deter illicit activity, the scale of such an undertaking and its brazenness was on an entirely 
new level compared to Memphis’s prior history of racial conflicts. In part, this reaction tapped 
into a fairly long-simmering schism between West Tennessee politics and East Tennessee 
politics. The former had been synonymous with Crump and his machine brand of politics for 
decades at this point, drawing the ire of many of Tennessee’s other politicians and businessmen 
who viewed Crump as rule-breaking upstart and demagogue. This in part explains why the 
concern manifested itself in terms of Crump potentially driving Martin out of business, rather 
than revolving around the machine’s racial antagonism. That stated, while to a certain extent the 
criticism of Crump played into longstanding political and business rivalries, I argue that the 
inherent drama of an event such as the Reign of Terror was such that the usual message 
massaging on the part of the Crump administration failed to keep the Reign of Terror a strictly 
local affair. 
 In that regard, if Boyle, Chandler and Crump thought that would be the end of outside 
investigation into their affairs, however, they were sorely mistaken.   On a national level, there 
was no institution more dedicated to exposing and ending Crump and Boyle’s machinations than 
black newspaper, the Chicago Defender.  Martin and other local blacks reached out to the 
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Defender in an effort to get their story out with the hopes that by drawing national attention to it, 
Crump and Boyle would relent.  The editors of the Defender, having a longstanding national 
reputation as a defender of black rights longstanding grudge against Crump were more than 
happy to oblige, and ran frequent editorials excoriating the “tyrant” at the head of Memphis 
politics. Moreover, the paper called on and calling on the both President Roosevelt and the 
Department of Justice and even President Roosevelt himself to take action to end what the paper 
dubbed, the Memphis Reign of Terror.218  
 As if such a large amount of unwanted national attention was not enough, the final nail in 
the coffin for the events of the Reign of Terror was driven when the U.S. federal government 
began to get involved. What made this wound the most severe was that it was entirely self-
inflicted on the part of the Crump administration.  While on a trip to the East Coast, in early 
December, Boyle had met with FBI authorities and federal Narcotics Division officials seeking 
aid in his ongoing effort to “clean up Memphis.”  Upon his return to Memphis, Boyle offered 
optimistically “All I can say about it is that I talked with the heads of these two departments and 
received full assurance of co-operation wherever it is needed.” Boyle added, “There are lots of 
things we can do by ourselves, but there are other things, naturally, in which we must be assisted.  
An FBI agent is expected here in about a month to investigate certain of these things. They aren’t 
going finishing up this cleanup program though. I haven’t started anything I can’t finish, and I’m 
not going to.”219  
 These words however would prove to be a bit of an overreach on Boyle’s part however, 
as within just a few weeks, he shut down the police occupation suddenly and overnight. The 
normally quite loquacious talkative Boyle merely issued a terse statement that read, said “We are 
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going to police the store in a different manner.” Moreover, Boyle, Chandler and Crump and 
stridently,” and refused to comment further on the reasons for the abrupt reversal of position.220 
What could have happened to cause such an abrupt turnaround? 
 We can make an educated guess that the looming Federal appraisal of the situation in 
Memphis had at least something to do with. Whereas as Boyle initially projected a bold sense of 
optimism that the federal government would certainly back up his efforts at policing black 
Memphis, the truth could not have been further from such hubris.   U.S. Justice Dept. Attorney 
Col. Amos W.W. Woodcock visited Memphis after President Roosevelt received a strongly 
worded letter for help from the Southern Conference for Human Welfare r. regarding the 
harassment of blacks that had been occurring in Memphis for 3 months.221 The letter was 
particularly damning for Boyle, Crump and Mayor Chandler arguing 6 major points:  
1. In retaliation for black community organizing over supporting other 
presidential candidates than the one Crump preferred, the Memphis police began a 
systematic campaign designed to drive Martin and other black community leaders 
out of business “under the guise” of law enforcement. 2. The Memphis police had 
threatened to “run out of town” “scores” of black Memphians who opposed the 
Crump regime politically, most notably black newspaper editors and writers. 3. 
“Scores” of blacks had been arrested solely on a loosely defined charge of 
“loitering” and nothing else. 4. On segregated streetcars, black Memphians had 
been routinely provoked to anger by Memphis police in an effort to give the 
police department “a pretext for wholesale violence.” 5. Memphis authorities 
stockpiled numerous submachine guns in anticipation of their use being necessary 
in what they saw as the likely event a full-on race riot. 6. Members of the 
Interracial Religious Commission had been pressured to cancel a planned 
conference scheduled for late December because of what police referred to as 
“reliable evidence” that the conference was meant to be a build-up to a race riot.  
These conditions do evidence that a race riot situation is being fanned by 
theauthorities of Memphis, including Ed. H. Crump. As to what reasons like 
behind this series of arrests, threats and intimidations, we are not clear . . . Mr. 
Crump is apparently fearful that the abolition of the poll tax system in the South 
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will bring a measure of freedom and independence to the citizens of Memphis and 
make it more difficult for his machine to attempt to herd the voters to the polls to 
vote for his candidates. He is evidently determined to stamp out any movement 
for independence in Memphis. By these means, Ed Crump and the city 
administration of Memphis, which he controls, are seeking to establish an 
efficient dictatorship which could be used as a pattern to under democracy in 
other parts of the United States, especially in the South. This situation in 
Memphis calls for the immediate intervention of federal authorities and the 
Department of Justice to maintain order and elementary American rights in 
Memphis. We expect that you will use your high authority to intervene in 
Memphis to maintain order and preserve peace and liberty for the people of 
Memphis.”222  
 
 After visiting Memphis to investigate these claims, the Justice Department concluded that 
the evidence of black intimidation would not stand up in a court, but very pointedly made sure to 
remind Commissioner Boyle of Federal Civil Rights laws and the consequences for their 
violation.223 The claim that legal charges could not be sustained against Crump, Boyle and others 
appears to have been based less on terms of legality and more on an unwillingness on the part of 
the Federal government to get too closely involved in local racial affair. However, even with 
such a tenuous denouncement of what was occurring Memphis, an important point had been 
made. Boyle’s belief that federal intervention would in fact bolster his and Crump’s efforts was 
not only sorely wrong, it also highlighted rather starkly the contrast between how Memphis saw 
itself and how the city was seen nationally. The Crump regime in Memphis just saw itself as 
maintaining business as usual with regards to interactions with the city’s black population. The 
Reign of Terror may have been dramatic, but in the eyes of the Crump regime, it was not outside 
the boundaries of Southern social mores to make such efforts from time to time in the name of 
maintaining the racial order. And to a certain extent, the Crump administration was right in this 
                                                
222	  U.S.	  Investigator	  Reports	  On	  Charges	  That	  Memphis	  Negroes	  Are	  Intimidated,	  Col.	  Woodcock,	  Here	  For	  Four	  Days,	  Gives	  Findings	  to	  Attorney	  General	  on	  Charge	  of	  Abuse	  by	  Police,	  Memphis	  Press-­‐Scimitar,	  January	  8,	  1941 
223	  J-­‐Man	  Reports	  on	  Memphis	  Negro	  Inquiry	  –	  Here’s	  Result:	  Tells	  Jackson	  Evidence	  That	  Police	  Violated	  Civil	  Rights	  Wouldn’t	  Stand	  In	  Court	  –	  Spoke	  To	  Boyle,	  Memphis	  Press-­‐Scimitar,	  January	  9,	  1941. 
 118 
regard. In the South, their actions were not out of the ordinary, and even might be considered 
tame compared to the racial disquiet of other Southern cities. 
 The discord, however, lies in Memphis’ aspirations to not just be another Southern city, 
but to compete on a national stage. However, as the response from the federal government 
indicates, outside of the South, the types of Draconian methods of racial control implemented by 
the Crump regime did not fly, and thus, the Southern city with Northern aspirations that 
Memphis was at the time was rebuked and publicly scorned for the actions it took, actions that 
again, would not be outside of the ordinary in a specifically Southern context.  In this case, 
however, what might be termed the “Southern-ness” of Memphis’s racial attitudes blinded it to 
how its actions would be perceived on a national scale, a platform to which Memphis desperately 
wanted access to but was restrained from owing to its nagging Southern DNA.  Boyle and 
Crump may have escaped legal consequences for their actions, but the message that they were to 
cease all overt harassment immediately or face consequences was very clear. And in that way, 
the Reign of Terror in Memphis was formally ended, although its ultimate consequences would 
linger on for some time to come. 
Aftermath and Conclusions 
 By the time December rolled around, three months since the round the clock occupation 
of J.B. Martin’s drug store and the surrounding neighborhood first began, Boyle finally pulled 
his police off of surveillance duty.   It scarcely mattered at this point, however. The message of 
the Reign of Terror had been made and the damage had been done. For months now blacks 
passing through and by J.B. Martin’s drug store had been witness to the spectacle of other blacks 
being assaulted and hauled off to jail by the dozens each and every day.  Many, including Martin 
himself, left town hoping for greener pastures elsewhere. Martin eventually abandoned Memphis 
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and its racial and political perils altogether for Chicago, leaving behind the pharmacy that had 
been passed down to him from his father and placing it in the hands of his own son in turn.  
 Even years after the Reign of Terror ended, Crump, Fuller and others remained kept an 
eye on J.B. Martin’s activities barring him from returning to Memphis unless his activities while 
in town could be carefully monitored in order to ensure he would not cause further trouble for 
the Crump machine by stirring up political discontent by trying to organize the black vote to do 
more than reelect the machine ticket year after year.224  Those who would choose to continue on 
and organize would now a much more uncertain future as far as black political activism in 
Memphis went. Effecting change in Memphis would never have been easy, but now the effort 
must have seemed all the more insurmountable.225    
 Recent historical scholarship on Memphis by historians such as Michael Honey and 
Laurie Green, among a number of others, has showcased the rigors of daily life under the 
oppressive hand of Jim Crow.  These scholars have revealed in sometimes shocking detail the 
oftentimes brutally violent methods employed by those in power to both politically and 
economically disenfranchise black Memphians.  Michael Honey has famously described 
Memphis during the first half of the twentieth century as a “stronghold of one of the toughest 
political bosses ever to emerge in the United States, Edward H. Crump.”226 Green, for her part, 
has uncovered what she describes as Memphis’ pervasive and enduring “plantation mentality” 
during the Jim Crow Era. The plantation mentality is defined as an explicit desire on the part of 
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white Memphians in positions of authority and public influence to hold on to an antebellum way 
of thinking, in effect acting as if they were slaveholders without actually owning slaves.227   
 Memphis, as these scholars and quite a few others have uncovered, was in terms of racial 
politics, a gilded city.  It appeared harmonious to the casual observer, however, beneath the 
veneer of racial cooperation between the city's all-white power structure and its black community 
lay a bedrock of racial antagonism, violence, and political corruption dependent on the coercion 
of black votes.  And yet it was that gilded veneer that was the very livelihood of E.H. Crump and 
his political machine for four decades. By working to portray Memphis as a city of racial 
harmony where blacks were happy with their lots in life, Crump and his regime were able to 
convince voters year after year that Memphis was not like other Southern cities. It was free from 
the types of rioting or urban rebellions that plagued other cities with large black populations.  To 
maintain this illusion and keep the curtain from falling down, however, sometimes necessitated 
drastic action on the part of Crump and his lieutenants. And thus the Reign of Terror was born. 
 After the Reign of Terror was over, it soon became common practice that when black 
Memphians opposed the draconian measures of the Crump regime, Crump no longer needed to 
send in his troops like he did in the Fall of 1940.  Some of the fiercest opponents of so-called 
“black agitators” in Memphis became other black Memphians.  Those who had accepted Crump 
and Boyle’s “out” during the Reign of Terror became not only spies but also mouthpieces that 
could pointed to and called upon whenever “proof” was needed that black Memphians were 
content with Crump’s policies. For the sake of their safety and security, they had abandoned their 
allies in a time of need.  
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 On one hand, we can look at this outcome fairly clearly from today and see that this intra-
racial conflict engendered a state of being that exacerbated the systematic suppression of black 
activism and unity in Jim Crow Memphis for decades, denying their efforts any real traction and 
delaying significant changes and challenges to racial oppression in Memphis by undercutting 
them at every turn.  On the other hand, the question must still be asked, is it entirely fair for us to 
judge Crump’s “sympathizers” in so harsh a manner based on our own notions of black unity 
today? Crump provided familiarity. He provided tangible evidence of power and influence. 
Serving nearly uninterrupted for decades as Memphis’s paterfamilias, whatever the actual merits 
and qualities of his leadership may have been, the Crump “brand” signified power, order and 
stability. To a black community besieged by violence and disruption, this proved to be a 
powerful lure, even if the very source of that violence and disruption was none other than Crump 
himself.   
 For those who, chose to continue the fight, the reasons were likewise compelling. The 
very fact that Crump had to resort to open and prolonged harassment at this juncture whereas in 
the past such things had almost always been done under the cover of darkness and with hushed 
voices was a sign of desperation on the part of the Crump administration.  It was also recognition 
of the threat that black political activism represented and recognition of the collective political 
power held within Memphis’ black community. Black activists and leaders in Memphis 
recognized this moment as being a prime time to rally their numbers and strike back. For them, 
submission meant a loss of all gains and momentum made up to this point. The fear was that if 
the advantage were not pressed, then the chance would be lost or at least significantly delayed.  
And indeed it seems as if in the final accounting, their fears may have been borne out. 
Regardless of how we today choose to judge or not judge those black leaders who were lured 
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away by the promise of safety under the protection of the Crump regime, it must be recognized 
that their loss and eventual active opposition was felt.  It would take decades to regain the kind 
of traction that black leaders were beginning to attain in 1940.   
 The Reign of Terror was in some ways the last gasp and wild thrashing of a dying 
regime, and yet it marks what can be seen as a tragedy in three parts with regards to racial 
progress in Memphis. Firstly, it marked the beginnings of a fracture within Memphis’ black 
leadership that would only deepen over the next decades.  Where once, there was unity, now 
there was only discontent and ill will.  Secondly, Crump succeeded in achieving exactly what he 
wanted.  By enacting a systematic repression of black political power, Crump ensured himself a 
prominent role in shaping the course of Memphis politics for another decade and a half up until 
his death in 1954.  Thirdly, and arguably most tragically, the sacrifices and suffering of those 
black Memphians caught in the middle of Crump’s Reign of Terror went unaccounted for.  The 
thought that their suffering was in vain surely must have been a bitter pill to swallow indeed. The 
only comfort one can find is that this situation would not endure forever. There would come a 
day when black Memphians would again unite in the face of overwhelming odds against a 
political regime that wanted nothing more than their continued subjugation.  This fight, as the 
following chapter reveals however, would be even more fraught with conflict and complications. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
DEMAGOGUES OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH 
 “Free speech does not mean that anyone has a right to holler ‘fire’ in a crowded 
theatre.”228 These were the words political boss E.H. Crump told to a reporter from the Chicago 
Defender late in 1943 when asked why he had barred black activist and labor leader A. Phillip 
Randolph from visiting Memphis and giving a speech on black rights. Arguing that nothing good 
would come from Randolph giving such a talk in Memphis, Crump went on to say that “[free 
speech does] not mean that anyone, white or black has a right to incite race trouble. . . . We [have 
never had] any trouble in Memphis and will not if we run our own affairs and no outsiders ever 
run them for us.”229  By drawing a line in the sand here and pledging to do everything in his 
power to keep Randolph out of Memphis, Crump and his political machine fired the opening 
salvo in what would turn into a months-long battle with local black leaders over Randolph’s right 
to visit Memphis and speak to its black community.  
 For decades by this point in the early 40s, Memphis’ self-styled black leaders, a class 
composed mostly of middle-class business owners, physicians, clergy and educators, (in other 
words, people with hands in near every aspect of black life in Memphis) had been a part of a 
quid pro quo voting alliance with the city’s political machine headed by Boss Edward Hull 
(E.H.) Crump.  However, after years of enduring the machine’s racialized paternalism with little 
to show in terms of racial progress in the early 40s, this coalition began to strain and break down. 
As described in the previous chapter, following a series of civil liberty violations and violent 
racial conflicts set in motion by the Crump machine, a cadre of black leaders in Memphis began 
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strategizing ways to break away from machine rule and bring an end to racial disenfranchisement 
in their city.  
 In a pivotal moment in Memphis’ history, one such strategy involved bringing to town A. 
Phillip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and a nationally known black 
activist credited with successfully pressuring President Franklin Roosevelt to sign the Fair 
Employment Act of 1941. The goal of inviting Randolph to Memphis was twofold in that 
Randolph’s name recognition would bring national attention to the Crump machine’s crooked 
activities while at the same time Randolph’s message of civil rights and black self-actualization 
would serve as a banner that would inspire a new wave of local activism amongst Memphis’ 
black population. What was unforeseen at the time, however, was the controversy and conflict 
that Randolph’s scheduled visit would engender not only with the Crump political machine in 
Memphis but inside the very ranks of Memphis’ black leadership community as well. 
 This chapter argues that the six-month period of conflict surrounding A. Phillip 
Randolph’s visit dramatizes two important aspects of the history of racial politics in 1940s 
Memphis. First, it reveals a schism amongst Memphis’ black leaders based around competing 
visions of what actually constituted black progress in Memphis and exactly how much progress 
could blacks in Memphis reasonably expect to attain. Secondly, this moment in time marks what 
I see as the beginning of a transition in Memphis’ black freedom struggle from what I would 
argue were Jim Crow Era methods of black activism to Civil Rights Era methods of such, insofar 
as local battles over race were now connected to and played out on a national stage as well.  It 
was perhaps this transition that caused the most consternation within Memphis’s black leadership 
community, as a new question arose and now needed to be addressed - whether Memphis’ racial 
problems stood the best chance of resolved locally and in-house or whether the best way forward 
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was to join together with a broader, nation-wide movement. The ideological geography that had 
shaped the course of racial politics in Memphis since the turn of the century was slowly starting 
to give way. As this chapter will show, some amongst Memphis’ black political leadership were 
eager to shed the trappings of faux-cooperation with the Crump Machine that had kept them 
shackled to the past with no hope for meaningful progress. Others, however, would fight just as 
hard to hold on to the past. Cooperation with Crump was at the very least a known quantity, and 
it was feared that the disruption that would attend any further attempts to defy the machine 
would send race relations in Memphis past the point of no return.  
Outside and Inside Agitators 
 As the previous chapter discussed in detail, one of the main catalysts for the Randolph-
Memphis affair began with a police campaign 3 years earlier in the fall of 1940. Dubbed the 
“Memphis Reign of Terror” by black media outlets across the country such as the Chicago 
Defender, this campaign carried out by the Memphis police force under the direct orders of the 
Crump machine involved 3 months of round the clock police surveillance and occupation of 
black neighborhoods, culminating in searches, seizures, and mass arrests of any black Memphian 
who “looked suspicious.” By the fall of 1943, Crump and his machine appeared to cross the line 
one time to often and spurred an organized backlash against his tactics of paternalistic terror.  
And thus, we enter the A. Phillip Randolph affair.  Invited to town by Rev. George Love of Mt. 
Nebo Baptist Church to speak before a presumed crowd of hundreds of black Memphians, 
Randolph accepted and hoped to use the opportunity to encourage Memphis blacks to join their 
local unions. 
 In the Memphis World, one of two local black-owned newspapers, Randolph’s speech 
was advertised as a “first” for Memphis. Calling Randolph an “outstanding Negro leader,” the 
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paper wrote that he “has taken the lead in racial matters not only affecting the Pullman porters, 
but also those which touched the interests of the Negro worker in other fields. His views and 
influence have been felt in all the major labor councils of this country, as well as in government 
circles. He is the idol of the Pullman porter.”  “Mr. Randolph’s appearance here should be 
regarded A milestone in the progress of the Memphis Negro . . . He is not coming here to deal 
with any particular situation but rather to take advantage of the opportunity to speak a word of 
inspiration and encouragement.”230 Even this seemingly innocuous action, however, was a step 
too far for the Crump machine. 
 It is pretty well documented that there were at least a few of things E.H. Crump was not a 
fan of: one was outsiders bringing trouble to his city; another was unions, for fear of them doing 
the same; and three was dealing with race issues, and mostly for the same reason. And yet here 
we had with specter of A. Phillip Randolph coming town, a perfect storm of all of these things 
that provoked Crump’s ire. In the beginning, however, more than anything, Crump seemed 
personally offended at even the mere notion that anything was wrong with race relations in 
Memphis. “I would cut off my right arm before I’d let anything or anyone disturb the present 
friendly race relations between whites and Negroes in Memphis,” Crump stated.  “It’s like this,” 
he went on, “Colored folk here make up about . . . 47 per cent [of the population.] And you 
know, there’s a lot of mean white folk down here. White folk who don’t like colored people. 
Can’t stand them. Hate them! Would like to ring off their necks. But me – nobody in the world 
has ever done more for colored folk than I have.”231  
 It is important to note that there were in fact black leaders in Memphis who sided with 
the Crump machine at this point.  As mentioned previously, Memphis was unlike the majority of 
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other Southern cities when it came to relations between the city’s white ruling class and its self-
styled black middle-class leaders. For decades up to this point, the two sides had managed to 
maintain something of a working relationship in terms of quid pro quo benefits. The black elite 
worked to keep the broader masses convinced that Crump and his regime were their best hopes 
for political enfranchisement and by doing so likewise prevented Memphis’ black population 
from causing too much disruption to Crump’s agenda. In return, Crump only rarely openly 
resorted to the types of heavy-handed racial violence found in other areas of the deep South and 
from time to time would make a token gesture towards addressing one of the many ills plaguing 
the black community, for example, approving the construction of a segregated swimming pool or 
public park so that blacks had a public space to congregate that approximated those that white 
Memphians often took for granted.  
 Make no mistake however; this relationship was decidedly slanted in Crump’s favor.  It 
was something of an open secret in Memphis that dissenters to white authority in Memphis were 
“taken care of” privately and under the cloak of darkness rather than in the naked daylight of the 
public watch. Yet, it must also be understood that as unequal a power relationship as it was, 
many local blacks still saw it as far more beneficial than the racial norms of the Jim Crow South 
dictated.  Thus, in this light, many of Memphis’ black elites while perhaps privately none too 
fond of Crump’s paternalism felt it was either making due with his caprices or nothing at all. The 
grip on a sliver of racial equality in Memphis was at best always a tenuous one, and the efforts of 
Randolph and those black Memphians who invited him to speak threatened to render it 
nonexistent entirely, or in other words, ruining it for everyone. In the moment, then, that fear 
superseded any supposed ideas of racial solidarity, prompting many to throw Randolph and his 
local black supporters under the figurative bus when the opportunity arose.  
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 For example, Blair T. Hunt, principal of Booker T. Washington high school was one of 
Crump’s staunchest supporters within Memphis’ black community and indeed often liked to 
describe himself as just a “little brown nut in the Crump machine.”232 Following word of 
Randolph’s impending visit, Hunt sent letters out to all of the local press outlets solely for the 
purpose of making sure to distance himself and his constituents from the uproar that was sure to 
follow, pointing out that he was not involved in this affair whatsoever and begging each paper to 
make this as clear as possible in its reports on Randolph.233  
 From Crump’s perspective and that of his black supporters, the only problem was the 
problem of “outside agitators” such as Randolph and his kind stirring up trouble putting crazy 
ideas into the heads of Memphis’s black community, ideas such as social and political equality.  
With the talk on course to proceed as planned despite his admonitions, however, Crump and his 
lieutenants were more than willing to double down on their warnings. “No blatherskite or 
demagogue of the North or South should be permitted to interfere with the friendly relations 
between the races that now exists in Memphis . . . If negroes are imported here to make 
unnecessary fire-brand speeches, then the blame [for what happens] is on them.”234 
 Subsequently, just a few days before Randolph was scheduled to speak in Memphis, the 
sheriff, under orders from Crump, held a meeting in a local jailhouse with 18 black leaders on all 
sides of the issue (including figures such as Dr. L.G. Patterson, Dr. W.S. Martin, the 
aforementioned Blair T. Hunt, George W. Lee, prominent insurance official, Ashton Hayes, 
principal of Manassas High School, and Rev. George Love, pastor of Mount Nebo where the 
speech was to be held) The sheriff told them all very plainly “Randolph is not to be permitted to 
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speak in Memphis, and if you don’t want to meet him at the train and tell him, I will!”235 Given 
the setting where this “meeting” took place and the un-subtle “suggestion” that the Randolph 
situation needed to be take care of or else, it is of little surprise that even those black leaders 
supportive of Randolph’s visit now had a vested interest in making sure it did not proceed as 
planned. Thus it followed that on the 12th of November, the day the speech was set to take place, 
Randolph, upon arriving in Memphis by train, was greeted by the county Sheriff, a contingent of 
offices and almost all of the black leaders from the prison meeting. As he later recounted, 
Randolph was very curtly informed that he would not be able to speak because of the he was a 
radical labor organizer and his mere presence in Memphis threatened to set off a race riot the 
likes of which Memphis had never seen. Moreover, he was given the directive to leave Memphis 
as soon as possible.236   
 It is important to note here the pretext that this was not about denying Randolph the right 
to speak, but rather about protecting the peace in Memphis. There was a rumor before Randolph 
arrived spread by Crump officials that blacks were buying guns en masse to prepare for mass 
rioting after Randolph’s speech was over.237 It is also highly relevant to mark the reasons for the 
pains being taken to make sure that black leaders were upfront and visible in denying Randolph 
the chance to speak. Their presence allowed the Crump machine a level of plausible deniability 
in being able to say, that it was an internal affair within Memphis’ black community that kept 
Randolph from speaking. Indeed, Crump when asked by the Chicago Defender at a later date 
about his role in keeping Randolph out, simply demurred by stating that it was “the Negroes 
                                                
235 “Crump Bans Memphis Rally For Randolph,” The Chicago Defender, Nov 13, 1943. 
236 “Crump Bans Memphis Rally For Randolph,” The Chicago Defender, Nov 13, 1943. 
237 “Randolph Speaks: Defies Boss Crump; Randolph Defies Crump; Makes Memphis Speech,” 
Fay Young, The Chicago Defender, April 8, 1944. 
 130 
[who] decided against Randolph.” Crump argued, “the proposition of Randolph’s speaking [was 
put] squarely up to them,” and “it was all done in a peaceful manner.”238  
 Black media outlets such as the Chicago Defender however were quick to call out what 
had happened here. The Defender explicitly linked Crump’s rebuke of Randolph to the events of 
the “Memphis Reign of Terror” just a few years earlier when Dr. J.B. Martin had been forcibly 
run out of Memphis, but made the claim that the tactics used back then by the machine would not 
pass muster this time, so long as a spotlight was shone on the machine’s activities.239 
 As for Randolph, he made a couple of small meetings in Memphis with constituents and 
supporters, then left with few other immediate options for redress, departed town. He however 
was not deterred and perhaps was now all the more convinced that it was of the utmost 
importance that he make future plans to come back to Memphis and finish what had been 
started.240 He was quoted soon after as saying, “The actions of city officials who forced 
Memphis negroes to call off the scheduled mass meeting is a challenge to the people to stage a 
huge public meeting at some future date. Memphians have a moral obligation to invite me to 
speak at that meeting, otherwise the whole spirit of democracy in Memphis will be dead. To take 
this insult lying down would be to perform a disservice to progressive forces at work all over our 
nation and all over the world who are fighting for freedom from fear.”241  
The Half-Year War 
 Over the next six months, there was a great deal of political wrangling and barb-firing 
between the Crump machine, Randolph and black leaders in Memphis on all sides of the issue, 
with the AFL even becoming involved at one point. Ultimately, Crump did not so much 
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acquiesce as he was simply told by Randolph’s camp, that this speech was going to happen one 
way or another.242 Before all of this came to bear, however, the fight over Randolph’s right or 
lack thereof to visit Memphis and speak before a black audience about black issues would fully 
dramatize the unique racial-political dynamics at play in Memphis. 
 Immediately after Randolph’s unceremonious booting from Memphis, Crump went on 
what might be called a media campaign to defend his right to keep Randolph out. In these 
interviews and editorials, Crump would routinely downplay the level of racial discord and 
disenfranchisement in Memphis, arguing that 99% of Memphis blacks were happy and content 
with how things were in the city, save for the remaining 1% pressing for the unattainable in the 
form of “social equality.”  “The few who want that [social equality] had better give serious 
thought to this matter as long as they live in this section . . . That unhappy one per cent, with a 
mistaken sense of their wrongs, usually pass down unwise thoughts to those further down the 
ladder and then there is mischief,” Crump stated.243 
 For his part, Randolph responded in kind sent an open letter to Crump challenging him to 
a public debate on the plight of blacks in Memphis and the hardships of Jim Crow.  Randolph 
very openly flouted the social mores governing racial interaction in Memphis, calling Crump out 
as “Cowardly,” “contemptible,” and a “symbol of Southern fascism that [stood as] a menace and 
danger to American democracy and hence must be exterminated.” Furthermore, Randolph 
explicitly laid bare the polite lie of “friendly relations” that for decades were said to set Memphis 
apart from the rest of the South. Randolph concluded his missive by challenging Crump to a non-
segregated public debate and stating,  
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[Memphians] are tired and sick of you and your police terrorism against law-
abiding citizens, white and colored, and your brazen, bold and baneful attack has 
sealed the mouths and silenced the voices of many honorable men and women 
who will soon gather enough spirit and courage to blast your regime and relegate 
it into oblivion from which it ought to never emerge. - Yours for the end of the 
Crump dynasty, A. Phillip Randolph.244 
 
 For his part Crump responded again with own open letter, firstly insisting that there “was 
no law against mixed gatherings in Memphis. It’s just public opinion that keeps them apart.”  He 
further stated, “ I say again, I would walk to Chicago if that would prevent race trouble in 
Memphis.”245 There is some question as to whether Randolph actually believed his challenge to 
Crump would result in an actual debate or if it was more meant to provoke a discussion in and of 
itself. This war of words between the two leaders notwithstanding, what might be called the real 
battle over Randolph’s right to speak, and more broadly, racial politics in Jim Crow Memphis 
played out on a different battlefield and with a different set of historical actors in play. 
 In terms of media attention, Randolph and his black supporters in Memphis perhaps had 
no bigger boosters than The Chicago Defender. The Defender was altogether relentless in its 
assault on Crump in the wake of Randolph’s ouster, calling Crump “the czar of Memphis.” It 
also made the prediction that Randolph would win out in the end, and that owing to the national 
implications of Crump’s “stifling [of] civil liberties,” his aggressions against dissent would not 
stand this time around. “Memphis will not permit [Crump] to isolate it permanently from the 
American way of democracy and free speech.”246 “The plain truth,” the Defender wrote at one 
point, “is that Crump is using his political influence to strike down by whatever means those who 
disagree with his rule as well as those who have the temerity to challenge him politically.” They 
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went even further against Crump by stating, “He [Crump] is the exact prototype of the German 
Fuehrer” and “Crump is more than a mere local figure endangering the security and freedom of 
the people of Memphis; he is a threat to the processes of democracy in America. He looms today 
as the greatest challenge at home to the fundamental concepts that underlie the Four 
Freedoms.”247 It is interesting to note here the framing of what is happening in terms broader 
than just Memphis and its local concerns.  
 Extending the comparison, to those black Memphis leaders instrumental in rebuffing 
Randolph, the Defender more of less called them out as Nazi sympathizers, writing, “Those 
leaders who allowed themselves to be intimidated into calling off the Randolph meeting have 
placed themselves in the unenviable position of being the unwilling tools of a Fascist 
demagogue.” To those who would not speak up in favor of Randolph and against Crump, the 
Defender issued its most vehement challenge. “If democracy is dear to us; if it is the only form 
of government that will keep the chain of bondage from our ankles . . . then it makes no 
difference whether we fight or die for it abroad or at home. One thing is certain, that is: OUR 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS WILL NOT BE HANDED TO US ON A SILVER PLATTER.”248 
 The Defender further wrote, on the state of Southern politics and its contribution to the 
nation at large, “the South can proudly boast of having contributed more fools, near idiots, 
clowns and crackpots to the American political arena than any other section of the country.”  Of 
Memphis politics in particular, it wrote, “Somehow, a jackass has always had some connection 
with city government of Memphis.” And ever since E.H. Crump had “rode on a mule into 
town . . . we’ve witnessed a lot of jackass brayings [from] “Boss Crump.” Again predicting 
imminent defeat, the paper further editorialized that “So long as the Negro race produces A. 
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Phillip Randolph, and alongside of him, the whites produce “Boss Crumps,” we are positively 
assured that so-called “white supremacy” is definitely dated on the way out.”249 
 The Memphis-Randolph affair of course did not only play out in the media but it also 
exposed a split among between national and local labor leadership over the Randolph issue.  By 
and large, the national office of the AFL voiced support for Randolph’s rights and Memphis’ 
own labor groups joining with the Crump machine and attempting to block Randolph from doing 
so. Nationally speaking, Randolph had the unwavering support of AFL President William 
Green. , Green, for his part, was perhaps not only the most vocal ally in Randolph’s corner but 
also the most powerful. As head of the AFL, Green vociferously defended Randolph’s right to 
speak in Memphis and continuously advocated for him after Randolph’s initial expulsion from 
Memphis, seeing the issue as one that at its core about free speech. Green stated publicly at one 
point, “The interference with the right of free speech and free assemblage in Memphis or 
elsewhere is unjustifiable. These rights are cherished by all citizens of our republic who regard 
them as priceless and of vital importance at any cost.”250 
 Further defending Randolph’s right to speak in Memphis, Green wrote, “Because the 
American Federation of Labor believes uncompromisingly in freedom of speech and freedom of 
assembly, we shall uncompromisingly support the exercise of the right of [Randolph] to address 
the public meeting in Memphis.” Support of Randolph here, Green argued was part and parcel 
with a broader movement for labor rights in the US. He further stated, “How can we protest this 
can we protest [unfair practices] if the organized labor movement will join in preventing any 
man the right to speak and individuals the right of free assembly . . . As president of the 
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American Federation of Labor, I disapprove the action taken by the Memphis Trades and Labor 
Organization Council in proposition to free speech and free assemblage.”251 
Such pronouncements held very little sway in Memphis however, as locally, Randolph 
and Green were both staunchly opposed by Lev Loring, the white president of the Memphis 
Trades and Labor Council and a firm opponent of interracial union organizing.252 Still, the 
Memphis labor community was not completely monolithic, and dissension within the ranks did 
exist. On a local level, Randolph’s biggest supporter was arguably Benjamin F. Bell Jr., secretary 
of Memphis’ Urban League. Calling out other local blacks whom he felt were in the pocket of 
the Crump machine, Bell provoked a great deal of ire so much so that Memphis blacks such as 
M.W. Bonner, president of the Urban League and a secretary of the Universal Life Insurance 
company, along with Dr. J.E. Walker, president of the same and president of the National Negro 
Business League, along with Blair T. Hunt, what the Chicago Defender referred to as “the local 
Negro appeasement bloc,” all sought to have Bell forcibly removed from his position in the wake 
of scathing comments Bell made to the Chicago Defender, giving him an ultimatum that he 
would be fired if he did not resign first. In their view, Bell was far too “militant” in his approach 
to seeking racial justice within Memphis. Worth noting in all of this was the fact that the Urban 
League was in effect bankrolled by the city and the Crump machine, making the threat of 
withdrawal of financial support if self-policing did not occur.253 Also worth noting is that Bell 
was indeed subsequently fired from his position as secretary of the local Urban League 
chapter.254 
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 While these battles highlighted local and national divisions in terms of labor rights and 
race, within Memphis itself a different battle entirely was playing out during these six months, 
one which showcased the widening schisms within Memphis’ own black leadership community. 
As the previous chapter on the Memphis Reign of Terror showed, by the 1940s, black politics in 
Memphis were swiftly becoming a fractured affair. When it comes to the Memphis-Randolph 
debacle, nowhere is this point more clear than in the post-banned clamor amongst Memphis’ 
black leadership community to assign blame for the matter to others all the while jockeying for 
position with each and favor with the Crump machine. 
 In the wake of Randolph’s ouster, much of this came to bear in the form of a judicial 
inquest into exactly what the impetus for Randolph being forced to leave town was. In sworn 
affidavit after sworn affidavit, a veritable who’s who of Memphis’ black leadership all attempted 
to direct the shape of the narrative that would form.  Much of the testimony boiled down to 
determining the nature of the initial jailhouse meeting called by Sheriff Perry warning the black 
leaders to handle Randolph’s original impending visit in-house, as it were. 
 W.S. Martin, (brother of J.B. Martin, and both discussed in the previous chapter) asserted 
that he, Blair Hunt, and the rest of black leaders in attendance “voluntarily attended” the meeting 
in the Sheriff’s office and that while the merits of Randolph coming to Memphis had been 
discussed, he had personally “never heard of anyone molesting or interfering with Randolph 
while he was [in Memphis.]255 George W. Lee concurred in his affidavit that he had “not heard of 
anyone intimidating or abusing [Randolph] while he was in Memphis” and that if there is any 
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black to be laid for the speech’s cancellation, it was “entirely with President Patton of the local 
union.”256    
 For his part, H.F. Patton, of the local Brotherhood of Sleeping Porters chapter, made 
further excuses for Randolph’s not speaking in Memphis, for example arguing that the church 
where Randolph was supposed to speak at that simply was no longer available.257 Others simply 
denied that the situation had been anything of note to begin with and that Randolph left on his 
own accord. “I have never heard of anyone intimidating, molesting, or interfering with A. Phillip 
Randolph while he was here in the city,” Rev. Waverly Johnson testified.258 Principal Blair Hunt, 
in the longest and most detailed affidavit, stated that the meeting was held for no other reason but 
to express everyone’s concern over “the probability of [Randolph] making a highly inflammatory 
speech” that would “provoke serious trouble . . . [within a] community that was on edge” 
because of rumors of an impending race riot.” Despite these misgivings, however, Hunt argued 
insistently “the white officials [present at the meeting] did not ask us to call [Randolph’s speech] 
off.”259   
 Despite all of the political wrangling and barb-firing between the Crump machine, 
Randolph and black leaders in Memphis on all sides of the issue, however, ultimately, the Crump 
machine did not so much acquiesce as he was simply told by Randolph’s camp, that this speech 
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was going to happen one way or another.260 And thus the date for Randolph’s new appearance 
was set for Friday, March 31. 
Randolph Returns 
When Randolph finally did return to Memphis in April, his speech was wide-ranging, and 
he spared practically no one even remotely related to the Memphis racial-political community 
from his condemnation. In a show of force and support, according to the Memphis World, 
Randolph was flanked by at least 15 “nationally known” labor leaders, both black and white.261  
These included AFL president William Green.262 Worth noting is that none of Crump’s allies in 
the black community were present at the meeting, “Crump’s democratic stooges” as the Chicago 
Defender referred to them.263 None would provide comment on their absence save an anonymous 
high school principal’s wife who told the Defender, “Now you know right well, honey, that we 
couldn’t dare to go. It would jeopardize my husband’s job.”264 The black Memphis leaders who 
showed up were few, but some did stand next to Randolph and likewise give speeches of their 
own, with Rev. G. A. Long giving the meeting an opening benediction.265 
 To the Crump machine, he offered the accusation that “the Memphis political boss [had] 
out-Hitler[ed] Hitler] in his suppression of free speech in Memphis. To those black Memphians 
who supported the machine, Crump’s “brown nuts” as he called them, Randolph shamed them 
for “jump[ing] at the crack of Crump’s whip.” And to the rest of, white and black, he made sure 
to specify, he urged them to “join trade unions, the same unions, where they may work, fight, 
suffer and sacrifice together for a common goal.” This, he argued, was the ultimate way to 
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ensure peace, comfort and prosperity in Memphis.266 He referred to Crump’s suppression of free 
speech as “dictatorship with a vengeance.”267 Randolph advocated for negro history to be taught 
in both black and white schools as a countermeasure to the prevailing messages most in 
Memphis received about blacks.268  Randolph noted that there was a “spineless” cadre of “Negro 
stooges” who did not want him in Memphis but that such equivocating made his presence all the 
more necessary because, as he put it, “my race needs me here.”269 
With that admonition, the speech that had vexed the racial-political scene in Memphis for 
months now had been given, and despite the rhetoric swirling around on all sides, the world did 
not come to an end, nor did Memphis descend into racial anarchy. Rather, what happened next 
was much more predictable, as each side of the affair became more entrenched in their own 
rhetoric and beliefs that they had taken the educated, moral and proper course of action. The day 
after the speech, Crump was apoplectic.  
Randolph is the upstart, vicious, demagogue type out to create trouble and did not 
come here with any helpful thoughts . . . No good can come from inflammatory 
harangues such as Randolph and his imported associates made in that church. . . . 
If the Negroes of this community or any whites insist on these imported rabble 
rousers, creating hatred, they might as well make up their minds to abide by the 
consequences . . . including the preacher who gave permission to hold that 
meeting in his church.”270  
 
 Moreover, Crump directly refuted any charges that he had intimidated Randolph out of 
town in the first place, calling any such accusations by Randolph or others “incendiary” and 
saying that ill-speak of the jailhouse meeting which started everything was nothing but “race 
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hate” brought about by blacks in Memphis who were ungrateful for all Crump had done for 
them. Crump stated, “Randolph didn’t tell that the Police Department had cleaned up Beale 
Street dives that were harboring criminals with pistols and long bladed knives. Nor did he tell 
that the police were forced to give protection to a gathering of negro bishops in one of the 
churches where young negroes shot pistols, which created a near panic, and robbed those in 
attendance. He didn’t tell in his formula for the conduct of negroes in Memphis that the Police 
Department was forced to give protection at their leading football games where there was 
shooting and cutting affrays.”271 
 True to his word, then, Crump and his machine would continue to hold a grudge against 
those black in Memphis who had defied them and continued to take whatever opportunities were 
available to take potshots at its rivals. In late April, Crump sent the Memphis fire chief to Rev. G 
A. Long’s church for what was called “just a routine inspection.” When asked why he was there 
at a place with no history of fire-safety problems, the chief responded curtly, “I’m just looking 
around” and left it at that.272 Nothing ever came of the “routine” safety inspection but the 
message to Long to watch his back was sent loud and clear. This was not the end of Crump’ 
retaliation, however, as in May, Crump cancelled a birthday celebration in Randolph’s name 
being organized by the “ladies’ auxiliary” to Randolph’s union, reasoning that the party was set 
to take place in the recreation hall of a local housing project on the grounds that “outside groups” 
were not allowed to hold such events on federal property.273  
 There was a flurry of attempts at what might be called damage control in the wake of 
Randolph’s speech. Multiple public statements and newspaper editorials from black leaders 
                                                
271 “Randolph’s Address Denounced By Crump,” The Commercial Appeal, April 2, 1944. 
272 “Crump Starts 'Spite Work' On Pastor,” The Chicago Defender, April 29, 1944. 
273 “Crump Cancels Celebration To Honor Randolph,” The Chicago Defender, May 6, 1944; 
 141 
attempting to distance themselves and their constituents from the things Randolph had said.  Rev. 
J.A. Hayes wrote to the Commercial Appeal that Randolph’s speech “left us all feeling as though 
a thorn had been plunged within our flesh.”  He went on, in what would be a common refrain in 
the majority of these missives, “There have been built up here many and varied institutions and 
establishments that any city would gladly welcome; and the citizens of Memphis – white and 
colored – do not appreciate outside interference from anybody, and especially interference that 
tends to create friction, unrest, and discord within our ranks.” He went on, “Memphis through the 
years has never had a riot here; and there never will be as long as we have sane-minded officials 
such as now stand at the helm of our government. We live in Memphis, not because we have to, 
but because we want to and for the wonderful opportunities which it offers.”274 
 Blair T. Hunt, principal of Booker T. Washington high school, expressed bitterness and 
even a bit of regret that other black in Memphis were unable to see the racial-political situation 
in Memphis the way that they did.  He wrote to the Commercial Appeal afterward, “Really, to 
know Mr. Crump is to love him. So many people, even Memphians don’t know him. This 
modern Memphis is really the shadow of Mr. E.H. Crump…”275 Hunt furthermore opined, “This 
is a great big “family we have here in Memphis, and as such, naturally, we don’t want our soiled 
linens hung on public clotheslines . . . by persons whose interests and stay here were only 
transitory, and whose utterances apparently served no other end than to stir and unsettle 
“Family” matters which it has been our concern to seek to handle in our own way and among our 
own folk.” He concluded by again pleading that “the efforts of Mr. Crump . . . are deeply 
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appreciated by the overwhelming majority of the colored citizens of Memphis” and that only 
“misinformed outsiders” threatened to undo this relationship.276 
 For his part, Rev. J. L. Campbell likewise expressed continued admiration at “all the 
things Crump has done for us Negroes.”277 Dr. J.E. Walker, president of the Universal Life 
insurance company was perhaps a bit more circumspect in his defense.  “Yes, Crump is a 
dictator,” he stated, “ and the votes are already counted before they are cast . . . but the machine 
is honest and economical.” In any event, Crump was trustworthy and had done more for blacks 
in Memphis than a “demagogue” such as A. Phillip Randolph.278 When pressed how whether he 
felt he had a duty to stand up for Memphis’ black community first and foremost before 
allegiances to Crump or to his own business dealings and insurance company, Walker demurred 
further by stating, “We have to think first of our policy holders and that will eventually benefit 
the Negro race.”279 Defender speculated at the time that Crump’s black contacts were organizing 
to run Long out of Memphis for allowing Randolph to speak at his church.280 
 At one point, after Randolph’s speech, a trio of black leaders in Memphis penned a letter 
in the Memphis Press-Scimitar, expressing their disapproval of Randolph and their scorn for the 
aspersions he had cast on Memphis. In addition to being signed by Rev. J.L. Campbell, and Rev. 
James H. Pugh, most surprisingly this letter was also endorsed by Rev. Roy Love, the man who 
initially invited Randolph to Memphis back in November and whose church was set to be the site 
of the original intended speech. “Did the speech delivered on Friday by one Phillip Randolph, in 
which he lambasted and vilified E.H. Crump, the city and county administration, represent the 
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attitude of the colored people of Memphis and Shelby County? We, the committee appointed by 
the Baptist Pastors Alliance, representing more than 70 per cent of the negro population [in 
Memphis] . . . take the position to say NO.” The letter went on, “Many things have been done for 
the colored people of Memphis. They speak for themselves: Good schools, increase in salaries 
and more to come; good housing conditions . . . wading pools, playgrounds, parks, health 
centers, and more of these in the making. These we think are evidence of good leaders and good 
city and county government. We think that any sane person will agree that these are signs of 
progress . . .” “Things don’t just happen. The leaders, Mr. E.H. Crump, E.W. Hale, Mayor 
Chandler, Sheriff Oliver Perry, General Gerber, Commissioner Boyle and Commissioner 
Andrews, city and county commissioners, with their efficient help, made these things possible, 
and the negroes of Memphis appreciate your efforts and services in our behalf.” They concluded 
by stating, “We may be called stooges and white folks lovers. The gospel we preach and the 
Christ we represent commands that we love everybody, do good for evil and to do unto others as 
we would have them do to us. Upon this truth hangs the hope of the world. Knockers will never 
win and winners never have time to knock.”281 
 Sheriff Perry was practically irate in the wake of Randolph’s speech, releasing a 
statement blasting Randolph and putting Randolph’s local black supporters on notice to watch 
themselves in the future and that there would be consequences for their actions. Perry wrote,  
“Had I known the negro Randolph from New York City and those be brought with him were to 
make blackguarding speeches defaming this community and speaking ill of my friends, Mr. Hale 
and Mr. Crump, I would have pulled them all out of the pulpit in Preacher Long’s Beale Street 
Church.” Perry continued, “Mr. Crump and Mr. Hale have done too much for Memphis and 
                                                
281 “Negroes Appreciate Many Improvements,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, April 1944. 
 144 
Shelby Country all these many years for some wide-eyed publicity seeker like Randolph to 
belittle their efforts. They have helped the negroes of this community in so many ways. I know 
plans are on foot to do more for them. But the Memphis negroes do not show their appreciation 
by encouraging a man like Randolph to come here and find fault – ridicule what has been 
done.”282  
 Long, for his part, seemed both content and defiant of any ire provoked by playing host to 
Randolph. He wrote, “I do not encourage hate for the white group, some of my best friends are 
white, for whom I am ready to give my last drop of blood. I would have Mr. E.H. Crump to 
know I am an ambassador of Jesus Christ and take my orders only from Christ . . . I did not ask 
Mr. Crump could I come to this town and I am not going to ask him if I may stay.”283  
 In regards to the inspection of his church and any further attempts at intimidation or 
retaliation by Crump, Long stated, “I am just a humble negro . . .I shall observe the laws of 
Memphis, respect white and colored, but I shall not live in fear.”284 “I feel safe in saying all who 
listened to A. Phillip Randolph and other speakers . . . left there with love, respect and good will 
for white and colored in Memphis, Tennessee, America and the world. A spirit of loyalty was 
reborn in every heart. Memphis shall see a spirit of love and not hate as the result of that 
meeting.”285 
 After all of this, moreover, there was a concerted desire and effort on the part of many to 
simply move on and forget any of the discontent Randolph’s speech may have stirred up. The 
Memphis Press-Scimitar opined in an editorial “Our peace and prosperity are dependent on 
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harmonious race relations. These relations will be right if leaders of both races keep their 
heads. . . The Press-Scimitar does not believe any good will come to Memphis from any further 
discussion of the Randolph affair by our politicians or by anyone else . .  . Let us consider the 
Randolph meeting and opinions concerning it a closed chapter. Let white and negro citizens 
work together as friends to win the war and build a better Memphis in the spirit of the Lord 
whom they both serve.”286 
 The Chicago Defender, however, one of the staunchest opponents of Crump’s rule in 
Memphis declared Randolph’s visit nothing less than a total success. “The Crump machine is 
crumbling,” it editorialized after Randolph’s speech. “This is the only conclusion that can be 
reached from the events which have recently taken place in Memphis. . . Crump has ruled 
Memphis for years through terror and hate. White as well as colored citizens have despised him 
but in the past have feared him to such an extent that they tolerated his rule rather than face his 
revengeful “Gestapo.” No one dared challenge him until . . . A. Phillip Randolph was invited to 
speak in Memphis. Then for the first time Crump found that blustering threats didn’t work. He 
couldn’t scare Randolph and then because on man showed courage others have followed his 
example. . . Thus the foundation is laid for white and Negroes to work together to break Crump’s 
power. His armor is cracked. With proper courage, it shouldn’t be long until it is rendered 
useless.”287  
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Aftermath and Conclusions 
 How do we make sense of all of this – the conflict and the controversy?  How do we 
make sense of the sheer animosity between Memphis’ blacks leaders in the face of the seemingly 
obvious and overwhelming threat that the Crump political machine posed to them all in terms of 
racial oppression?  How do we make sense of everyone walking away from this incident 
somehow feeling that they had been right in their thoughts and actions? There are multiple 
angles that can be explored with a story such as this: There are issues of black labor and political 
economy. There are issues related to the policing of black bodies and black speech. There are 
class issues at play, as it is very significant that the black Memphians involved in this affair are 
all ostensibly well educated, wealthy and middle-class. For the purposes of this essay, however, 
what I find to be the most interesting aspect of this affair is what it tells us about changing nature 
of black activism in Memphis as the Jim Crow Era slowly melted away to give rise to what call 
today the birth of the Civil Rights Era. I want to talk about what effect that transition had on 
black politics in 1940s Memphis. 
 To do this, firstly, we must understand here that despite A. Phillip Randolph being 
ostensibly at the center of this conflict, the whole affair was never entirely, or even mostly, about 
Randolph himself. Rather, it revolved around just exactly what his visit to Memphis portended 
for the future of black activism and racial uplift in Memphis. This story, at its core, revolves 
around a conflict of ideologies amongst a non-monolithic black leadership community in 
Memphis at odds over a locally oriented or nationally oriented approach to curing Memphis’ 
racial woes. 
  On one hand, there was what might be called the progressive faction of black leaders in 
Memphis, those such as the two Georges, Love and Long, to name a few. These were the ones 
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who, by the 1940s, had long-since grown weary of both the Crump political machine’s near iron-
fisted rule of the Memphis political machine and also the snail’s pace of racial progress in 
Memphis. They had tried to work with the Crump regime for a number of years for decades by 
this point, using their influence and positions of authority within Memphis’ black communities to 
minimize black protest and rally support for Crump and his political allies.  
 All of this was done in exchange for the promise of communal benefits for black 
communities in Memphis and with the tacit agreement that Crump would never resort to the 
types of draconian methods of racial control practiced in many other Southern cities. However, 
after years of this arrangement, these community leaders began to question there was actually 
anything tangible to show for their efforts. Moreover, in recent years, as the machine became 
more and more entrenched in the local political scene, and less fearful of opposition and losing 
power in Memphis, it routinely began to violate this last agreement, as the aforementioned 
“Memphis Reign of Terror” shows us. 
 To many in Memphis’s black leadership community, acts like these were unacceptable in 
the current climate. Civil rights issues were beginning to be at the forefront of the national 
discussion. And while, there was certainly much more work to be done, and many more battles 
that would be fought, a sense that the tide was slowly beginning to turn with America’s racial 
status quo was pervasive. And many felt that the time was now where more could be achieved in 
Memphis than would be allowed by continuing to beg for scraps at the feet of the Crump 
political machine.   Crump could not be trusted any more, nor, given the formidableness of his 
control of the city, could black Memphians be able to stand up to him and his regime without 
equally big guns. And thus, the campaign to bring Randolph to town was born. 
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 On the other side of things, we can also see that, for what might conversely be called the 
conservative wing of Memphis’ black leadership community, (people such as Blair Hunt, J.L. 
Campbell, Dr. J.E. Walker, W.S. Martin…) despite the oppressiveness of his machine, Crump 
not only provided familiarity, he provided tangible evidence of power and influence. Serving 
nearly uninterrupted for decades as Memphis’s paterfamilias, whatever the actual merits and 
qualities of his leadership may have been, the Crump “brand” signified power, order and 
stability. To a black community besieged by disruption and violence, this proved to be a 
powerful lure, even if the very source of that violence and disruption was none other than Crump 
himself. Moreover, despite the slow pace of change in Memphis, the argument could be that it 
was better than nothing (at least we’re not Mississippi, right?). For better or worse, racial issues 
in Memphis had to be taken care of locally. No one, they felt, could possibly understand the 
power dynamics in play, and the delicacy of racial politics in Jim Crow Memphis better than 
Memphis’ own. To invite a foreign element into the mix in the form of Randolph, one that was 
unfamiliar with the precariousness of the position blacks had in Memphis, risked destroying all 
the effort put into shaping Memphis into at least a livable, if not equal or perfect place, for black 
Memphis. This was, they argued, a long march toward progress, not a short sprint, and the 
situation had to be handled with the utmost care to prevent the ground from falling out beneath 
them. 
 At some point, however, one has to wonder whether there was a disconnect between 
black leadership and the broader black community in Memphis in terms of how they perceived 
the Crump machine and the racial status quo of Memphis. The turnout for Randolph’s speech, 
numbering in the thousands, presents an image of a black population in Memphis not as solidly 
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“appreciative” of Crump’s patriarchy as many in Memphis’ black leadership community would 
have you believe. 
 While passing judgment from today on the actions and motivations of any of the 
historical actors involved in the Randolph affair, is naturally a somewhat dicey proposition, there 
are still things we can learn here simply from the nature of the conflict in and of itself. At this 
historical moment, the nature of racial politics in Memphis stood at a crossroads. For historians 
of race and civil rights, the schism created by the Randolph affair adds a layer of complexity to 
the process of mapping out the ideological geography of the black freedom struggle. Historians 
often ask questions such as “was the movement primarily a series of small and local affairs 
coming together to form something much larger?” Or “should the broad and national aspects of 
the movement be seen as the backbone supporting and gave strength to those local struggles?”  
Historians like Aldon Morris have argued that rather than being a series of disorganized or 
otherwise unconnected events, the modern civil rights movement was a highly systematic and 
organized effort that continually learned from and built off of previous black activist efforts. 
Alternatively, historians like John Dittmer have argued in favor of the idea that the local is of 
absolute importance. One has to consider it and all its specificities regarding race that it has to 
offer before one can understand any aspect of Civil Rights. 
 Perhaps, all of these ideas are true. However it might also be true that during the 
transitional phases from Jim Crow to Civil Rights, where ideas about the nature of racial politics 
and racial activism were influenced by ideas of both so-called “era,” maybe this process was 
more give and take or, maybe push and pull than we often think about as historians. It is difficult 
to say with certainty that anything was resolved at the end of the Randolph affair. Crump 
remained in power until his death a few years later, and the opposing sides of Memphis’ black 
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leadership remained as staunchly combative with each other as ever. The only certain thing was 
that Memphis had at long reached a decisive turning point in terms of the ideological geography 
that defined it as a “border” city for so long. While the unwritten rules of racial politics would 
remain in place for some time to come, from this point on, they would never again circumscribe 
black political progress as they had done throughout the Jim Crow Era. The bell had been rung, 
and it could not be unheard. Progress has been delayed, perhaps even more so than in cities with 
an overtly racist and violently regressive sense of racial politics. However, progress could not be 
stopped, and the stage was at this point set for the wars to come that would usher Memphis into a 
new era. 
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CONCLUSION: 
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH 
The effects of Jim Crow Era racial politics in Memphis have lingered in throughout the 
20th century and beyond in the city’s historical memory. This history has loomed large over and 
exerted pressure on nearly all of the major moments of racial tension and conflict that have since 
taken place. As such this dissertation has made the case that in order to understand the problems 
Memphis has faced up to the present day, one must first understand how deeply rooted the 
origins of these problems are. 
For example, even though E.H. Crump died in 1954, his influence on Memphis politics 
remained for decades to come. For nearly half a century at this point, there effectively was no 
Memphis city government without E.H. Crump. His iron-fisted style, racially polemic style of 
governing Memphis had proven to be overwhelmingly effective in terms of amassing and 
maintaining power, and the years after his death saw numerous political figures trying to position 
themselves as the proper successor to his machine. By the 1960s, the man who most closely 
approximated this goal was Mayor Henry Loeb. Governing Memphis for almost the entire 
decade, Loeb was at the forefront of the city during its most infamous moment in the national 
spotlight - the 1968 sanitation workers strike that saw the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. take place in Memphis.288  
During this time, Loeb who was doggedly determined to cement a place for himself in the 
annals of Memphis history, in the same way that Crump had done, by being unwaveringly tough 
when issues relating to race arose. Loeb saw himself as having something to prove in this regard. 
Thus when black sanitation workers went on strike to protest unfair treatment, poor wages, 
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discriminatory behavior on the part of management, Loeb was especially uncompromising and 
determined to stamp out any hint of racial trouble. This in turn created an environment that was 
overwhelmingly hostile toward the black strikers and any sympathizers. Memphis was a powder 
keg of racial animus, waiting for a spark to inflame all of the various racial-political tensions that 
had been building up for so long. Tragically, this spark came in the form of King’s assassination, 
which led to rioting and all-out racial chaos, forever scarring not only the city’s reputation, but 
its people as well.289 
 Another legacy of Memphis’s Jim Crow Era history was the fact that Memphis’s black 
activist and political community came out of the Crump Era entirely fractured. Prominent figures 
such as Robert R. Church Jr. and Dr. J.B. Martin had of course been run out of town during the 
height of the Crump machine’s time in power, and those prominent black figures that remained 
were not only getting older but also struggling to connect with a new generation that had little to 
no patience for the game of compromises and broken promises that these leaders played a part in 
throughout the latter years of the Crump era. 
 Thus, throughout the 50s, 60s and 70s, black Memphis was without any sort of organized 
and stable leadership to lobby for and guide it through moments of racial turmoil and strife. 
There were of course a number of figures that made names in this period - people such as 
Benjamin Hooks, Russell Sugarmon Jr., Rev. Roy Love and others. However, as important as 
these figures were and are, they were nevertheless limited in their ability to unite Memphis’s 
black population under a common political agenda in the way that past figures such as Church Jr. 
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had done. It was not until the 80s at best that Memphis’ black political structure began to truly 
rebuild itself and coalesce into a united force.290 
At the same time, Memphis found itself steadily moving towards becoming a majority 
black city. In the 70s, 80s and 90s, Memphis found itself widely affected by the issue of “white 
flight” where wealthy and affluent white citizens began to exit the city in droves in favor of 
starting their own communities out in the unincorporated suburbs of East Memphis. This mass 
exodus of wealth in turn led to a dichotomy beginning to be seen in many other cities throughout 
the country at the time where the city’s economy began to nosedive, leading to a very prominent 
schism in terms of racial and wealth disparities between jurisdictions under the Memphis city 
government and these new suburban areas forming their own county government. In Memphis, 
however, white flight had the added effect of further polarizing race relations within the city 
itself, as those white who for various reasons were unable to take part in this mass exodus began 
to suddenly find themselves in the minority in terms of the city’s racial demographics. This in 
turn bred a sort of hyper-polarization as Memphis’ white population fought to prevent this shift 
from becoming too pronounced and Memphis becoming a “black city.”291   
Both this hyper-polarization and the ultimate futility of this struggle were represented in 
the 1992 mayoral election mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, which as stated before, 
saw the African-American city schools superintendent W.W. Herenton defeat white mayoral 
incumbent Dick Hackett in an election that saw whites and blacks vote almost exclusively along 
racial lines, with black Memphis emerging victorious to elect the first African-American mayor 
in the city’s history. This moment perhaps more than any signaled the death knell of racial 
politics in Memphis existing in the same form as it largely had since the beginning of the 
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century. Memphis’ black leadership community suddenly found itself scoring more and more 
electoral victories over the next two decades and into the present. Having existed on the outside 
looking in in terms of the city’s governance for so long, Memphis’ black leadership had at long 
last gone mainstream. Yet, despite outward appearances of shrugging off its old history, racial 
tensions in Memphis did not begin to ease. In the new millennium, Memphis has continued to 
confront old ghosts from the Jim Crow Era of racial politics. In the past 10 years, Memphis has 
seen not only a renewed debate over the historical legacy of Tom Lee but also, more troubling, a 
resurgence of Klan activity and visibility.292   
In 2003, a very powerful windstorm swept through Memphis causing power outages and 
widespread destruction.  One of the casualties of this storm was the monument to Tom Lee that 
had stood for almost exactly 50 years.  In the aftermath of its destruction the now almost 
exclusively African-American city government debated whether to repair it or let it fall by the 
wayside as an aberrant anachronism of racial paternalism.  It was ultimately decided that no 
matter how difficult the past is to look at sometimes, it is nevertheless vital to not forget it.  Thus, 
the monument was repaired in its original form, however the mayor and city council decided it 
should no longer stand alone.  With its repair came the construction of a new monument to Lee 
which would was seen as better serving to encapsulate not only Lee’s legacy but also Memphis’ 
new racial dynamic. Thus a new monument was erected in the same park as the original - this 
time a bronze sculpture depicting a young, heroic-looking Tom Lee reaching over the side of his 
small boat to pull a drowning figure out of the water.  In this vision of Lee’s story, he is cast no 
longer as the “kinky-haired negro hero” with a heart of gold and an “aw shucks” persona, but as 
strong, courageous, and altogether powerful black Memphian, selflessly risking life and limb 
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simply because it was in his nature.  For lack of a better term, Lee is cast in this vision as a “race 
hero,” an almost mythic figure that contemporary black Memphis can point to as a pioneer and 
founding figure of Memphis’ current racial status quo of black empowerment. In this way, Lee’s 
legacy continues nearly a century later to be molded the perfect figure to have public identity 
shaped to fit the dominant racial of Memphis.293 
On the other end of the spectrum, serving as a grim reminder that the tortured past 
Memphis holds claim over is not so easily forgotten, Memphis has been the site of 2 major Klan 
rallies in recent years. In January 1998, the Klan announced that it would hold a March through 
downtown Memphis, ostensibly as a protest over the January Martin Luther King Jr. holiday. 
Memphis’s history with both the Klan and King being what they are, tensions flared and the 
event turned into a minor riot a crowd of nearly 2000 angry counter-protesters confronted the 
Klan members.  Police clad in full riot gear and on horseback fired canisters of tear gas into the 
crowd in an effort to break up the conflict, only managing to cause more chaos on the scene as 
windows were broken, stores were looted and fights broke out. At the end of the affair, 
approximately 20 black counter-protesters were arrested on various charges, and Memphis was 
left reeling from the entire ordeal. This would not be the last time the Klan would use Memphis 
as a staging ground to protest what they felt was their erasure from the city’s history, however.294 
In March 2013, the Klan threatened to hold “the largest Klan rally” in history in Memphis 
to protest the city council deciding to change the names of local parks that for a century had been 
named after Klan leaders Jefferson Davis, and Nathan Bedford Forrest. This time around, the 
event was decidedly less chaotic and significant as the Klan itself predicted. Only about 75 Klan 
members were at the rally. This time around, no violence broke out. No arrests were made. 
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Virtually the only audience the Klan had was the small group of local police assigned to the rally 
to keep peace and prevent a repeat of 1998. Instead, city leaders decided to hold a festival across 
town at the same time as the Klan rally, channeling the city’s frustration at continually being 
reminded of its past in the worst possible ways into an event that focused on the future, 
promoting peace, harmony and reconciliation.  
This dissertation opened by positing that Memphis was not a Southern city in the 
traditional sense. Throughout the Jim Crow Era, Memphis was a city of contradictions as far as 
the ideological geography race was concerned.  Racial progress and oppressed were woven 
together into a near-inscrutable knot in such as way as to confound easy interpretations of 
Memphis’ history. The seemingly progressive policies of cross-racial cooperation that bucked 
the trend for Southern cities in the early days of Jim Crow over time became the hidden chains 
that held Memphis back for decades from truly meaningful growth and progress. As the brief 
examinations recent Memphis history above show, Memphis has come a long way since the days 
of the Crump Machine, but throughout the 20th century, the battles waged against it and also 
within Memphis’ black leadership itself have continued to be felt.  There are many challenges 
remaining in present-day Memphis when it comes to the intersection of race and politics, 
however as this dissertation has hopefully demonstrated, the only way to chart a path forward 
towards a better tomorrow is to begin to reconcile the contradictions of the past.295  
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